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CHAPTER ONE 
GROUPS AS RULE CONSTITUTED ENTITIES 
We commonly talk of corporations, fraternal organizations, gov-
ernment agencies and other groups of persons as if they are themselves 
single, unified agents, distinct from the persons who comprise them. 
We speak, for example, of the goals of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, of decisions by the IBM Corporation, and of actions taken by HEW. 
Such ways of talking seem puzzling on close scrutiny, for we appear to 
be treating the group as if it is itself a person of sorts and not 
merely an aggregate of human persons who are all acting in roles. In 
short, our choice of language in talking about groups of persons makes 
it appear that the group is itself an agent with its own goals, capable 
of making decisions and acting. It is my intention to show here the 
conceptual underpinnings of this sort of talk as well as to show that 
it has implications for morality. More precisely, my intention is to 
show how it is that a group of persons can be a single moral agent, 
responsible for its own actions. 
In arguing for the moral agency of groups J will ao a number of 
things. Firstly, I shall examine more carefully the aistinction between 
an aggregate of persons and the group as a single entity. An exam-
1 
/ 
2 
ination of the kinds of rules that we use in constituting and under-
standing our world will enable us to see this distinction better. That 
much will be accomplished in the present chapter. ln Chapter Two I will 
examine a challenge to the intelligibility of the distinction between 
the aggregate and the group as a single entity. ln subsequent chapters 
I shall argue that groups are able to make decisions, have goals, and 
have moral obligations and rights that are attributable to the group 
itself and not necessarily to all the persons in the group. I shall 
then explore in more detail the logical relations between the group and 
the persons in the group, especially as these relate to the moral agency 
of the group and that of persons in it. In an appendix, I will explore 
the significance of the moral agency of groups in the context of two 
specific moral issues, the demand for black reparation and strict lia-
bility in tort. 
* * * * * 
Groups can be of various kinds. Groups are sometimes simply 
aggregates of persons. In such cases, the propositions that we use to 
describe the actions of groups can be replaced by sets of propositions 
about the actions of individual persons in the group. Such a replace-
ment can be regarded as successful when the new set of propositions 
about persons can function in all contexts in exactLy the same way as 
the proposition it replaces functioned. When such a group action can 
be adequately described (i.e. with nothing left out) as the actions of 
persons in the group, I shall refer to that group action as a "reducible" 
group action. And I shall refer to the sentences describing such 
3 
reducible group actions as "translatable" to sentences about action by 
persons. The unwieldiness or verbosity of such translations is not at 
issue here; instead, I am concerned only about the possibility of 
translation. Whenever a group action is reducible to the action of the 
members of the group, the sentence describing that group action will be 
translatable. We can express this nature and interrelation of reduc-
ibility and translatability as follows: 
Where "~ did "'!._" designates a group action (where ~ is a group of 
persons and "'!._ is an action) , that action Y is reducible if there 
are persons in A (a, b, c, ... ) such that "A did Y" can be trans-
lated to some finite set-of sentences:l 
"a did G; II 
"b did H; II 
"c did I;" etc. 
There are some group actions that are reducible; or, to put it 
another way, there are some group-action sentences that are translatable. 
Consider, for example, the following sentence: 
The entire Jones family refused their flu shots. 
The act of refusing is in this case reducible to the acts of 
refusing by individual members of the Jones family if it involves no 
act by the family as a unity but is instead the aggregate of the 
following acts by members of the family: 
Mr. Jones refused his flu shot. 
Mrs. Jones refused her flu shot. 
Susy Jones refused her flu shot. 
1The notion of a "person in a group" is one that will receive 
a technical definition once we have completed the examination of rules 
in the present chapter. (Seep. 18). For now, it must suffice to 
state that a person in a group is, for our purposes here, any person 
who can perform some act that, by itself or as part of some set of 
acts, counts as an act by that group. This, the reader should note, 
differs sharply from ordinary usage. 
4 
2 Billy Jones refused his flu shot, etc. 
Translations, though, are not always as simple as this one. In 
order to see this, consider now the following group-action sentence: 
The entire community built the barn. 
To parallel exactly the first example, this sentence would have 
to be translatable into some set of sentences about acts by persons 
such as the following: 
Jones built the barn; 
Brown built the barn; 
Smith built the barn; etc. 
Such a translation is, at best, opaque and perhaps incorrect. 
For it leaves us wondering how the barn can be built by all at once 
with each counting as the sole builder. There is, however, another 
possible translation: 
Jones laid the foundation; 
Brown put in the joists; 3 Smith shingled the roof; etc. 
This new translation makes it obvious that each person performed some 
different and distinguishable act or set of acts, the cumulative result 
2The adequacy of such a translation seems apparent, at least 
for contemporary North American society. But one can conceive of a 
society in which families (or clans, tribes, etc.) are so precisely 
structured that a person in authority (e.g. a patriarch) can make de-
cisions or take actions that count as decisions or actions by the 
family and not as his personal decision or action. 
The possibility of one thing "counting as" something else 
presupposes a substructure of various sorts of rules. The nature of 
these rules will be explored in the present chapter. 
3Again, the adequacy of the translation depends on the actual 
situation. If the community in question is so highly organized that 
it has a decision-procedure of its own, has assets that belong to no 
single person in the group decides to spend these assets on building 
materials and relegates specific barn-building tasks to Jones, Brown, 
Smith, etc., then the action would not be reducible to those of ind-
ividual persons. 
5 
of which is a completed barn. 4 
Thus, there are at least these two kinds of reducible group 
actions: those that involve individuals each performing the same ac~ 
tian individually and those that involve persons performing different 
actions with some cumulative result. There might be other forms of 
reducible group action as well, but my main concern in this work is 
whether there are any group-actions that are not reducible to aggregates 
of acts by persons and that must be attributed to the group itself. This 
irreducibility can be expressed thus: 
Where "A did Y" designates a group action (where A is a group of 
persons-and !-is an action), that action ! is irr;ducible if and 
only if "~ did Y" cannot be translated to some finite set of 
sentences: 
"a did G;" 
"b did H; II 
"c did I;" etc., 
where~,_£,_£, .•• , are persons in A. 
For the present, I offer one example of what I take to be an 
irreducible group action. Consider the following proposition: 
The Standard Novelty Company promised delivery of the widgets by 
the end of the year. 
In order to be reducible, this act (of promising) by the com-
pany would have to be merely the sum of acts by persons in the group 
that we call the "company". Certainly, persons must perform acts in 
order for the company to promise: the company salesman might have to 
sign a contract typed by a company secretary and perhaps notarized by a 
company attorney; a higher level executive might have to authorize the 
4 Some other examples of this sort of reducible group action 
might be expressed in the following propositions: 
The Italians encouraged the Renaissance. 
The freshmen filled the classroom. 
6 
contract, in accordance with prices decided upon by sever~l other offi-
cials, etc. Nevertheless, we do seem to recognize a difference between 
promises made by any or all of these individuals and a promise attri-
buted to the company itself. Though the company's promise may involve 
acts by persons in all the above named roles, it does not follow that 
the promise is reducible to those acts. In fact 1 we do ordinarily di.s-
tinguish between propositions of the following two sorts; 
I, Jones, who am employed by the Standard Novelty Company, personally 
promise delivery of the widgets. 
The Standard Novelty Company, through me, Jones, its authorized 
representative, promises delivery of the widgets. 
That there is a difference between the two propositions can be 
established through a form of Open Question Argument -- by showing that 
the truth of the first proposition leaves the truth of the other prop-
osition still indeterminate. 5 In the one case, Jones is personally 
promising. In the other, he does not give his personal promise but 
performs certain acts, that, because of his role in the company, count 
as the company's promise. We do ordinarily distinguish between a per-
son's actions and actions taken by some other agent with him as its 
representative. This is evident when we consider that it is the company 
that takes on the obligation to deliver the widgets when Jones acts as 
its representative in making a promise of delivery. T~e difference 
between Jones's personal promise and the company's promise made through 
Jones is made evident also by the possibility of the widget purchaser 
5This is formally similar to the Open Question argument 
by G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica, Chapter I, B, Section 13. 
explain it in more detail on pp. 23-24. 
proposed 
I 
---
7 
saying something like the following, and making sense in doing so: 
Jones, I know that your company has promised delivery of the widgets. 
But can I have your personal promise that they will be delivered? 
This would be a sensible statement only if we can distinguish 
between the company's promise and Jones's promise. It seems therefore, 
that a company is able to perform some act(s) that cannot be reduced to 
the acts of persons in the company. 
It might be objected that the legal device of corporate per-
sonality is what makes the distinction between the company and Jones an 
intelligible one and that the distinction is therefore only a legal 
fiction. In response, we should note that legally constituted persons 
are often treated as individuals even in contexts independent of the 
6 law. Granted, legal recognition may serve as a catalyst for societal 
recognition of a group as a single entity, but this is a causal re-
lation and says nothing about reducibility. Legal considerations, in 
fact, provide a clue to the analysis of the capability of groups to 
perform actions distinct from those of persons in the group. There is 
a similarity between the way legal agents are constituted under the law 
6
see especially Maitland's inconclusive but thought-provoking 
essay, "Moral Personality and Legal Personality" in Maitland: Selected 
Essays (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968). Mait-
land draws on a theory of legal personality that could be described in 
the words of W. Friedmann: 
The life of an association does not depend upon state recognition. 
The legal statute which bestows legal personality merely has de-
claratory significance, in so far as it declares the general con-
ditions of juristic personality to be applicable to a particular 
association. But it does not create the association, either 
socially or legally (Legal Theory, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967, pp. 236-237.) 
Friedmann cites such thinkers as Gierke, Savigny, and Ehrlichman as 
supporters of this view. 
8 
and the way in which agents are constituted in a wider social frame-
work. The similarity rests in the fact that they are both constituted 
by a system of rules. 
So far we have seen that some of what appear to be group-actions 
are in fact reducible to aggregates of actions by persons. But we have 
seen also that other group actions do not appear to be reducible. The 
second section of the present chapter will provide a further explanation 
of how the existence of a system of rules enables us to draw this dis-
tinction between reducible and irreducible group action. This same 
analysis of rules enables us to see in later chapters how it is that 
groups can have goals, make decisions, and have a number of other char-
acteristics that distinguish agents from other beings. 
* * * 
Although my intention in this section is to discuss those 
features of groups that enable us to say that they can act in an irre-
ducible way, I shall begin here with a discussion of rule-constituted 
activities in general. This general discussion will provide us with 
an understanding of the various types of rules that will eventually be 
shown to be relevant to my analysis. I will then pursue more narrowly 
the analysis of groups as rule-constituted realities. 
Rule-constituted activities are of various sorts. Important 
features of such activities are discussed by John Rawls in his well 
known essay "Two Concepts of Rules." Rawls calls such activities 
"practices" and defines them as 
... any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines 
offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which 
9 
7 gives the activity its structure. 
As examples he cites games, rituals, trials, and parliaments. Although 
only the last of these is a group of persons, the rules that constitute 
all of these will be examined here. 
In general the rules of an activity can be put into two dif-
ferent categories. Some rules dictate what acts ought to be performed 
by an agent involved in the practice. Rules of this sort are norms of 
conduct. Other rules express what counts as an act, event, or entity 
8 
with some significance within the practice. Rules of this second sort 
. . 1 9 are const1tut1ve ru es. I shall explain each type of rule more fully, 
although my ultimate concern is with rules of the second sort. 
Norms of conduct, rules that order or prescribe specific action 
in a given situation, are often expressed in the imperative form: 
(1) Do not cross the out-of-bounds marker. 
(2) Trump when you cannot follow suit. 
(3) Ask the chairman for recognition in order to address the 
group. 
(4) Do not attempt to cover your losses in a bear market. 
They may also be given in any number of prescriptive forms: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
You ought to keep your promises. 
A good physician keeps patients' records 
It is right to compensate the victims of 
confidential. 
l . 10 your neg 2gence. 
7 John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," Philosophical Review, 
LXIV (1955), p. 3. 
8For the sake of precision, it should be noted that it is only 
the formulation of a rule that "expresses" something. 
9 The term "constitutive rule" is introduced by John Searle in 
Speech Acts (Cambridge: The University Press, l970)r pp. 33-41. Searle 
deals with the difference between norms of conduct and constitutive 
rules, but he has named the former "regulative rules." 
10The various grammatical forms in which norms of conduct may be 
expressed does not concern us here, but we should be aware that gram-
matical form is not always a reliable criterion for their recognition. 
10 
Besides serving to recommend or order a course of action, norms 
f d t 1 t . . f h . 11 o con uc serve a so o Just1 y t at act1on. This justification is 
of an immediate nature; to justify playing a trump card I need only 
show the rule that says that one may or must play trump under conditions 
that presently obtain. There may be requests for further justification, 
but such requests involve no longer simple justifying my act but now 
justifying the rules by which I justify my act. Justifying my act by 
appealing to a rule is possible only because that practice to which the 
rule belongs is a practice that I have accepted. 
To someone unfamiliar with some rule-constituted activity, the 
set of norms of conduct by themselves do not suffice to enable him to 
participate in that activity. In activities involving the norms of 
conduct cited above as (1) , (2), and (3) the neophyte might need answers 
to some of the following questions: 
What is an out-of-bounds marker? What counts as crossing it? How 
do I determine which cards are trump? How do I go about playing 
trump? 
If I wish to speak at a meeting, should I raise my hand, send the 
chairperson a letter, or talk to him before the meeting? How am 
I recognized? 
Anyone who has learned a new game, ever wondered whom to tip and how 
much, that is, anyone who wishes to engage in a practice with which he 
is unfamiliar, has asked such questions. These questions are not 
simply about what to do but about certain things that must be under-
stood before the norms of conduct can be understood. Such questions are 
answered by appeal to a rule, though the rule is of a sort different 
11
on this characteristic of rules see David Ozar, "Social Rules 
and Patterns of Behavior," Philosophy Research Archives III (1977) 
p.ll88 as well as Chapter Four of H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961). ---
11 
from norms of conduct. Rules that specify what a chairperson is, what 
counts as asking for the floor, etc. are constitutive rules. The dif-
ference between constitutive rules and norms of conduct may be expressed 
by the following example: a norm of conduct might state that one ought 
to trump in a situation of a given sort. Constitutive rules, on the 
other hand, would state what counts as a trump card, what counts as 
playing trump and so forth. Thus a constitutive rule is about what is 
the case within some practice, while a norm of conduct is about what 
one ought to do in that practice. 
Searle explains the general structure of constitutive rules in 
this way: 
X counts as Yin context c. 12 
This general formulation covers all those cases in which some thing, 
activity, or phenomenon takes on a special significance within a prac-
tice. It covers the case in which the small paper with one red spot 
on it is the ace of trump, the case in which the person who holds the 
gavel is the chairman of the meeting, and the case in which a certain 
motion of the arm counts as seconding the proposal. It also shows how 
a simple movement X of the arm can count as a reality ~of another sort 
(directing an orchestra, voting aye, asking for the floor, waving good-
bye, submitting a bid, giving a blessing, saluting a superior officer, 
etc.), depending on the nature of the constitutive rules of the practice 
within which the arm movement occurs. 
Should there be some question as to how a simple arm movement 
12speech-Acts, p. 35. Alvin Goldman has proposed a similar 
explanation applied specifically to agency. See A Theory of Human 
Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 25-26. 
12 
can really be something else, one can explain the practice and justify 
his claim by citing the relevant constitutive rule: 
In our culture, when a person takes leave of another, he signifies 
his intentions and his emotions by raising his arm slightly and 
moving it laterally. This counts as a farewell. 
From the viewpoint of one who is involved in the activity, the con-
stitutive rules of the activity need no further justification; to be 
. l d . h . . f . f . 13 1nvo ve 1n t e pract1ce 1tsel 1s to accept the rules o 1t. 
I shall be particularly concerned here with rules having to do 
with agency. When I examine them more closely we will see how it is 
that groups are said to act. There are two kinds of constitutive rules 
having to do with performances that I shall focus on here. There are 
rules that express what shall count as a performance of a given sort 
and rules that express what shall count as the ability to perform a 
given sort of act. The former I shall call rules of act-specification. 
The following are examples: 
(1) Pounding the gavel counts as calling the meeting to order. 
(2) Offering a diamond ring to one's girlfriend counts as pro-
posing marriage, and accepting the ring counts as accepting 
the proposal. 
(3) Crossing one's heart counts as swearing to the truth of what 
one says. 
Besides rules of act-specification there are rules of com-
petence. A rule of competence is a constitutive rule that determines 
when an agent shall be counted as capable of performing some act spec-
ified by a rule of act-specification. In legal systems such rules of 
competence are often explicitly stated. There they specify what type 
13one could, of course, still demand justification of the ac-
tivity itself. This would be more likely to happen where the activity 
in question was one such as the punishment of criminals. 
13 
of agent under what set of circumstances will be counted as capable of 
performing some legally significant act. For example, Hart notes that 
... behind the power to make wills or contracts are rules relating 
to capacity or minimum personal qualification (such as ~~ing adult 
or sane) which those exercising the power must possess. 
Legal systems and organized sports and games provide common 
examples of codified, publicly accessible rules of competence. In foot-
ball, for example, only certain players are counted as capable to 
receive a forward pass. All others are incapable, regardless of what 
acts they perform. Thus, an ineligible receiver does not receive a. 
pass, even if he should manage to gain control of the ball before it 
touches the ground. On such an occasion the quarterback•s pass is 
counted as incomplete because, according to the rules of the game, the 
player who caught the ball was not competent to receive a pass. His 
act is a nullity in much the same way as, under the law, contracts and 
wills attempted by those who are not competent for such acts have no 
status and consequently are without legal effect. 
Although rules of competence are most obvious where there is 
a written list of rules and detailed procedures for deciding when an 
act is performed, they exist even where they are unexpressed, provided 
that there is a rule of act-specification. Where there exists a rule 
of act-specification, there will always be a rule of competence, be--
cause the rule of competence is logically prior. This rule may some--
14The Concept of Law, p. 28. The examples in this citation 
(wills_and contracts) are not an exhaustive list. Questions of juris-
diction, legislative power, power-of-attorney, legal guardianship all 
presume some (set of) constitutive rule(s) specifying what type of 
agent in what type of context shall be capable of performing the act 
in question. 
14 
times be so broad that any agent in context ~ shall be capable of !-
ing.15 At other times it may limit the capacity for !-ing to a few 
agents with some very special characteristics. In either case, the 
performance of an act entails the agent's capability of performing it, 
but not vice-versa. And within a rule constituted practice both the 
ability to act and the performance of the act are themselves rule-
constituted. 
The competence to perform some act must be distinguished from 
the performance of that act, for one may have a competence without 
acting on it. One cannot, however, do what he is not competent to do. 
Jones's capacity for !-ing (where Y is any act constituted by a rule 
of act-specification) must be distinguished from any actual performance 
of ! by Jones. Any performance of an act presumes a competence to 
perform that act. Thus, in the case where a performance is constituted 
by some rule of act-specification, we may legitimately expect some rule 
establishing competence to exist, though it might not be formally 
expressed. 16 
15context C could conceivably be something as wide as the gen-
eral context of the activity itself. For example, only players of 
chess games have the capacity to win chess games. There is always at 
least such a minimal rule of competence. But sometimes it takes more 
than participation in some activity to become competent to perform some 
of the actions associated with that activity. Most football players 
can at least sometimes catch a ball thrown to them, but not all players 
in all circumstances, have the capacity to receive a forward pass. 
16ozar discusses the issue of when a rule can correctly be said 
to exist in his "Social Rules and Patterns of Behavior." He agrees with 
Hart (The Concept of Law, p. 55) that a rule exists for some population 
where that population accepts and uses the rule. However, there often 
remains (as Ozar notes) an ambiguity in determining when some way of 
acting is to be considered a pattern of acceptance and use of the rule 
on the part of the population. Thus, the difficulty in determining 
15 
So far this discussion of constitutive rules has been limited 
to those that have to do with the agency of a single human person in 
rule-constituted situations. We have seen how a person can perform an 
act of one sort that counts as an act of another sort by that same per-
son, provided that the rules of the relevant practice so specify and 
provided that the rules of the practice make him competent to perform 
the act of the second sort. But rules of act-specification and rules 
of competence can also serve to establish what shall count as an act 
by a group as well as to establish the capacity or competence of the 
group to perform that act. I shall examine this in more detail pre-
sently. But the reader is forewarned that the ability of a group to 
do something does not itself establish either that such doings are 
irreducible or that they are a genuine exercise of agency by the group 
itself. Later in the present chapter I shall examine in more detail 
h . f . d "b"l" 17 t e ~ssue o ~rre uc~ ~ ~ty. In order to argue that a group is an 
agent, we will need to see whether a group can have the various char-
acteristics that agents have, such as the ability to have goals, to 
make decisions, and so forth. Chapters Three, Four and Five will be 
when a rule exists is not a function of the peculiar nature of rules, 
but is instead part of the broader problem of the nature of a pattern 
of behavior, and especially of determining when a given pattern exists. 
-- For present purposes, the population in which such a pattern 
of behavior must exist must at least be larger than the group of per-
sons whose acts count as a performance by the group. For, we are con-
cerned not only with how persons in a group see themselves, but also 
with how other persons outside the group (including those, who, for 
example, have a contractual relation with the group) see the group. 
Thus, we are concerned chiefly with those cases where there is a pattern 
of acceptance in the general population. How widespread this acceptance 
must be is certainly imPortant, but I do not discuss it here. 
17 
See pp. 21-22. 
16 
devoted to such an examination. In the meantime, I shall employ the 
term "performance" to refer to those activities that, if irreducible, 
would be exercises of agency by a group provided that the group pas~ 
. . . . 18 
sesses the essentlal agentlal characterlStlcs. 
Rules of act~specification and rules of competence are important 
in the analysis of how something can be a performance by a group. In 
this respect, of course, it would not be sufficient merely to show that 
constitutive rules can establish that one thing that a group does can 
count as something else that that same group does. This would surelx 
beg the fundamental question. What we are most interested in finding 
out is how it is that groups are said to act in the fi.rst place. 
Ln our everyday lives we do often (and correctly} count some~ 
thing that one being does as something that another does. Consider, for 
example, the note written by Mrs. Belvedere's social secretary: 
Mrs. Belvedere accepts with pleasure your invitation to dinner on 
the 30th at 7:00 p.m. 
This counts, at least in certain social circles, as Mrs. Belvedere's 
responding to and accepting the invitation, though it is acco~plished 
in virtue of her social secretary's act and not through any act observ~ 
ably performed by Mrs. Belvedere herself. This is so because, in Mrs. 
Belvedere's social circle, there exists a constitutive rule establishing 
what shall count as responding to and accepting an invi.tation. In this 
case the rule of act~specification does not establish that one act by 
18As I use the term ''performance" it is not intended to haye the 
same technical meaning as that given to the notion of a ''performance'' b:Y 
J. L. Austin in How to Do Things with Words. 
17 
Mrs. Belvedere shall count as another act by her (as the halfback's 
catching the b~ll counts as his receiving a pass), but that an act by a 
person who bears a specified relation to her (i.e., an act by her social 
secretary) shall count as an act by her. This is because, in general, 
a performance by one being a can count as a performance by some other 
being b where there exists a rule of act-specification to that effect. 
This can provide some further clarification of the example of 
Jones, who is an authorized representative of the Standard Novelty Com-
pany.19 We saw that Jones can per~orm some acts that count as a promise 
of delivery by the Standard Novelty Company but not necessarj_ly as 
Jones's personal promise of delivery. We can see now that it is the 
practice {or set of practices) of having company representatives that 
explains this, and that rules of act-specification define this practice: 
Jones's act counts as a promise by his company because there exists a 
constitutive rule to the effect that acts by persons in Jones 1 s position 
count as performances of a certain sort by their company and because 
the group itself satisfies the conditions of capacity expressed in the 
rules of competence. 
We have now seen what kind of concepts would justify a claim 
that some group ~ performed act ~· Besides the issue of whether this 
is a genuine exercise of agency by the group {an issue to which I shall 
return in later chapters) there are several other issues that will be 
dealt with in the present chapter. Firstly, I will analyze more care-
fully the relation established between a group and persons in that group 
19 See above, pp. 6-7. 
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when some act(s) ~by persons count(s) as a performance by the group. 
Our findings here will become especially important in Chapter Five, 
where, having already argued that the agency of groups is moral agency, 
I shall discuss the moral responsibility of persons for acts by groups. 
We shall see presently that the relation of the acts of persons to per-
formances by their groups in the situation where the former counts as 
the latter, is actually a threefold relation. We shall see here that 
there is a logical character to the relation, an existential dependence, 
and a sort of quasi-identity that makes the group's performance both 
identifiable with and yet distinct from the acts by persons that count 
as the group's performance, In examining the distinctness of the acts 
by persons from the group's performance, we shall have to return to 
the Open Question argument alluded to earlier in the present chapter, and 
20 I shall here explain it more fully. 
Whenever a group performs, it is necessarily true that persons 
in the group act. I wish now to explain this claim, a claim that I 
shall henceforth phrase as "The group performs in virtue of acts by 
persons." The phrase "in virtue of" is intended here to express the 
multi-faceted relationship of performances by groups to acts by persons 
in those groups. I shall use the phrase "persons in a/the group" to 
refer to those persons whose acts count as or are part of the set of acts 
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that count as some performance by the. group itself. These two pieces 
20 See above, p,6, 
21 As I use the terms here "persons in groups" are different from 
"persons having roles in groups." It is at least conceivable that a 
person could have a role in some group without any of his acts counting 
as a performance by the group itself. Admittedly, this goes against 
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of terminology are defined stipulatively here. 
first under consideration shall be the claim that there is a 
logical relation between acts by persons and performances by groups. 
Because the groups under consideration in the present work are 9roups 
of persons, when such groups perform they do so only by the agency of 
persons in them. The very things that are counted as performances of 
the group, under constitutive rules of the sort discussed earlier, are 
themselves actions by persons. This is found to be true through anal-
ysis of what it is for a group to perform. We may find sometimes that 
a performance of one sort by a group counts, in some context as a per-
formance of another sort~ by that same group. For example, a given 
university's invitation to a scholar to present the commencement address 
may, in certain contexts, count as the university's offering of an 
honorary degree to that scholar. In such cases, it might appear that 
we have found a counter"""instance to the cla.im that there is a logical, 
necessary relation between performance by a group and actions by persons 
in the group, for we find no mention of persons in the explanation of 
what counts as the group 1 s offer of an honorary degree. However, if we 
pursue the matter further, we must ask also what counts as the univ-
ersity's invitation to present a commencement address. The question 
may be pushed back several more levels, but ultimately we will arrive 
at acts by persons counting as something that will ultimately count as 
a performance by the university itself. Again, the explanation of 
this is that, ultimately, such groups are, as a. matter of logical nec-
essity, composed of persons. 
popular usage. 
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In addition to the logical relation, there is also an existen-
ti~l relation between a performance by ~ group and acts by persons 
that count as that performance. The phr~se "in virtue of" is meant to 
convey this as well. A group performs only through the force of act-
ivity of persons; their activity counts, in the rule-constituted con-
text, as a performance by the group. Thus, lacking the activity of 
persons, a group is inactive. The relation of the group to the persons 
in it is not primarily that of one being alongside other agents who 
happen to have roles in it. Although there are many groups that can do 
things to persons in them, the primary relationship is that expressed 
by the type of constitutive rule we have been examining. 22 A group 
performs through or in virtue of acts by persons. 
But notice that the relationship between performances by groups 
and acts by persons in groups is not itself a cause-effect rel~tionship. 
The "in virtue of" relationship is one that exists where there is a 
constitutive rule that 11~-ing counts as ~-ing." Such a constitutive 
rule does not express a causal relation. Instead, it states that, pre-
suming the rule's acceptance and the appropriate context, ~ is consi.dered 
identical with Y. President Carter's inaction on the bill is not the 
cause of his pocket veto of the bill; his omission is itself the act 
of vetoing. Similarly, the acts by members of the AAUP are not the 
cause of the AAUP's censure ~; given the appropriate constitutive rule, 
22A special case would be that of a member of a club censured 
or honored by the club. Even this case, though, would involve an act 
by the club. performed in virtue of acts by members of the club. The 
peculiarity of this case is due to the two-fold positipn of the person 
being honored or censured: he can be both one of the .agents whose acts 
count as acts by the club as well as the object of some act by the club. 
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they are the AAUP' s cens.ure. This indicates that instead of establishing 
a causal relation, the constitutive rule whereby ! counts as ~ estab-
lishes a sort of identity between! and Y. It is, however, an identity 
of a rather weak sort, for it holds only when and where the appropriate 
constitutive rule exists. This identity is a rule-constituted identity; 
! and ~ are identical only where the applicable constitutive rule exists 
and the conditions stated in the rule satisfied. 
It is conceivable, where the existence of the rule is not given, 
that a Carter inaction on some bill would not be a veto, and similarly 
so for the AAUP censure, mutatis mutandis. Where the rule does exist, 
though, there is a way in which! and~ are identical, and this identity 
obtains wherever an institution acts in virtue of acts by persons in 
the institution. There is therefore also a sense in which some per-
formance ~ by a group and the acts X that count as that performance are 
not identical. It is conceivable that the appropriate constitutive rule 
not exist and thus that X not be identical withY. 
The non-identity of X with Y can be supported in a second way: 
~ is not reducible to (or identical with) X because the practical sig-
nificance of Y differs from that of X. By the "practical significance" 
of~, I mean that set of expectations, rights, obligations, etc. that 
become reasonable or justified only on the existence of Y. Within some 
rule-constituted activity, the existence of~ legitimizes various expect-
ations, justifies various claims, etc. that would not be justified or 
legitimized solely by the existence of X. 
Let us consider an example. Suppose I come into a room filled 
with persons who are rais.ing their arms. This may be simply a room full 
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of people raising their arms; but, where the appropriate constitutive 
rule exists, I may have walked in on the ~djournment o~ the legislature, 
If there exists a constitutive rule to this effect, then ~ whole set of 
expectations, claims, and future courses of action become re~sonable: 
(1) If I am a reporter, I may now feel free to approach Senator 
Bl~dderhorn to get his assessment of the recently completed legis-
lative session. 
(2) If I am a lobbyist, I m~y rush to the phone to report to my 
boss that the widget-depletion allowance is intact for another year. 
(3) If I am Senator Bladderhorn, I may heave a sigh of relie~ ~t 
the finish of a rather gruelling session and approach the lobbyist 
for the money promi.sed me. 
(4) If I am a stock speculator, armed with the knowledge that the 
widget tax benefits are intact, I may rush to buy 100 shares o~ 
common stock in the Standard Novelty Company, a major producer of 
widgets. 
Such expectations, acts, claims, etc. can receive a justification only 
if what went on was the adjournment of the legislature. If the event 
had been simply the raising of 100 arms, all the above would be quite 
silly and inappropriate. This in itself is sufficient reason for 
claiming that ! is not identical with X. 
The example of the legisl~tive adjournment in the above p~ragraph 
serves well to illustrate the peculi~r relation between X and !r where 
the former counts as the latter. However, that particul~r example 
does not illustrate well the importance of this "identity that is not 
an identity'' for the problem of group performances. In fact the prop-
osition that Y is not identical to X is what is needed to gener~te the 
Open Question Argument alluded to earlier in this chapter. 
The reader will recall that the Open Question argument as pro-
posed there was intended to justify the claim that ~ performance by a 
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group is not reducible to some acts by persons in the group even when 
the latter count as the former. If the existence or occurrence of acts 
x by persons does not itself establish the existence of performance ~ 
by the group, then we can say that given the existence of ~' the exis-
f . . 23 tence o Y rema1ns an open quest1on. If given the existence of ~' the 
existence of ~ remains an open question, it follows that ! is not reduc-
ible to X. For if Y is actually ~ and nothing but ~, the existence of 
X will be sufficient to establish the existence of Y. 
Now, the example of the legislature showed that there is a dif-
ference between a large number of hands raised in a room and the ad-
journment of the legislature. This was, in the end, to establish that 
the practical significance of Y differed from that of X, which was to 
show that the existence of a room full of raised hands left the question 
of whether the legislature had adjourned an open question. It was only 
with the additional consideration of the sppropriate constitutive rule 
2 3Goldman offers a similar objection to the identity thesis in 
A Theory of Human Action, when he claims that two identical acts must 
have all the same properties (pp. 2-6). My argument here cites an 
example where ~and! do not have all the same properties. 
A more modest claim, that Y is explicable in terms of X, en-
counters difficulties similar to those in the identity thesis.- According 
to Quine in Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960) explicability 
is elimination of the troublesome features of an expression by replace-
ment with less troublesome forms of expression (p. 260). But this pro-
cedure demands that we first decide what needs to be replaced, and this 
decision is "dictated by our interests and purposes" (p. 259). Thus 
certain irreducible differences between X and Y could be dismissed as 
uninteresting. But the claims and expectations in the examples I describe 
above cannot be dismissed, because they are precisely the ones that the 
agents in the example consider important to their interests and purposes. 
And these claims and expectations cannot be explained without reference 
to the relevant constitutive rules. 
On the problem of reducibility the reader might wish to consult 
J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analyses (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), 
especially Chapter Ten. 
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that we could determine that an adjournment had actually occurred. 
Similarly, Jones's promise of delivery differs from that of his 
company even though Jones's promise could, given the appropriate rules, 
count as the company's promise. Given that Jones has uttered a promise, 
it is still an open question whether his company has promised. For the 
practical significance of the company's promise differs from that of 
Jones's promise. Where the company promises delivery, the promissee has 
the right to expect delivery, even if Jones is no longer employed by 
the company. This might not be true if we had only Jones's promise. 
Thus, the promise of delivery by the company is not reducible to Jones's 
promise, because the two differ in practical significance. The con-
nection between the two that I have called "counting as" exists only 
where the appropriate constitutive rule exists. 
In summary, although~ can count as Y it does not follow that 
X and Y have the same practical significance. It remains an open ques-
tion because X and ! may differ in their practical significance and 
thus the latter is not reducible to the former. By showing simply that 
Jones has promised we have not shown that his company has promised 
delivery. We must, therefore, regard as a mistake the attempt to reduce 
all group performances Y to the acts ~ by persons in virtue of which 
they exist. 
* * * 
In Chapter One I have examined our practice of regarding groups 
as single entities in the performance of actions. The key to the anal-
ysis rests in the rules that constitute such practices. Rules of com-
petence enable some groups (but not all) to engage in performances of 
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certain sorts. Such constitutive rules establish a relation between 
acts by persons and group performances, so that the former count as the 
latter. This relation, we have seen, has three important features. 
Firstly, it is a logical truth that when a group performs, persons in 
that group act. Secondly, a group performs in fact only through or by 
the force (or power) of the activity of personsJ so that a group without 
persons acting is an inactive group. Thirdly, there is a sort of identity 
of the performance of a group with the acts by persons in virtue of which 
it performs. But this identity is not absolute, so that the performance 
by the group is not reducible to the acts by persons in virtue of which 
it performs. 
This analysis accords with the fact that we do, in ordinary 
parlance, distinguish between a group and the persons in the group and 
do attribute performances to the group that we would not attribute to 
those persons. The analysis is still incomplete, though, for we speak 
sometimes of groups as having goals, making decisions and having moral 
obligations and rights of their own. Subsequent chapters are devoted to 
the completion of that analysis. But before we look at these matters, 
a more basic challenge to my analysis needs to be examined, one which 
claims that groups cannot, for logical reasons, be looked on as agents. 
I shall call this view "ontological individualism" and examine it in 
Chapter Two. 
CHAPTER TWO 
SOME OBJECTIONS: THE INDIVIDUALIST ONTOLOGY 
In Chapter One I argued for the irreducibility of at least some 
sorts of performances by groups, where those groups are constituted 
according to certain kinds of rules. Eventually, I shall argue that the 
same sorts of rules establish for groups certain other irreducible char-
acteristics that lead ultimately to the conclusion that a group of per-
sons can be a single moral agent. Thus, it is important to my thesis 
that the constitutive rules of which I speak actually establish some 
irreducible objectively existing activities and characteristics. For 
that reason the present chapter is an examination of major objections 
to my claim that such rules can establish such things as group per-
formances that are not reducible to the actions of persons in groups. 
First, I shall discuss a general rejection of the reality of rule-
constituted performances. After that I shall examine a more carefully 
developed ontology (the individualist ontology), one that systematically 
rejects the notion of an irreducible group performance. Both the general 
rejection and the individualist ontology will be shown to be inadequate. 
Even while acknowledging the existence of a constitutive rule 
that X counts as~' it might still be tempting to state that, when you 
get right down to basics, "Y is really nothing more than X."1 Thus, 
1For example, F.A. Hayek claims in The Counter-Revolution of 
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one might wish to claim that the chess player is "not really castling 
his king" but is instead "really moving a piece of carved wood with his 
arm." Or, to use an example more suited to the present discussion, one 
might claim that the AAUP's censure is really nothing but the unfa-
vorable attitude toward and desire for sanctions against some school 
by a number of persons prominent in the AAUP. The criticism, put very 
generally, is that there is something "less real" about a group con-
stituted according to rules and the performances of that group than 
about the persons in that group and their actions. 2 
We have already seen evidence against this criticism: rule-
constituted performances are different from the actions that count as 
those performances. In developing the Open Question Argument of Chapter 
One, we noticed that a whole range of expectations, claims, actions, 
etc. become justified only when we acknowledge the objective status or 
reality of the rule constituted performance. Unless one is willing to 
admit that there is no real difference between a roomful of raised hands 
Science (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952) that institutions are "abstractions" 
(pp. 69-70). Similarly, A.M. Maciver claims that institutions are "gen-
eralizations". See especially his "Levels of Explanation in History" in 
Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, edited by May Brodbeck 
(New York~Macmillan and Company, 1970). These two claims have in 
common that they reduce groups as such to an objective component (an 
aggregate of individual persons) and a subjective component (some sub-
jective operation of the mind by which we, for our own purposes, unify 
them). By reducing the principle of unity to some subjective operation, 
both conclude that what is really existent is the aggregate of individuals. 
2 One possible foundation for such a criticism would be the 
reduction of rules to mere patterns of behavior. A thorough discussion 
of that very important criticism would take us far afield. For a brief 
discussion see Chapter Three. 1·. 
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and a vote to adjourn the legislature, it seems that he is compelled to 
acknowledge that there is a real difference between rule-constituted 
performances and the actions by individuals that count as those per-
formances. 
It may be that the criticism under examination draws upon our 
ability to conceive of a world in which some specified constitutive 
rules do not exist. Because we can conceive of a world without a game 
of chess, we can conceive of a world in which Boris would not be really 
castling his king but would instead be moving that piece of carved 
wood to the black square. That is, however, beside the point; for, 
what matters is whether the world that we presently live in is a world 
in which such rules exist. 3 In fact, there is such a game as chess. 
It is therefore incorrect to state that, when Boris moves that piece of 
carved wood, he is not really castling his king. 
Rule-constituted entities such as groups of persons and their 
performances are no less real than chess games, provided that we live 
in a world in which the appropriate constitutive rules exist. There 
3
we do often use a special vocabulary to distinguish a being or 
event that exists only because of some constitutive rule from a similar 
being or event that is not rule-constituted. Witness the various names 
in board games and sporting events given to pieces of equipment and 
actions. Similarly, in legal contexts we distinguish an event of legal 
significance from a similar one that has no standing within the law: we 
distinguish contracting, for example, from merely stating that one will 
do something. Moralists also employ special terms to distinguish those 
events having significance within moral contexts: we often distinguish 
between intercourse and fornication, acquiring a thing and stealing 
goods, having and owning, etc. Such special vocabulary often serves as 
an implicit reference to an underlying system of rules. 
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can be such a world, and it seems to be the case that such a world exists 
now: the AAUP censures colleges and universities; the Teamsters Union 
endorses candidates; my bank lends money; RCA guarantees its picture 
tubes for two years, and so on. 
If our ontology and epistemology cannot account for these rule-
constituted beings and events in the world, then our epistemology and 
ontology rather than our world must be changed. We cannot revise reality 
in order to render adequate our theories about reality; nor can we 
revise and alter what we know in order to suit the limits of some theory 
about what we can know. We have seen, both in the case of the adjourn-
ment of the legislature and in the case of a chess game, that a socially 
constituted entity or event is in fact different from the realities in 
virtue of which it exists, but that it is nevertheless real. 
It may be that the objector, in rejecting the reality of groups 
in favor of the reality of persons who comprise groups, is not so con-
cerned with the rule-structure as he is with the origin of groups. Let 
us now consider one facet of a typical claim about reducibility: 
Every complex social situation, institution, or event is the result 
of a particular configuration of individuals, their dispositions, 
situations, beliefs, and physical resources and environment. 4 
The statement was made by J.W.N. Watkins in a discussion of the meth-
odology of the social sciences. Watkins states further that this is 
evidence for his own belief that groups and their performances are 
4J.W.N. Watkins, "Methodological Individualism and Social 
Tendencies," in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. 
by Brodbeck, pp. 270-271. The emphasis is mine. 
See also a similar statement by Maciver: "History is nothing but 
the resultant of all the acts of millions of individuals •..• " ("Levels 
of Explanation in History," p. 306). Again the emphasis is mine. 
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. 5 
reducible to persons and their behavlor. To be precise, Watkins does 
not claim that the sta.tus of groups as results ''entails" reducibility 
but holds instead that it nevertheless "supports" it. He does not ma.ke 
clear in what this support consists. We shall see that, in fact, this 
is not evidence for his position and m~ well involve a genetic fallacy. 
If all Watkins means to say here is that groups are groups of 
individuals and that, when groups act, persons are acting, then he is 
not really marshalling evidence for his reducibility claim. We have 
seen already that such a proposition is consistent with the view that 
groups are not reducible to the persons in them. 
If what Watkins is alluding to is a cause-effect relationship 
between the behavior of persons and the existence and activity of groups, 
then it certainly does not serve as evidence for the reducibility claim. 
One may hold to the view that groups are created by persons without 
thereby being committed to the view that groups are reducible to the 
persons who create them. For the former is a claim about how groups 
come into existence and not directly about what groups are. Questions 
of how groups come into existence or of what causes them to act as they 
do are distinct from the question of what a group is. The failure to 
respect this distinction would involve a genetic fallacy, if one were to 
infer directly from a proposition about the origin of a group a prop-
6 
osition about its nature. The ambiguity of Watkins's use of the term 
5J.W.N. Watkins, "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation" in 
Readings in the. Philosophy of Science, ed. by H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck 
(New York: Appleton, Century, and Crofts, 1953}, pp. 729-730. 
6Leon Goldstein discusses this logical mistake in "The Inade-
quacy of the Principle of Methodological Individualism," Journal of 
Philosophy, LIII (1956). 
31 
"support" saves him from the accusation that he commits such a fallacy, 
but it also leaves one uncertain about what he means to say. 
The statement by Watkins quoted above may in fact be the basis 
for some sound methodological advice to the social scientist. He may 
wish merely to be saying that the social scientist ought always to 
trace groups to their causes. This might be sound advice, but it is 
advice about methodology and is not itself a statement about the on-
tology of groups. In fact such methodological advice is completely 
consistent with the proposition that groups are not reducible to the 
persons in them. From the kinds of causes that Watkins lists (indi-
viduals, their beliefs, dispositions, etc.) there could conceivably 
emerge a new sort of reality that is not reducible to or totally de-
7 
scribable with the terms that can be used to describe its causes. In 
developing the Open Question Argument, I showed that this is so. What 
the description of the aggregate of persons lacks is the rule component, 
which is what establishes a difference in the practical significance of 
the group performance. A group may emerge through the planning, desires, 
beliefs, etc. of a number of persons. But, having emerged, it is what 
it is, regardless of the manner of its origin or of the motives of its 
7This is the doctrine of descriptive emergence, which is the 
view that there are properties not definable in terms of their causes. 
It must be distinguished from explanatory emergence, the view that the 
laws by which the behavior of social entities can be predicted are un-
like the laws of the behavior of persons. On descriptive emergence see 
M. Brodbeck's "Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction" 
in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, especially p. 284 
as well as Alfred Kuhn, The Logic of Social Systems (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1974), especially Chapter One. On explanatory emergence, 
see Richard Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 71. 
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creators. It seems, then, that these two objections, that groups are 
less real than the persons who comprise them and that groups are re-
ducible to persons because they result from the behavior of persons, do 
not stand up on close examination. But perhaps there is some more force-
ful objection. To see whether there is, let us examine a more carefully 
developed individualist ontology, one espoused by Watkins as well as 
others. 
Much of the resistance to the claim that there are irreducible 
group performances is grounded in a wish to preserve what is regarded 
as a fundamental ontological insight into the primacy of persons over 
entities made up of persons. Decision-making, having goals, acting 
voluntarily, etc. are all characteristics that seem to belong, if not 
uniquely, at least paradigmatically to individual human persons and 
might appear attributable to groups only as a convenient collective way 
of speaking. One doctrine regarding the methodology of the social 
sciences, known as methodological individualism, has been built on this 
ontological insight. We need here to be concerned primarily with the 
ontology that is used to back up the methodological position, and my 
remarks concerning methodology should be considered significant only as 
they bear on the ontology. 
The relevant features of the ontology under discussion, i.e. the 
individualist ontology, can be expressed in the following three prin-
ciples: every agent is an individual; an agent must be able to perform 
some act that is not simply the aggregate of acts by its parts or mem-
bers; and no agent can be composed of other agents. I shall give an 
overview of the ontology that employs these three principles and then 
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examine each of the principles in a bit more detail. Than I shall argue 
that the first two principles, properly understood, do nothing to estab-
lish the proposition that groups and their performances are reducible 
to the persons in them and their actions. I shall argue that the third 
principle is incorrect. 
The methodological doctrine of the individualist is that all 
concepts applied to groups can and should be explained by means of con-
cepts applied to persons and their behavior. On this view, then, the 
most adequate and basic sociological explanation is a psychological 
8 
one. Thus, when a scientist offers an explanation of some group and 
its behavior, his explanation ought to be given by means of concepts 
applicable to persons individually. His failure to do so would be con-
sidered an incomplete job of scientific explanation, due to either the 
ignorance of the scientist himself or the impracticality and unwield-
iness of a detailed explanation, but not due to any logical barrier 
preventing such a reduction. 9 
The methodological individualist position is (importantly) a 
methodological claim. The question that it proposes to answer is: how 
ought the social scientist to proceed in his examinations? Insofar as 
this is a strictly methodological issue, it is of little concern to us 
8An extended analysis of the claim that sociology is reducible 
to psychology can be found in Laird Addis, The 
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975). 
Five. Mancur Olson maintains a similar thesis 
of economics in The Logic of Collective Action 
University Press, 1965) . 
Logic of Society (Minne-
See especially Chapter 
about the reducibility 
(Cambridge: Harvard 
9Methodological individualism can be set in distinction to 
theories that hold that at least some concepts applied to groups are sui 
generis. One group of such alternative theories is called "holism." 
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here. Instead, we must turn our attention to the ontology that has some-
times been proffered in justification of the individualist methodology.lO 
Unfortunately, the ontology does not receive a systematic treatment by 
any of its best known proponents, Hayek, Maciver, and Watkins. There-
fore I shall have to do some interpolating in order to set out the basic 
principles of this individualist ontology and to explain how they figure 
in claims about the impossibility of group performances. 
The ontology behind the methodology claims that persons and 
their behavior and dispositions are real and that explanations must be 
about these in order to be about what is real. To fail to analyze a 
group and its doings into its component persons and their doings is to 
do an incomplete job of explanation. Maciver claims that 
The ultimate stuff of history is the countless individual doings of 
individual human beings through the ages ... 11 
In a similar vein, Watkins (whose views we have already examined 
in part) claims that 
The ontological basis of methodological individualism is the [war-
rqnted] assumption that society is not some unimagined sort of 
organism, but really consists only of people who behave fairly 
intelligibly and who influence ~ach other directly and mediately 
in fairly comprehensible ways. 1 
What is the status of groups under such an individualist ontol-
ogy? Hayek regards the social entity as a useful mental construct that 
10r do not wish to claim here that this ontology is the only 
one that would justify the individualist methodology or even that its 
justification must be in an ontology of some sort. My remarks here 
should not be taken as an argument against individualism as a scientific 
methodology. 
llA.M. Maciver, "Levels of Explanation in History," p. 304. 
12J.W.N. Watkins, "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation," 
p. 732. 
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enables us to more conveniently interpret individual behavior. To at-
tribute any extra-mental existence to it, though, is to engage in a 
f 11 f . 1 d 13 a acy o m1sp ace concreteness. Maciver regards referring to a 
social entity as merely a linguistically convenient way of referring 
· a· ·a 1 14 to 1n 1v1 ua s. Just as "I have some books" is no more than a way 
of saying that "I have the Republic and the Critique of J>ure Reason," 
so also "The 4-H Club of Dogneck, Montana refused to participate in the 
war protest" can be translated into statements about the behavior of 
the individuals who are members of the club. 
In all three thinkers, then, the basic argument being offered 
is that, because persons are real and because groups are nothing more 
than the persons who comprise them, all sentences about groups must be 
translatable to sentences about persons in groups. Obviously, since 
my purpose in this study is to show how groups can be described cor-
rectly as moral agents in ways not reducible to the moral agency of 
persons in groups, it is important to explore this ontology more care-
fully. As mentioned above, there seem to be three basic principles 
concerning agency that underlie this position. 
One of these principles may be expressed as follows: what 
is not an individual is not an agent. The same principle may also be 
expressed as: every agent is an individual. "Individual" should here 
be taken to mean a being that exists extra-mentally and that i.s a single, 
unified being. Thus, mere collections and aggregates are not individuals; 
13F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, p. 54. 
14
"Levels of Explanation in History," p. 308. 
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nor are laws, ideas, etc. Granted, the term "individual" is often used 
in other ways, but I will here use the same meaning employed by these 
philosophers when they call themselves "individualists." 
That the three thinkers under consideration here accept this 
principle in their ontology is made evident in two ways. First, the 
principle is instantiated in their claim that the human being is an indi-
vidual. All three thinkers regard human beings as more than the sum of 
their parts. Persons as beings capable of acting in their world (i.e., 
as agents) are not reducible to their parts and the behavior of those 
parts; persons are the basic unit of social explanation. Human persons 
(and not, for example, their molecular components) perform the acts that 
are fundamental to the explanation of social events. 
Secondly, the individualists, in rejecting the possibility of 
group agency, do so by claiming that groups are not individuals: 
This [central] assumption [of the individualist position] could also 
be expressed by saying that no social tendency is somehow imposed 
on human beings 'from above' ... -- social tendencies are the product 
(usually undesigned) of human characteristics and activities and 
situations •.. 15 
Gellner (who is not himself an individualist) has summed up well the 
position of the ontological individualist on this matter: 
What the Individualist here will object to is the inference from an 
holistic concept, somehow abstracted from the concrete behavior of 
concrete individuals, being then able to figure in the antecedent of 
a causal sentence. 16 
15J.W.N. Watkins, "Methodological Individualism and Social Ten-
dencies," pp. 271-272. 
16Ernest Gellner, "Holism Versus Individualism," in Readings 
in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. by M. Brodbeck, p. 262. 
r 
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According to the individualist, groups do not do things to persons. 
Groups are not individuals in the world able to affect other individuals 
in the world; they are mental constructs and cannot therefore be 
agents or causes of any sort. 
This first of the principles of the ontological individualist 
is not itself necessarily supportive of his position. In fact, it is a 
two-edged sword; if it can be established that there are some things 
that groups do that are not reducible to what persons in groups do (and 
that groups can have other important characteristics of agents) , then 
we will have reason to assert that these groups are agents and there-
fore objectively existing individuals and not merely mental abstractions. 
That groups can have the various essential characteristics of agents 
will be argued in the chapters to follow, and we have already seen the 
irreducibility of some things that groups do. 
Perhaps the subjective or mental element that the individualist 
claims to find in statements about groups and their performances comes 
from the fact that these are constituted according to rules. There does 
seem to be some contribution by human minds in the existence of rule-
constituted beings. This contribution involves the acceptance by persons 
of the rule that X counts as ~, or that some acts by persons count as a 
performance by a group. One might attempt to argue from this contri-
bution by the mind that the Y known is itself something purely in the 
mind of a person encountering the ~- But this would surely be wrong-
headed, for the beings and performances so constituted are beings and 
performances in the world; they are not simply subjective mental con-
structs. The adjournment of the legislature would be, according to that 
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argument, not an event in the world, but in the minds of Senator Blad-
derhorn, of the lobbyist, of the stock speculator, and so forth. Indeed, 
the individualist may be constrained to such a conclusion; but Senator 
Bladderhorn, the lobbyist, the speculator, chess players, football 
players, and all persons dealing with rule-constituted beings and per-
formances all treat these as things and occurrences in the world. The 
evidence appears to be on the side of Senator Bladderhorn et al., but 
it needs to be explained more fully with an adequate analysis of ob-
jectivity and the place that constitutive rules and the conventions have 
in our world. I shall not do that here. 17 
In fact, we do already consider some groups and other rule-
constituted entities as efficacious and, thus, as objective or in the 
world rather than simply as subjective mental constructs. The first of 
the principles of the individualist ontology, that agents must be indi-
viduals existing in the world, appears to present no difficulty for the 
claim that groups can be agents. Again, I have so far argued only that 
the performances of groups exist and are irreducible. The rest of the 
account of group agency will be provided in chapterstocome. 
The second principle of the individualist ontology is: an 
agent is an individual that can perform acts that are not simply the 
aggregate of acts of the components of that individual. The principle 
can be expressed more formally as follows: 
17The analysis of objectivity might begin by acknowledging that 
reality is constituted in some way by the activity of mind. (See Kant, 
KRV 105 B26). Rule-constituted beings seem to be objective in this way, 
for their objective existence requires the acceptance of rules by per-
sons. 
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If A is composed of ~~~1£1 ••• , then~ is an agent only if~ can 
perform some act that cannot be reduced to acts by ~~~1£1 •••• 
This principle stresses the irreducibility or ultimacy of agency. If all 
that~ does could be completely redescribed as what ~·~•£•··· do, then 
absolutely nothing is gained by ascribing agency to A itself. For A to 
truly do something ~·s performance must not be resolvable into the per-
formances of A's components. The ultimacy of agency thus consists in 
the unity of the agent in its action; the unity of ~ in acting is 
absent where the act is reducible to the acts of the various components 
of A. The principle can also be expressed in terms having more directly 
to do with the problem of group performances: 
If A is a group and~·~·£,··· are persons in A, then~ is an agent 
only if ~ can perform some act that cannot be reduced to acts by 
~~~t£1 ... 
Hayek appeals to this principle implicitly when he contrasts 
the objectivity of the physical sciences with what he calls the "sub-
jectivity" of the social sciences. 18 The human goals, purposes, desires, 
decisions that the social scientist must consider cannot, he believes, 
be reduced to the chemical reactions that occur in the human body simul-
taneously with them. The human being as subject and agent is therefore 
18F.A. Hayek, op. cit,, pp. 25-36. The same view of the person 
as the ultimate in social explanation can be found in Watkins, who states 
that "We shall not have arrived at rock-bottom explanations ... until we 
have deduced an account of them from statements about the dispositions, 
beliefs, resources, and inter-relations of individuals" ("Methodological 
Individualism and Social Tendencies," p. 271). Similarly, with Watkins 
" ... the ultimate premises of social science are human dispositions ••• 
And while psychology may try to explain these dispositions, they do 
provide social science with a natural stopping place in the search for 
explanations of overt social phenomena" ("Ideal Types and Historical 
Explanation," p. 735). 
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a unity, an ultimate, that cannot be properly understood unless con-
sidered as such; in other words, something is missing if the human being 
is redescribed simply in chemical terms. 
The individualist might employ this second principle in arguing 
against the possibility of a group agent. This principle, coupled with 
a second premise that the performances of groups are always reducible to 
the acts of persons in groups, yields the conclusion that groups are not 
agents. But, again, the principle can cut both ways; it does not sup-
port only the individualism for which it is the tendered explanation. 
The same principle combined with a different second premise, that a 
group can perform an act not reducible to those of persons in the group, 
would yield the alternative conclusion that the group is in fact an 
agent. The conclusion would still have to be supported with some attri-
bution of other agential characteristics to the group. But we have 
already seen that groups can engage in irreducible performances. The 
evidence for this was discovered when we saw that a performance by some 
group can have a practical significance that is not to be found in the 
aggregate of acts by persons that counts as the group's performance. 
Further analysis revealed that this difference in practical significance 
is due ultimately to the existence of relevant constitutive rules, and 
the existence of such rules ultimately explained also the irreducibility 
of the group performance. Before arriving at the conclusion that groups 
are agents in the full meaning of the term, we still need to see how it 
is that they can have the various characteristics that belong to agency. 
For now, though, we have at least seen that groups can satisfy this 
second condition, for they can engage in performances that are not re-
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ducible to the acts of persons in groups. 
A third important principle of the ontology under examination 
is that no single agent may be composed of other agents. This principle 
can be formally expressed as follows: 
If~ is composed of~·~·~···· and if any one of~·~·~~··· is an 
agent, then ~ is not an agent. 
Although there is some similarity between this and the second principle, 
there is an important difference. The second principle stated that A 
is not an agent if all of its acts are reducible to the acts of its 
components; the present principle states that, if any one of A's com-
19 
ponents can act, then ~ itself cannot correctly be said to be an agent. 
This principle, if correct, would enable the individualist to argue 
simpliciter that, because persons in groups are agents, no group composed 
of persons can itself be an agent. If the principle stands, and if 
persons are agents (as surely they are) , then there can be no group 
agency. 
With this third principle we are again taken back to the heart 
of the matter. We need to ask whether an entity composed of persons who 
are themselves agents can be reasonably said to be an agent as well. We 
have seen, through several examples, that a group can engage in per-
19This position that, if groups are agents, then the persons in 
them are not, is common in the individualist literature. See Watkins, 
"Ideal Types and Historical Explanation," p. 732 and "Methodological 
Individualism and Social Tendencies," p. 271-272. One can see the pol-
itical fears that might result from the belief in such a position: 
the State could easily be pictured as an acting being, with no persons 
accountable for its actions. Once we understand, though, how it is that 
group agency does not entail a denial of personal agency, such fears are 
not grounded in reason. 
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formances in virtue of the acts of persons in the group, and that, in 
such cases, both the group and the persons in the group act. Legislatures 
adjourn through the actions of various members of the legislature; com-
panies sell and promise delivery through their authorized agents, etc. 
Analysis of the kinds of rules that constitute groups and their per-
formances has shown how it is that both the group and persons in it 
can act: constitutive rules establish a distinctive relation between 
a group and its members, a relation that I have signalled with the 
phrase "in virtue of" and examined in some detail above. The situations 
I have examined, then, stand as counter-examples to this third principle; 
and analysis shows how these counter-examples are possible. It seems, 
then, that the third principle of the individualist ontology is incor-
20 
rect. 
* * * 
To what general assessment of the individualist ontology can we 
come? The first two principles do seem to express fundamental insights 
into the nature of agency: it does seem to be the case that an agent 
must be an individual existing in the world; and it does seem to be 
superfluous to attribute agency to a being whan all its exercises of 
20 There may be another way in which this third principle can be 
understood: it may mean simply that attributions of agency for the 
group's act and that ascription of agency to the group for some act !_ 
entails a denial of agency for act !_to all other agents. Such an 
interpretation would make the third principle consistent with the nature 
of groups as we have explained it and would be a corollary to the second 
principle. There is no reason, though, to think that the individualist 
would accept this interpretation. 
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agency can be exhaustively described as acts by its components. But 
these two principles are consistent with the claim being defended --
that groups can act. 
The third principle entails that, if a group can act, then per-
sons in the group cannot act. Here the individualist fails by misun-
derstanding the nature of groups. He sees correctly that, where per-
sons act, their actions are not erased from existence by the fact that 
they act in groups. What he does not see is that this is consistent 
with the agency of groups. I have argued that the relation of group to 
personal action is such that one need not deny the agency of persons in 
order to affirm the agency of groups. Indeed, as we have seen, the 
agency of groups entails the agency of persons in groups. 
What seems to be missing from the individualist ontology is a 
full understanding of the nature of rules and their place in the con-
stitution of groups. The individualist has seen that groups are groups 
of persons, but he has not seen that they are groups of persons acting 
under constitutive rules. Thus, he fails to see how it is that a group 
can engage in performances that are not simply the aggregate of acts 
by persons in the group. 
So far, I have argued for the irreducibility of group per-
formances and have defended this claim against objections raised by an 
individualist ontology. This does not by itself establish that groups 
are agents. I intend to argue in Chapter Three that groups can also 
have other characteristics of agency besides the ability to engage in 
performances that are irreducible to the acts of persons in them. Among 
these characteristics are the ability to have goals and to make decisions. 
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I will argue that groups are capable of these and that these are not 
reducible to the goals and decisions of persons in groups. 
CHAPTER THREE 
GROUPS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AGENTS 
In Chapter One I argued that groups are what they are due to the 
systems of socially accepted rules that constitute them. Such systems 
of rules are, we have seen, the key to the explanation of how group 
performances are not always reducible to the acts of persons in those 
groups. But showing that groups can engage in irreducible performances 
does not by itself establish that groups are agents. For agency includes 
only those performances or instances of behavior that can be described or 
qualified through a cluster of interrelated concepts that include goal-
orientation, decision, practical reasoning, voluntariness, etc., a 
cluster of concepts that refer to what I shall henceforth call "agential 
characteristics." My intention in this chapter is to explain how the 
performances of groups can be correctly described through attribution 
of such agential characteristics. 
I shall focus here on two agential characteristics above all 
others, namely the having of goals and the making of decisions. These 
two characteristics seem crucial; for we ordinarily do not consider a 
being that is incapable of having goals or of making decisions to be an 
agent. There are other agential characteristics; but the analyses of 
the two that I have singled out can serve as models for the others. The 
discussion here is intended to show, in general, how groups can have 
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agential characteristics that are not reducible to the agential charac-
teristics of persons in groups as well as to instantiate this in the 
cases of two such characteristics. 
Before proceeding to examine the agential characteristics of 
groups, it is important that we observe three cautions that any such 
examination must respect. I will state and explain the importance of 
each of these three cautions and will have some brief remarks on some of 
the more likely temptations to ignore them. The value of these cautions 
will eventually be confirmed when we have seen the merits of the con~ 
stitutive rule analysis of agential characteristics. 
The first caution is that in describing the group agent, we must 
avoid unwarranted anthropomorphization of groups. We must avoid assuming 
that the agential characteristics of groups are similar in all respects 
to those of persons, the agents with whom we are most familiar. Instead 
we must describe what we see. The belief that we must anthropomorphize 
groups in order to explai_n their agential characteristics will eventually 
be shown to be unfounded. 
It i_s worth noting at this point that the issue of consciousness 
creates a special temptation to violate this first caution. Conscious-
ness is regarded in several diverse philosophical traditions as a basic 
fact about human beings, and one necessary for the explanation of phe-
1 
nomena such as makl_ng a decision, having a goal, and so forth. If such 
agential characteristics can characterize only a conscious being, then 
1
This view is mamtamed in various ways and w:ith.various con-
ceptions of consciousness by traditions as diverse as the scholastic, 
Kantian, phenomenological and existentialist. 
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either groups are conscious or they are not agents. Those who take this 
position and who find the notion of a group mind philosophically repug-
nant will obviously feel justified in concluding that groups cannot be 
2 
agents. 
In insisting that consciousness is a necessary condition for 
agency, though, one might be neglecting to consider that, just as humans 
have a peculiarly human way of being agents, so also might groups have 
3 
a way of being agents that is peculiar to groups. That is, the agency 
of groups might be in some aspects sui generis. If this is so, then the 
necessary conditions for human agency might not all be identical with 
the necessary conditions for group agency; and the importance of the 
first caution would then become obvious. In the forthcoming analysis I 
argue that the constitutive rules of groups ground their agential charac-
teristics and show that anthropomorphization is unnecessary in this 
matter. Groups can have agential characteristics though they have no 
consciousness of their own, because such characteristics are always had 
in virtue of some characteristics of or acts by persons in the group. 
This will be more fully explained shortly. 
The second caution is that group agency, if there is such a 
thing, must have something in common with the agency of persons, if we 
are to be justified in using the same concept of agency for both. The 
possibility that group agency is somehow sui generis might lead us into 
2see Ernest Gellner, "Holism Verses Individualism," in May 
Brodbeck (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London: 
The MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 257. 
3I am indebted to Louis Werner for proposing this possibility in 
unpublished remarks on Martin Benjamin's "Can Moral Responsibility be 
Collective and Nondistributive?" Social Theory and Practice, IV (1976), 
93-106. 
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the mistake of not seeking similarities. If there are no similarities, 
or if they are minimal or irrelevant, then we need separate concepts to 
describe group agency and personal agency. The case for group agency 
would be philosophically uninteresting if we could not find such simi-
larities, for we would be left with a mere equivocation -- the use of 
the familiar term "agency" to refer to phenomena, altogether different 
from what we ordinarily recognize as agency. 
The third caution for the ascription of agential chara,cteristi,cs 
to groups is that these characteristics must be ascribable to the groui? 
itself rather than simply to either some or all of its members, We saw 
in Chapter One that, although the performances of groups exist only in 
virtue of performances by persons, there is nevertheless a conceptual 
distinction between a performance by the group and performances by per-
sons in virtue of which it exists. This distinction is essential to the 
claim that the group itself is an agent. The distinction must be pre-
served not only in the matter of performances by groups but also in the 
matter of those agentia,l characteristics that a group must have for its 
performa,nces to be exercises of agency by it. 
It should be noted at the outset that the nature of agential 
characteristics continues to be a matter of lively philosoi?hical dispute. 
There is, for example, a trend in the explanation of the behavior of 
persons (a trend that could be reasonably extended to the explanation of 
group behavior as well) that tends to reduce agential characteristics to 
either observable behavior or some measurable quality of observable 
behavior. Occasionally analyses of having goals have been provided on 
such a model, for example, the various "teleological" machines designed 
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by some behavioral theorists. 4 
If we were to accept the adequacy of such behavioral accounts in 
general, we would probably not find it difficult to provide a behavioral 
account of group goals. We would need only to accept the proposition 
that groups behave or perform in ways not reducible to the behavior or 
performances of persons in them, a proposition that I argued for in 
chapter One. Given this, it would remain only to show that a given 
group was constituted in such a way that it could engage in behavior of 
. 5 the appropr1ate sort. 
Alternatively, an account that would argue against the adequacy 
of behavioral explanation of agential characteristics might hold that 
having a goal is not reducible to any form of behaving. Such arguments 
often appeal to some aspect of the "interiority" of agency. 6 They claim 
a difference between what an observer can know about agency, and what 
the first person, the actor, who is interior to agency, can know. Such 
a first person perspective is sometimes used to point out the problems 
4see, for example, D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the 
Mind (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), pp. 138-139. 
5For an example of a behavioral account of group goals, see 
Herbert Simon, "On the Concept of Organizational Goal," Administrative 
Science Quarterly, IX (1~64), 1-22. 
If the behaviorist were to refuse to acknowledge the justificatory 
function of constitutive rules (Chapter One, p. 10) and instead analyze 
rules as simply patterns of behavior, he would then be left without an 
explanation of why one thing might count as something else. This is 
discussed in more detail on p.64 of the present chapter. 
6An interesting and rather elementary contrast of these two 
approaches can be found in the debate between Brand Blanshard and B.F. 
Skinner, "The Problem.of Consciousness-- a Debate," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, March, 1967. See also Chapter Two of Jerome 
Shaffer's Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1968) • 
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of translating statements such as "A intends to do X" to "There is a 
probability of that !2_ will engage in behavior X." That is, I do not 
experience my intentions as mathematical probabilities but as personal 
commitments to perform the acts I intend. In a similar way, while a 
behavioral account might see no relevant difference between "I have my 
reasons for doing!" and "There are causes of Smith's engaging in be-
havior!," the interiority approach would hold that reasons justify acts 
while causes make behavior occur. Thus, it would be claimed that a. 
behavioral account does nat provide the conceptual tools with which to 
explain the justificatory activity that often accompanies agency. 
It is not my intention here to offer a resolution to the dispute 
between philosophical behaviorists and those who claim the relevance of 
first person accounts of agency. Moreover, because behavioral accounts 
Of agency are already available, it seems more useful to direct our 
attention to those accounts of agency that do not simply describe ob-
servable behavior. 
* * * 
Agents have goals. These may be short-term or lang-term; in 
either case, allusions to the goal(s} of an agent often figure in dis-
cussions of his agency. The intended consequences of a.n action are often 
said to be an agent's goals. Similarly, the goal of an action figures. 
in discussions of whether that action is rational. It is not my intention 
here to provide in exhaustive detail an analysis of each relation that 
goals bear to the exercise of agency; such an analysis would depend, in 
the end, on how goals are related to the exercise of agency in srenera.l. 
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My primary concern here will rather be to show that we do in fact believe 
that groups have goals and that such beliefs are intelligible. I shall 
argue later that this belief fits into the general picture of the group 
as agent. 
We need first to distinguish between having a goal for oneself 
and having a goal for some other being. An agent may have a goal for 
some nonagent: Jones the fisherman may tie his flies carefully with 
the goal of catching fish with them. Agents may also have goals for 
other agents: Jones may want his boy, Bill, to become an accomplished 
fisherman himself. The case of Jones's boy, Bill, differs from that of 
the fishing flies in that Bill can also have goals for himself. Even if 
Jones's goals for Bill are similar to the goals of Bill himself, the 
relation is one of similarity; Jones's goals for Bill and the goals of 
Bill are clearly distinct from one another. This is always true of the 
relation of the goals of one agent to the goals of another agent: they 
may be similar, but they are at least numerically distinct. Such is not 
the case with the goals had by an agent for an inanimate object, such 
as fishing flies. Their goals are the goals that agents have for them. 
I shall, in what follows, speak of the goals of an agent and of 
the goals had for an agent. Henceforth, I shall employ the locution 
"goals of A" to refer to some agent !2_'s own goals and "goals for~" to 
refer to goals had for B (where ~ might or might not be an agent) by 
some agent that is not B. 
I shall argue that there are goals of groups distinct from goals 
had for them by persons. I shall claim that, when persons have goals 
for a group, the group comes closer to being in the position of Jones's 
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son Bill than being in the position of the fishing flies. That is to 
say, the group is an agent, rather than simply the instrument of agents 
having goals for it. It will remain true, though, that persons can 
have goals for groups, because one agent can have goals for another. I 
shall first examine the evidence for the claim that there are goals of 
groups. Then I shall show how constitutive rules of groups figure in 
the explanation of this. 
Let us first consider, as an example, my relation with the cor---
porat-ion that employs me. My goals (or at least my principal goals) for 
the corporation might be that it provide me financial security, increased 
social status, the opportunity for fulfilling labor, and so forth. Yet, 
it is conceivable (and even fairly likely) that these would not be the 
goals of the corporation. 7 Corporate goals are more often such things 
as maximizing profits, outselling the competition, increasing production, 
penetrating the market, better quality control, and so forth. In a 
similar example, I might join the SPCA in order to meet new friends, but 
this would have to be distinguished from the goals of the SPCA itself. 
Such examples provide some prima facie evidence for the distinction 
between goals of a group and goals for it. We need to see how best to 
account for this distinction. 
7 
Although there is no conceptual barrier to business organizations 
having such goals, it seldom occurs in this way. One common opinion of 
the goal of business organizations is that they have only one: the 
maximization of profits. Recent research into organizations has shown 
this to be an over-simplication. See Charles Perrow, Organizational 
Analysis: a Sociological View (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Pub-
lishing Company, 1970) especially pp. 133-175; Richard M. Cyert and 
James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice=Hall, 1963); and th;-vario~iews expressed in Joseph 
A. Litterer (ed.), Organizations: Structure and Behavior (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963). 
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James Thompson, in discussing organizational goals, has noticed 
the error of regarding the individual's goals for the organization as 
the goals of the organization. Thompson expresses the difficulty thus: 
There is obvious danger in reifying the abstraction "organization" 
by asserting that it, the abstraction, has goals or desires ... 
There is little to be gained, however, by swinging to the other 
extreme of insisting that the goals of an organization are somehow 
the accumulated goals of its members. 8 
Thompson has noticed two dangers here, while tacitly acknowledging a 
third one. The first is the danger of reifying the organization. But 
we have already seen in Chapter Two that groups can (and do) exist extra-
mentally as social realities and are not merely abstractions by the mind. 
The second danger noticed by Thompson is that of regarding the 
accumulation of all goals had for a group as the goals of the group. 
Thompson has an insight here: he is rightly concerned with the problems 
involved in claiming any and all goals had by persons for a group to be 
goals of the group. 
Thompson implicitly brings up a third danger, one included in 
the first caution proposed at the beginning of this chapter. He is 
concerned that regarding a group as something more than an abstraction 
might require us, in claiming that it has goals, to attribute to it, 
without evidence, human characteristics such as desires. 
Thompsonls own solution to the problem of group goals is that 
the goals of a group are the goals that some special sub-group has for 
it. Thompson calls this sub-group the "dominant coalition," a group 
of 
8 James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1967) p. 128. 
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... interdependent individuals who collectively have sufficient 
control of organizational resources to commit them in certain di-
rections and to withhold them from others. 9 
Thompson's solution has some intuitive appeal, for it at least 
provides a basis for excluding the goals of some persons for the group 
as not being the goals of the group. Nevertheless, Thompson's solution 
is, in the end, unsatisfactory. Thompson's claim is actually that some 
persons or groups of persons who have goals for an organization also 
have sufficient power to use the organization to further their own goals 
(the goals of themselves). We know this to be something that actually 
occurs, but that is not sufficient evidence to show that what we mean 
by the goal of a group is nothing but the goal had for the group by 
some dominant coalition of persons in it. 
In fact, there is one particular feature of our ordinary under-
standing of group goals that indicates the inadequacy of Thompson's 
account:, namely, that we sometimes criticize persons who are successful 
in using a group to accomplish their goals for the group. To see this 
we can fruitfully return to the case of Jones and his boy, Bill. Bill 
might be a particularly pliant boy and Jones a particularly dominant 
father, so that he can generally direct the boy 1 s life as he wills. Here 
we could intelligibly criticize Jones by saying, "Your son has goals of 
his owni he's not simply an object to be used for your goals for him." 
Similarly, we might criticize a dominant coalition by arguing that the 
goals toward which they were directing the group were their own goals 
(for the group) and not the goals of the group. Unless all such crit-
g.b .. d ~·I p. 128. 
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icism is to be dismissed as self-contradictory or unintelligible, we 
must conclude that Thompson's account of the meaning of group goals is 
misguided. 10 
Other statements made by Thompson indicate that, despite his 
stated objective, he does not really intend to offer us an account of 
goals of a group. Instead, he is making an empirical claim, that those 
who have power tend to modify the structure of groups (i.e., to set up 
or modify their constitutive rules) in such a way that their own goals 
will count as the goals of the group. Thus, he summarizes at one point: 
We have asserted ... that organizational goals are established through 
coalitional behavior.ll 
Thus, Thompson is actually giving a genetic empirical account of goal 
selection in groups. He does not, however, address himself to the con-
ceptual problem that is our concern here. Thus, the problem of how 
there can be goals of a group is not yet solved. 
The problem of distinguishing goals of a group from goals had 
for it is actually related to a problem already discussed. In Chapter 
One I argued that a performance by a group is distinct from performances 
by persons in that group. This distinction was shown to be established 
by the existence of constitutive rules of a certain type (rules of act-
specification) • In what follows I shall argue that constitutive rules 
of other types, i.e. different from rules of act-specification, estab-
10 
The same point could be made by stating that Thompson's dis-
tinction confuses the notions of force and authority in a group. Having 
the force to do something (e.g. to direct a group toward some goal) is 
not the same as having the authority to do so. 
11Thompson, p. 32. The emphasis is mine. 
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lish the distinction now under discussion. In order to see this we will 
first have to examine differences among types of groups. 
First, there are groups that in their entire structure are di-:-
r~ctedat some specific goal or goals in such a way that, if these goals 
were altered, the group could rightly be said to no longer exist or to 
12 
no longer be the same group. Examples of such groups are governmental 
organizations such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Selective 
Service System and perhaps also the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals and the Welfare Rights Organization. Groups of this first 
type are often recognizable by their names; frequently, the name states 
the goal or goals of the group. This is not always so, however; it is 
not true that a name announcing the goals of a group is a requirement for 
being a group of this first type. Nor is the existence of such a name 
always a sure sign of the nature of a group. Other groups, even groups 
without a name, may be structured around some basic goals. Informal 
bowling leagues, poker groups, and the committee that planned the neigh-
borhood block party might also be examples of groups of this first sort. 
Groups of this first sort have in common that the goals that 
they presently have form an essential part of their identity. Should 
those goals change, there would be a reasonable doubt that the same group 
still existed. If, for example, Catholic Charities began a campaign to 
remove the welfare burden from self~supporting upper middle class cit-
izens, we might reasonably conclude that the group was no longer Catholic 
12 Am. . • . d . . ( 1 d 1 . ff See ~ta~ Etz~on~, Mo ern Organ~zat~ons Eng ewoo C ~ s, 
Jersey: Prentice~Hall, 1964) p, 4. See also John Ladd's analysis of 
formal organization, ,.Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal 
Organizations," The Monist, LIV (October, 1970), 488-516, 
New 
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Charities, that Catholic Charities was now defunct, and that some new 
group had usurped its name and resources. Any adequate account of goals 
of groups must be able to explain the goals of groups of this first type. 
Not all groups, though, are of this type. There are at least 
some groups that appear able to change their goals or add new ones with-
out reasonable men thereby claiming the group to be now defunct and to 
have been replaced by a new one. Thus, a Philosophy Department may decide 
to change from its goal of preparing professional philosophers to the goal 
of meeting the needs of all students in a university (or vice-versa). Any 
adequate account of the goals of groups must be able to explain why it is 
that groups of this second type may change goals, and also why it is that 
some groups cannot change goals. It is the constitutive rules of groups 
o'f these two types that provide the relevant explanations, i.e. both to 
the general question of how there can be goals of groups as well as the 
more. specific problem of how some groups can change goals and other cannot. 
I shall examine first the type of group that seems to have provision for 
change of goals and then the type that seems incapable of changing goals. 
Let us begin by inquiring how goals in fact are changed in groups 
where this is possible. One common way in which goals are changed is by 
specifying a role that has ·the authority to select goals for the group. 
Of course, this would have to be supplemented with a system of consti-
tutive rules that provide for selection of a person to occupy that role. 
In such a case, there must exist some rule that goals selected by the 
persons with such authority shall count as goals of the group. For 
example: 
It shall be the duty of the Grand Poobah to select the annual goals 
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of the Loyal Order of Aardvarks at the beginning of each year of 
his reign. 
When the example is stated thus, it appears to be a norm of conduct for 
Grand Poobahs, rather than a constitutive rule; but it has also a con-
stitutive rule embedded in it: 
Under conditions ~' a goal (formally) designated by the Grand Poobah 
shall count as a goal of the Loyal Order of Aardvarks. 
This manifests the general structure of constitutive rules (under con-
ditions ~' ~' counts as !) . 
The constitutive rules of groups often specify the procedure for 
goal-selection rather than the person empowered to select goals. For 
example, boards of directors or trustees, committees on purposes and aims, 
constitutional revision committees, or general memberships sometimes 
have the power to select goals. In such cases, though, the constitutive 
rule expressing this is embedded in a whole system of constitutive rules 
that together constitute a method for goal selection. For example, if 
there exists a constitutive rule stating that a goal selected by the 
board of trustees shall count as the university's goal, this rule becomes 
intelligible and functional only in the context of a larger system of 
constitutive rules: what shall count as a goal-selection by the board 
of trustees; what shall count as the board of trustees; what shall 
count as a meeting of the board of trustees; what shall count as a vote 
by the board of trustees, etc. It should also be noted that similar 
rules would come into play in the group's discontinuing some group goal. 
There are, as I stated above, groups that have no provision for 
goal changes. We need also to know what kinds of rules constitute such 
groups. Such groups are characterized by the absence of those rules 
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that establish methods for goal-selection and discontinuance and those 
rules that establish the capacity for doing so. This is simply to state 
that such groups have built into them no provision for goal change or 
for the selection of new goals. This is the rather simple answer to the 
question of how it is that such groups cannot change goals: they are 
unable to because they lack the relevant rules. And should they acquire 
the relevant rules, there is the possibility that their identity changes 
so drastically that they are not the same groups. 
But becides accounting for the inability of some groups to 
change goals, we must also account for the existence of the goals that 
such groups do in fact have. Groups of this second sort are character-
ized by some set of constitutive rules having the general form: 
Goal X shall count as the group's goal!· 
If the group exists and there is no provision for changing such 
constitutive rules, the rules (and thus the goals) constitute part of 
the group's ongoing identity. 
In summary, a goal is a goal of a group only where there exists 
a constitutive rule that establishes this goal as a goal of the group. 
This may be achieved in several ways: the constitutive rule may simply 
establish a goal; or it may establish the appropriate method for deter-
mination of the goal. 
This account explains the distinction between goals of and goals 
for a group: where a goal is had for a group by persons but does not 
meet the conditions expressed in the constitutive rule, it is not a goal 
of the group. We are now able to see the conceptual inadequacy in 
Thompson's position: it is not necessarily true that the goals of a 
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dominant coalition for a group are the goals of the group, because a 
dominant coalition's activities do not necessarily meet the conditions 
for goal adoption that are expressed or specified in the group's consti-
tutive rules. 
One of the implications of the account I give here is that there 
could conceivably be a goal of a group that is not a goal had for the 
group by any person(s) in it. Note, though, that such a group is only 
logically possible. Whether a group of this sort would actually exist is 
another matter; it is quite likely that it would not, as it might well 
fail to provide the necessary incentive to get persons to fulfill the 
demands of roles and to otherwise support the group. Thus, that persons 
have some goal Q for a group is quite likely a condition for ~becoming 
a goal of the group; but it is an empirical condition and not a logical 
one. It is in this that Thompson's analysis of group goals is weak. 
I have explained what it is for a group to have a goal and exam-
ined how it is possible to distinguish between goals of a group and goals 
had for it. At the start, I claimed that this distinction was valuable 
in that it enabled us to criticize persons who misdirect groups toward 
their own goals. That certainly is a value of the analysis provided here; 
but it is not the only value and, indeed, not the most important one for 
my thesis. To argue that there can be goals of a group is already to 
argue that this important agential characteristic is attributable to the 
group itself rather than to any particular persons in the group. It was 
important to show that this is so, as it will figure in my ultimate con-
clusion that such groups are moral agents. In order to arrive at that 
ultimate conclusion, though, we must first see if other agential charac-
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teristics belong to groups themselves rather than to persons in groups. 
Let us, therefore, examine the nature of decisions by groups. 
DECISIONS 
In the exercise of their agency, persons sometimes make decisions. 
I shall deal with decision insofar as it involves selection of an action 
by an agent from among alternative actions that he might perform, as in 
the following example: 
At first Jones was reluctant, but, having considered the alternatives, 
he decided to sign a four-year contract. 
The instances of decision that concern us here are always related to 
"performances," those behaviors or activities that, when conjoined with 
appropriate agential characteristics, are considered exercises of agency. 
A decision, in this sense, is always a decision to do X, where X is 
some performance that, if carried out, is an action by the agent de-
"d" 13 cJ. 1ng. 
Decisions of this sort are commonly made by persons. The problem 
here will be to establish whether groups can, in some similar sense, make 
decisions to perform acts. We must further determine whether such group 
decisions are distinct from decisions by persons in groups. 
13There is another sort of usage of the term "decision" to mean 
to bring about some result, as in the following example: 
The heavy wind from the north decided the match early in the second 
period. 
Similarly, the attendant's mistake decided the outcome of the exper-
iment. 
This use differs from the one with which we are concerned here in that it 
does not have the various relationships with other agential characteristics. 
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The project here is made complicated, as it was in the analysis 
of goals, by the lack of resolution among philosophers concerning the 
nature of decisions. Again, rather than attempt to resolve that contro-
versy, I have gathered the various competing analyses into three groups 
and will make some very general remarks about each group. I shall dis-
cuss here (i} behavioral accounts of decision, (ii) systemic accounts, 
and (iii) volitional accounts. I shall not attempt to give a complete 
conceptual analysis of decision. Instead, I shall show how, under any 
of the competing accounts, if persons can make decisions, then so can 
groups. Should the correct conceptual analysis of decision eventually 
be shown not to belong to any of these three groups of theories, it may 
still be the case that, given the existence of constitutive rules and 
their relation to group action, groups can still be said to make decisions. 
Let us first discuss (i) behavioral accounts of decision. Behav-
ioral accounts, in general, analyze decision as either observable physical 
behavior or as some verifiable quality of the behavior decided upon. Under 
such accounts an agent's decisions are theoretically as accessible to the 
spectator as they are to the agent deciding. As an example of this type 
of account, I will examine Ryle's behavioral account of deciding, as 
found in the Concept of Mind. 
Ryle holds that an act of willing (which he regards as essentially 
the same as deciding) is not really some mental act or act of volition. 
Willing is not an act that agents engage in and which subsequently causes 
a bodily motion; and to believe otherwise is simply a mistake. The 
source of this mistake is, he claims, a wrong conception of voluntariness, 
which we ordinarily take to be a characteristic of willed behavior: 
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... the doctrine of volitions is a causal hypothesis adopted because 
it was wrongly supposed that the questions "~at makes a bodily 
movement voluntary?" was a causal question. 1 
Instead, when one characterizes behavior as willed or voluntary, he means 
simply to say that the one behaving could have done otherwise. But, 
according to Ryle, the ability to do otherwise is reducible to (a) know-
15 
ledge of how to do otherwise and (b) not doing otherwise. Knowing how 
is some quality of a performance (e.g., carefulness, efficiency, success, 
etc.) and not another performance antedecent to what one does. 16 So 
behavior that is willed or decided upon can be accounted for without 
postulating some act of willing or deciding as an antecedent event. Willed 
behavior then is behavior by a being that could perform some alternative 
behavior carefully, efficiently, successfully, etc. 
What we must ask now is whether groups can engage in such behav-
ior. If so, then we must conclude that, under a behavioral account, a 
group can be said to engage in behavior that is willed or decided upon 
by it. It is important to note initially that there is something contra-
dietary about a behaviorist claiming that groups behave at all. We saw 
earlier that it is the existence of constitutive rules that founds the 
claim that a group engages in some irreducible performance. A behav-
ioral account must ignore the justificatory function of rules and instead 
14Gilbert Eyle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1949), p. 67. This citation must be understood in conjunction with Ryle's 
characterization of the "ghost in the machine" in Chapter One of his 
book. 
15rbid., p. 70. 
16rbid., pp. 40-41. 
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deal with rules only insofar as they are patterns of behavior by per-
17 
sons. If one regards such a behavioral account as exclusively correct, 
he could then never claim that we are justified in treating groups as 
capable of irreducible performances. He could state only that there 
exists a pattern of activity by persons, a pattern that consists in 
treating groups (and their decisions, goals, etc.) as irreducible. We 
saw in Chapter One that we do often feel justified in treating some X 
as Y. Thus, we are compelled to regard a behavioral account of rules· 
in general and of groups and their characteristics in particular as in-
adequate. 
But if the behaviorist will (per impossible) grant us the pos-
sibility of rule-constituted group performances, it can then be shown 
that groups can engage in performances that are willed or decided upon; 
and this is all that we need to claim at this point. For if a group can 
do otherwise (i.e., can engage in alternative behaviors), then group 
behavior is behavior that, on the behavioral account, can be said to be 
willed, voluntary, or decided upon. For, in Ryle's account of knowing 
how, there is surely a sense in which groups. ''know how" to behave other 
than they do. A group knows how to do otherwise when it can perform 
alternative behaviors carefully, efficiently, successfully, and so on; 
and there is no reason in principle why a group's alternate behavior 
could not be careful (if those who have roles in it perform those roles 
carefully), efficient (if its goal is met with minimum surplus effort), 
and successful (if its goal is met at all). Thus, the behavioral account 
1 7on this justificatory function of rules, see Chapter One, pp. 
10,12. 
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of decision is rather easily extended to group decision, provided that 
we first agree that groups can behave in ways not reducible to the be-
havior of persons, i.e., that constitutive rules play an essential role 
in our description of group acts. 
A second sort of analysis of decision is the systemic account. 
Systemic accounts usually consist of some set of propositions that be-
come true when some agent A has decided to engage in some performance ~-
Such accounts do not proceed by isolating and describing the decision as 
an event in the world. Instead, they show what is changed in the world 
(what other things become true) on the condition that a decision is made. 
The following are some representative examples of this sort of anqlysis: 
(1) It is analytically true that, if A decides to do Y but does 
not do Y, then A either was prevented from doing Y or changed his 
mind. 18-
(2) It is analytically true that, if A assents to the proposition 
"I ought to do '!_, II then A has decided to do Y _19 
-
(3) It is analytically true that, if A decides to do Y, A intends 
to do y_20 
{4) It is necessarily true that, if ~ decides to do '!_, then A has 
certain knowledge that he will do '!_ unless prevented. 
This list is certainly neither precise nor exhaustive, but it 
gives an indication of how this sort of analysis would proceed. Now we 
18P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1954), 
p. 102. 
19Ib"'d, 262 .... p. . 
20Andrew Oldenquist, "Choosing, Deciding, and Doing," in Edwards, 
Paul (editor), Enclopedia of Philosophy, II. 
21stuart Hampshire and H.L.A. Hart, "Decision, Intention, and 
Certainty," Mind, LVII (1958), 1-.12. 
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can ask whether, under such an analysis of decision, groups can correctly 
be said to make decisions. On this sort of approach, we do not need now 
to isolate some given event and show that that event is a group decision. 
What we need to do, rather, is to show that agential characteristics like 
those cited in the representative propositions above (e.g., being pre-
vented, changing one's mind, assenting to an ought-proposition, intend-
ing, having certain knowledge, etc.) can be attributed to groups and that 
the various necessary relationships among those characteristics (again 
as exemplified in the four propositions given above} obtain in the case 
of groups as well. 
Given what we know about group performances from the analysis in 
Chapter One, it seems clear that any such explanation can fruitfully 
proceed by an examination of constitutive rules. Being prevented, for 
example, can be analyzed only with reference to the rules that consti-
tute some group performance and with a description of the obstacle to 
that performance. Intending, insofar as it can be described without 
reference to some decision~event, requires only certainty on the part of 
those whose acts count as the groups performance that they will in fact 
perform the acts that count as the group's performance. Changing one's 
mind can here be considered simply a metaphor referring to a change of 
intention. For a group to assent to an ought-proposition seems to re-
quire two things: that it can have knowledge of ought-propositions and 
that it can act in accordance with those ought propositions of which it 
has knowledge. There is little difficulty in seeing how any being~s 
activity is in accordance with some ought-proposition, as such an accord-
ance is purely formal, at least in the sense that it requires no new 
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activity on the part of that being. But the question of how a group can 
have knowledge is another matter, one that I will discuss briefly here 
22 
and in more detail in Chapter Four. To the question of whether a group 
can have certain knowledge (or any sort of knowledge, for that matter) 
of what it is going to do, I respond that the group can have knowledge 
in virtue of the knowledge had by those in decision-making roles in the 
group; this shows that there is no need to posit some group mind to 
account for group knowledge. 
We can now give a preliminary analysis of the relationships among 
these characteristics. The analysis is intended to show only that these 
characteristics and their interrelationships can be spoken of intelli-
gently when applied to groups making decisions. Consider, for example, 
the claim that "International Widget Corporation has decided to go public." 
If we refrain from characterizing the decision-event itself, we must still 
admit that such a proposition about IntRrnationaJ Widget does not seem 
nonsensical. Moreover, if we do not soon find International Widget on 
the stock exchange, we would be entitled to conclude that the management 
has rescinded the decision (i.e. that International Widget has changed 
its mind). Or it might be true that some government regulation has pre-
vented International Widget from following through on its decision. 
International Widget would have certain knowledge that it will go public 
if it can be said that it decided to go public. The only problem here 
is ascertaining what person(s) in the group to approach in order to find 
out that the group has indeed decided to go public. It would not be 
22 See Chapter Four, pp. 82-83. 
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doing violence to the concept of intention to state that International 
Widget intends to go public. Such a locution would be appropriate be-
tween the time at which it became true that the company decided to go 
public and the time at which it went public. Indeed, that is the way 
in which we ordinarily speak of intentions. 
It would be out of place here to attempt a complete account of 
group agency here; the point is that group characteristics of the sorts 
relevant to a systemic account of decision, together with inter-relations 
of the relevant sorts, can be explained in the case of groups by reference 
to constitutive rules. When this is so, a group is reasonably described 
as a decision-maker. There is, in principle, then, nothing that prevents 
this mode of analysis from being applied to groups or that suggests in 
advance that groups could not be said to be decision-makers; and the 
exemplary application of it above suggests that at least some group de-
cision-making will be discovered when it is carried out completely. 
A third group of theories of decision, and one that has been 
prominent in the history of philosophy, is the volitional account. On 
this type of theory a decision is said to be a volition or act of the 
will, a mental event that is the cause of a bodily movement. Descartes 
clearly maintained such a position with his two-substance dualism. 23 But 
volitional accounts have been offered by other philosophers, including 
23 Descartes summarized his own position well in the letter to 
Reneri for Pollot: 
From the very fact that we conceive clearly and distinctly the two 
natures of the body and the soul as different, we know that in re-
ality they are different, and consequently that the soul can think 
without the body •••. 
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h ld . h d' . d 1' 24 some w o wou reJect t e ra 1cal Cartes1an ua 1sm. 
Because decisions are, on a volitional account, regarded as men-
tal events, there is a prima facie problem for showing how groups can 
make decisions. Groups do not have minds in a way that would enable us 
to attribute decisions to them in exactly the same way as we do to per-
sons. But the mental acts of persons (namely, certain of their volitions 
or decisions) may, under certain conditions, count as a decision by a 
group. This will be the case when there is an appropriate constitutive 
rule which holds that these acts by persons do indeed count as the group's 
decisions. 
Let us take an example: 
When Dr. Jones, who is the graduate school dean, decided that young 
Smith shall be admitted to the Graduate School, his decision counts 
as a decision by the Graduate School. 
In another type of graduate school, one not quite so autocratic, we may 
find admissions decisions made in some other way: 
When a duly constituted committee of five members of the graduate 
faculty, only three of whom may be from the applicant·'s own depart-
ment, vote unanimously to admit Smith, the Graduate School has de-
cided to admit Smith. 
In both of these cases, the Graduate School act of admitting 
Smith to the Graduate School was preceeded (and caused, according to the 
volitional account) by an act of deciding. Also, in each case we can 
see that the decision to admit Smith was in fact a decision by the Grad-
uate School only because of the existence of some appropriate constitutive 
rule. In each case, there is some specific event X that counts as the 
24 
For a list and summary discussion of various non-Cartesian voli-
tional theories, see Myles Brand (ed.), The Nature of Human Action 
(Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1970), pp. 8-9. 
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group's decision~· In some kinds o~ cases this! may be itself a de-
cision by some person in authority. In others it may be a se~ies of 
preferences expressed or votes given by some specified number or pe~-
25 
centage of persons in the group. These are typical ways in which 
groups make decisions. The important point in any explanation of the 
differences in the ways in which groups make decisions is the dif~erence 
in the rules that constitute them. 
This seems to provide sufficient evidence that even i~ decisions 
by persons are distinct act-events or volitions, groups can still be 
reasonably said to decisions. For our present purposes, or course, 
whether the volitional account of persons' decision-making is correct 
must remain an open question. A number of difficulties with this account 
should be noted, though. There is, for one, the problem of how a non-
physical cause (i.e., the mental act of deciding) can have a physical 
effect (i.e. the bodily performance of the action). This led the later 
Cartesians to propose a theory of occasionalism. More recently, it has 
been claimed that, if every act is preceded by a decision, and if de-
cisions are themselves volitions or mental acts, then every decision 
must be preceded by a decision to decide, ad infinitum. 26 A third crit-
icism is that we have no experience of volitions as such and therefore 
ha b . f 1 . . ha h . 27 ve no as1..s or c a1.ID1.ng t t t ey exJ.st. 
25 Note, though, that this need not necessarily be a majority vote. 
26 
This objection arises with the more general problem of basic 
actions. See, far example, Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1973), p. 28. 
27Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 57-72. 
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Until such problems are resolved, the exact nature of decisions 
must remain open to further examination. I do not propose any one theory 
here as being the final answer. I simply point out that, whether de-
cisions are volitions, or are overt behavior, or even are analyzable only 
through some set of conditional propositions, it will still make sense 
to speak of group decisions. Under any one of these sorts of theories 
group decisions will be describable and identifiable by means of the 
relevant constitutive rules of the group; and the relation between per-
sonal and group decisions in any given case will still be established 
through constitutive rules. Regardless, then, of which of these theories 
of the nature of decision is correct, we have an account of group per-
formance which will show how group decisions may exist in virtue of per-
sonal decisions and other activities of persons. 
Moreover, such group decisions are not always reducible to the 
decisions of persons in the group. To see this we need only to see that 
the decision of the dean to admit Smith to the Graduate School counts as 
a decision by the Graduate School only where the appropriate constitutive 
rule exists. Thus, we can conceive a situation in which the dean in fact 
makes the relevant decision ("Smith, I've decided to admit you to the 
Graduate School.") but in which this has no practical significance for 
Smith. If, for example, admissions decisions are made by committee vote, 
then the dean's decision is ineffectual; it is simply not a decision by 
the Graduate School. It is only with the introduction of the appropriate 
constitutive rule that the dean's decision can count as the Graduate 
School's decision. So the decision by the Graduate School is not, in 
any case, reducible to the decision of some individual person(s). 
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* * * * * 
My intention in this chapter has been to show that groups can 
have the various characteristics that we attribute to agents in the ex-
ercise of their agency. Is this account correct? Obviously, in order 
to be correct it must reflect the way we do in fact perceive and inter~ 
act with our social world. I have adduced evidence to show that we do 
in fact sometimes consider group goals, decisions, and performances as 
irreducible to the goals, decisions, and performances of persons in the 
group in question. Thus, we do in fact claim that groups have goals, 
make decisions, and act. 
The real difficulty, then, is to make intelligible the ways in 
which we construct our social world. That we do in fact constitute our 
social world according to rules provides the basis for this intelligi-
bility. However, the constitutive rule account must still be tested 
according to the three cautions proposed and defended at the beginning 
of the present chapter. Those three cautions, the reader will recall, 
are that the account must respect both the nature of groups and the con-
cept of agency, and that it must explain the irreducibility of group 
goals, decisions, and performances. 
The first caution was that we avoid assuming beforehand that 
groups are like persons in order to attribute agency to both. We have 
now seen that it is both incorrect and unnecessary to attribute human 
characteristics to the group. Even if persons can have goals or make 
decisions only on the conditions that they have brains, minds, souls, 
consciousness, or whatever, still groups can have goals and make deci-
sions without having or being brains, minds, souls, etc. And this is 
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because of the role that rules play in the constitution of a group and 
its acts, goals, and decisions. 
The second caution is that group agency not be assumed ahead of 
time to be so different from personal agency that they could not both be 
regarded as instances of the same concept. I have postponed discussion 
of this second guideline until now, for to show how it is satisfied by 
the constitutive rule account requires that we draw upon what has been 
accomplished in this chapter. What I provide here is a sketch of how 
such a justification must proceed; the complete justification would 
involve an analysis of all concepts necessary to a philosophy of action. 
Briefly, the justification would be a systemic account; it would show 
how the various agential concepts form among themselves a system of re~ 
lationships that are causal, logical, or both. The second part of the 
justification would involve showing that the systemic account of human 
agency has an analogue in the case of group agency, i.e., that the same 
concepts have the same relations among themselves whether applied to 
groups or to persons. If this analogy obtains, then it is reasonable 
to believe that group and personal agency are instances of the same con-
cept. 
We have examined only three agential characteristics as they 
are had by groups. I argued that having goals, making decisions, and 
performing (examined in Chapter One) are all things that can be attri-
buted to groups in such a way that they are not reducible to the goals, 
decisions, and performances of persons. The constitutive rule account 
can, I believe, be used to explain other agential characteristics al~eady 
examined. Consider, for a moment, young Jones, the budding violinist: 
74 
Because Jones's goal is to soothe the savage breast, he has decided 
to play his violin in a soundproof cubicle. 
We need to consider also the Flat Earth Society: 
Because its goal is that all mankind shall be informed of basic truths 
of geography, the Flat Earth Society has decided to issue monthly 
press releases. 
Here we have two instances of what I claim to be agency (involving spe-
cificalljperforming, having a goal, and deciding), the first an instance 
of personal agency and the second an instance of group agency. So far 
we know on the basis of what we have learned in Chapter One only that 
neither type of agency, considered in general terms, is reducible to the 
other, i.e. that group agency and its characteristics are not reducible 
to personal agency and vice-versa. We must, initially, admit that the 
same words ("deciding", "doing," etc.) are applicable in both cases. 
However, a systemic account will show that the similarity is more than 
this. 
If Jones is asked why he practices in the sound-proof cubicle, 
he may well respond that it's the best way he has found to soothe the 
savage breast. Similarly, if the Flat Earth Society, perhaps through its 
public relations office, is asked why it issues monthly bulletins, it may 
well reply that doing so helps it inform all mankind of geographic truth. 
There is a relevant similarity between the two responses: the goal of 
the agent bears a certain logical relationship to the performance it 
undertakes. In deciding on a performance, each will consider its goal 
as a reason for settling on a course of action. Also, when each is asked 
to justify its acts, the reason cited is the goal that each has. This 
highlights a basic fact about goals and agency: goals are used as reasons 
for action; they serve to justify performances as well as to justify de-
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cisions to perform. In this respect, at least, the relationships between 
goals and decisions and performances are the same in group agency as in 
personal agency. 
We may note also a second similarity. I stated early in the 
chapter that the relevant sense of "decision" is one in which it is para-
sitic on performances: a decision is always a decision to perform. We 
find now that it makes sense to attribute decisions to groups as well as 
to persons under this meaning of the term. When Jones decided as well as 
when the Flat Earth Society decides, their decisions are always decisions 
to bring about some state of affairs or to en~age in some performance. 
Let us consider a third similarity. Brown, who knows Jones and 
has followed closely the proceedings of the Flat Earth Society, tells 
us that Jones is in his cubicle today and that we may expect to hear from 
the Flat Earth Society on a monthly basis. We ask Brown why he feels 
justified in making such statements. He responds: 
I follow closely the activities of each. I know that yesterday Jones 
decided that henceforth he will practice in his cubicle. Also, I was 
at the meeting when the Flat Earth Society decided to send monthly 
press releases. I know for a fact that they have decided to do these 
things. 
Brown's response is based on some basic logical features of decision 
making: when an agent has decided to do Y it is true that the agent will 
do Y unless he changes his mind or is prevented. 28 Thus, Brown is en-
titled to :!;eel justi:f;ied in making such predictions, bot!L in the case of 
Jones and in that of the rlat Earth Society; in both cases he need only 
28
rn the present chapter, on p. 65 , see propositions (1} and (4), 
which could reasonably be projected to be true (though differently analyzed) 
on any of the three accounts of decision proposed. 
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appeal to the fact that we already know that they have decided. If what 
Brown says makes sense, then there is this third similarity between the 
two kinds of agency: a decision to engage in Y entails that it is true 
that the agent deciding will do Y unless he changes his mind or is pre-
vented. 
The above considerations establish, I believe, some important 
similarities between the exercise of personal agency and the exercise of 
group agency. To have a complete account, we would need to list all 
concepts related to either kind of agency (rather than only to personal 
agency, for we are looking for similarities between the two). Then we 
would need to determine if and how the rules that constitute a group 
make it possible to attribute to the group all the characteristics to 
which these concepts refer as well as to show how these concepts form an 
interrelated system. Finally, we would need to show that a similar 
system exists both in personal and in group agency. What I have offered 
here are only the beginnings of such an account, but these beginnings 
indicate the correctness of the account in regard to three crucial agen-
tial characteristics. 
The third caution stated that the intelligibility of the agency 
of the group as such requires that it not be reducible to its members 
and their individual actions. Again, the fact that groups are consti-
tuted by rules that are socially accepted creates this irreducibility. 
Thus, groups are able to adopt goals, decide and perform in virtue of 
the activities of persons without being reducible to them. 
Using the techniques that I have outlined in this chapter, we 
can establish that many of the concepts attendant upon personal agency 
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can also be attributed to group agency without significant change in 
meaning. The case for the group as agent is thereby strengthened and is 
provided with a working vocabulary; and group agency has been shown to 
be in many ways similar to personal agency. The following chapter will 
assess the grounds for regarding groups as morally responsible agents. 
This will further complete the picture of the group as an agent having 
rights and obligations and capable of deserving praise or blame. Chapter 
Five will return once more to the relation of persons in groups to those 
groups. There my concern will be specifically with the moral aspects 
of that relation. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GROUPS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
I have argued in previous chapters that groups, when constituted 
by the appropriate rules, can have goals, make decisions, and engage in 
performances and that none of these need be reducible to the goals, acts, 
or performances of persons in the group. This is what I mean when I 
claim that groups are agents. In the present chapter I shall argue that 
this group agency can be moral agency. By this I mean simply that a 
group is capable of being responsible for what it does, i.e., that it 
can meet certain general conditions for praise - or blame worthiness. 
Specifically, I will show that groups are capable of voluntary action 
and that groups can have moral rights and obligations. Thus, a group 
can be morally praise - or blameworthy depending on the relation of its 
voluntary acts to its rights and obligations. My claim here is not that 
a group can be a moral agent in exactly the same way as a person can. 
Even if groups are moral agents, for example, it would be wrongheaded 
to expect them to have singularly human moral emotions or to feel guilty, 
to blush with shame, to explode in moral outrage, etc. 
Even if groups can have goals, decide and act, their performances 
might be morally insignificant if they cannot be responsible for what 
they decide and do. 1 In ascribing moral responsibility to an agent, we 
1 . f Here I beg1.n to employ the word "act" to refer to the per or-
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acknowledge (at least implicitly) that the agent has or can have some 
sort of control over his acts, i.e., that the agent acts or can act 
voluntarily. Voluntariness, or control over one's actions is thus a 
necessary condition of moral agency. If an agent is in general incapable 
of acting voluntarily, then all ascriptions of praise - and blameworth-
iness to him are necessarily incorrect. If in a specific situation an 
agent does not act voluntarily, then the agent cannot be praise - or 
blameworthy on that occasion. My first project in the present chapter 
will be to discuss the voluntariness of group action. I shall argue 
that the agential characteristics of voluntariness and involuntariness 
are applicable to groups as agents in order to show that they are morally 
responsible agents. 
An agent actsvoluntarilyif, in acting, he satisfies three con-
ditions related to his control over his action. The first two of these 
conditions have met with general agreement. They are, briefly, that an 
agent must have knowledge both of what he does and of the consequences 
of what he does and that he must not be compelled or coerced to act as 
he does. In addition, at least some philosophers would claim that there 
is a third condition that must be met: Voluntary action must exhibit 
an interiority of the sort discussed in Chapter Three where we considered 
the notion of volition. 2 These three conditions together spell out more 
mances of groups. I have refrained from using this term until now for 
it in fact presumes that the performance referred to is by an agent. It 
was thus inappropriate to speak of "group acts" until after it was argued 
that groups are agents. 
2 See Chapter Three, pp. 49-50, 
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explicitly what is meant by the general requirement of control over one's 
actions as a condition of moral responsibility. I shall examine each of 
these three conditions in turn and show how groups satisfy them. 
The first condition is that, in order to be acting voluntarily, 
the agent must know both what he is doing and the consequences of what 
he is doing. In the case where an agent decides to do what he does, he 
necessarily knows what he does; for that is at least part of what it is 
to make a decision. But the matter of knowledge of the consequences of 
what one does is a bit more complicated, for agents are not always aware 
of the subtle or long-term consequences of what they have decided to do. 
There are consequences that are so remote that, realistically speaking, 
they cannot be known. The judgment that such consequences cannot be 
known justifies our refusal in such cases to hold agents responsible for 
3 them. Indeed, it is often problematic how far ahead an agent ought to 
foresee consequences of his acts; but there are cases in which we judge 
that an agent should have known and ought to be held responsible for what 
he does, regardless of his ignorance. These are cases of culpable ig-
norance. The existence of such cases manifests our presumption that an 
agent has a moral obligation to gain necessary information before em-
barking on a course of action. To summarize, the fact that an agent 
either knows (or ought to know) what he does and its consequences appears 
relevant to ascriptions of responsibility. Indeed, we cannot say that 
3 h . t . T e po~n ~n 
no longer responsible 
agent, the complexity 
the chain of consequences beyond which an agent is 
might vary according to the mental capacity of the 
of the causal chain, the time factor involved, etc. 
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an agent has control over his actions unless he has or can have this kind 
of knowledge. 
Besides knowledge of the effects of what we do there is another 
sort of knowledge that is usually considered relevant for ascriptions of 
voluntariness and responsibility: we sometimes consider an agent not 
responsible if he is ignorant of the moral significance of what he does. 
Consider, for example, Dee Brown's discussion of the Pemaquid Indians: 
Settlements began crowding in upon each other. In 1625 some of the 
colonists asked Samoset to give them 12,000 additional acres of Pema-
quid land. Samoset know [sic] that land came from the Great Spirit, 
was as endless as the sky, and belonged to no man. To humor these 
strangers in their strange ways, however, he went through a cere-
mony of transferring the land and made his mark on a paper for them. 
It was the first deed of Indian land to English colonists.4 
It could be argued that Samoset appeared not to have known that his sig-
nature could create a contract (by the group that was his tribe) and thus 
be an act of moral significance, one that created new obligations and 
right~ and therefore that he did not voluntarily deed the Pemaquid land. 
But it could just as plausibly be argued that the colonists did not 
realize the moral significance of the Indians' acts and of their con-
ception of land and thus had not themselves voluntarily taken it. In 
4 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (New York: Bantam Books, 
1972) p. 3. In this vein, consider John McPhee's remarks concerning the 
forest Eskimos: 
The Eskimos undeniably got a good deal in the Native Claims Settle-
ment Act, but it was good only insofar as they agreed to change their 
way -- to cherish money and to adopt the concern (for centuries un-
known to them) of private property. "No Trespassing" signs have 
begun to appear up here, around villages, where those words would 
once have not been understood. 
Coming Into the Country (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), pp. 
34-35. 
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such cases of moral ignorance, we often do not regard the agent as mor-
ally responsible for what he has done. But, again, we sometimes hold 
an agent responsible for his lack of moral knowledge; agents have an 
obligation to inform themselves of the moral significance of their acts. 
It would be out of place here to try to determine when an agent is vol-
untarily ignorant of what he has an obligation to know, but it is im-
portant to note that culpable ignorance does have a place in our assump-
tions of voluntariness and moral responsibility. 
In these ways and others more complex and deserving of more study 
than is appropriate here, factual and moral knowledge are presupposed by 
our ascriptions of responsibility in ordinary moral discourse. The 
question we need to ask is whether a group can have such knowledge and 
thereby meet the first condition for voluntariness. The prima facie 
difficulty in such a claim is that we are not accustomed to regard a 
group as a knower. To do so might seem to involve us in ascribing to 
the group a consciousness, a mind, or a brain, sense organs, linguistic 
ability, etc. Obviously, groups do not have such faculties. 
But we do not need to posit such faculties as these in order to 
be able to say that a group has the knowledge requisite for moral action. 
To understand this we need first to be aware of the distinction between 
5 
knowing as activity and having information at one's disposal. The former 
is an activity of minds, and this leads one to suspect that groups are 
therefore not correctly characterized as knowers. If acts of knowing 
5
This distinction was mentioned at p. 67· For a more detailed 
analyses of the distinction between the act of knowing and having infor-
mation see Alan R. White, "Acquiring and Possessing Knowledge," Analysis, 
XXXVIII (19781, 120-122. 
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were a prerequisite for voluntary action (i.e., if only knowers were 
moral agents), then groups would not be capable of voluntary action. 
What is important for the voluntariness of action, however, is not that 
the agent be capable of some act of knowing, but that the agent has 
available and is able to make use of the premises, prepositions, rea-
sonings, etc. that are relevant to a decision-making process. The in-
formation that a group has available to it is the information that per-
sons involved in group decision-making have available to them; and 
using this information is the process in which those persons incorporate 
it into the decision-making process of the group. Thus, the research 
and development arm of a corporation, its market analysts, and those 
who prepare its environmental impact statements all figure in the cor-
poration's ability to act voluntarily. Exactly how this information 
will be fed into the group's decision-making process will vary according 
to the nature of the group and of the rules that constitute it. 
The matter of culpable ignorance, mentioned above, is especially 
complex when it comes to groups. The question here is: do groups have 
a moral obligation to maintain some specific level of competence, so 
that they know what they are doing, the consequences of what they are 
doing, and the moral significance of each? If it turns out that groups 
can act voluntarily and can theoretically have moral obligations and 
rights then it would seem obvious that they would have this obligation 
to be informed. 6 The problem is in the extent of the obligation that a 
6This claim should appear obviously true. If moral agents have 
no obligation to be informed, then in every moral dilemma there would be 
at least two morally correct options: the agent could either do what 
is right or do his best to remain ignorant of what he does, its con-
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group has, i.e. , how far i,t ought to go in acquiring the information 
necessary for informed decisions. Though this is problematic, the prob-
lem is not unique to groups and poses no direct challenge to the thesis 
of the present chapter, that groups are capable of voluntary action and 
are thus conceivably right - and obligation-bearers. 
A number of groups have responded to this fundamental moral 
obligation. For the most part, groups (as well as persons) have strong 
prudential reasons for gathering factual data about their actions and 
their consequences. Unfortunately, it is not always the ca.se that a 
group has prudential reasons for becoming informed about the moral sig-
nificance of its actions. Nevertheless hospitals, for example, some-
times employ ethical consultants in positions where they can provide 
input for the decision-making process. There is some talk of businesses 
doing the same. To date the so-called "social audit" has been the 
primary vehicle by which business groups have informed themselves of 
7 
morally significant effects of their activities. The social audit is 
an attempt to measure the social good and evil caused by corporate 
action, good and evil that might not show up in a conventional audit 
that measures only those goods and evils that can be assigned a dollar-
value. In addition, many professional organizations have taken it upon 
sequences, and their moral significance. There would be nothing to 
recommend doing the right thing over remaining ignorant; each would 
be a morally acceptable option. I take it that this consequence of a 
denial of an obligation to be informed is one that we would not find 
acceptable. 
7 
See, for example, Raymond Bauer and Dan H. Fenn, Jr. The Cor-
porate Social Audit (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972) and David 
F. Limowes, The Corporate Conscience (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1974}. 
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themselves to institute codes of ethics and see to it that they are 
published and disseminated to those in decision-making roles. 8 In sum-
mary, there is empirical evidence that some groups have acknowledged 
both their ability and their moral obligation to have and make use of 
information about the moral significance of what they do. 
The second condition for voluntary action is that the agent not 
be compelled or coerced. In claiming that some act is coerced, we usu-
ally claim that some external force has disrupted the ordinary process 
by which the individual decides and acts. Thus, the distinction between 
forces external to and those that are part of the normal decision-
making and acting process appears to be crucial to the distinction be--
9 
tween coerced and uncoerced action. Threats of harm, immanent danger, 
and physical force are examples of external forces that are commonly 
judged to disrupt the normal decision-making and acting process of an 
agent and thus to diminish his voluntariness. Certain other kinds of 
influences are usually judged as part of the normal process and are thus 
not judged to diminish voluntariness; desires by the agent, for example, 
do not ordinarily provide an excuse for acting to satisfy the desire. 
"I wanted to" is not ordinarily considered a goo_d excuse. Normal desires 
are incentives and may provide reasons for acting, but they are usually 
not considered disruptive of a normal decision making and acting process. 
8 
See Jane Clapp's Professional Ethics and Insignia (Metuchen, N. 
J.: Scarecrow Press, 1974). This book contains codes of ethical conduct 
of 205 major professional organizations in the U.S. 
9 r make no attempt here to establish the parameters of normalcy 
in the decision process. What is important is that we do habitually 
distinguish between this process and its disruption due to external 
forces. 
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But we do sometimes excuse an agent whom we regard as consumed by some 
over-whelming fear or desire that we judge him incapable of resisting 
and that is regarded as disruptive of the normal process, provided that 
he has not voluntarily placed himself in that condition. 
In the case of groups, if there is some distinction between the 
influences that are part of the normal process of deciding and acting 
and the influences that disrupt this normal process, then there is a 
basis for distinguishing group acts that are coerced from those that 
are uncoerced. If there is a basis for such a distinction in the case 
of groups, then this second condition can be satisfied. That is, if a 
group's decision and acting can reasonably be described as either co-
erced or uncoerced according to the circumstances of the individual case, 
then it will make sense to claim on some occasions that it acts vol-
untarily, provided that it also meets the other two conditions listed 
above. I shall argue that there is a basis for distinguishing between 
coerced and uncoerced actions by groups. 
One objection to such an undertaking is that, because groups 
act only when persons do, all group action is compelled by abnormal 
influences. If this objection holds, then no group meets the second 
condition and no group can act voluntarily. Examination of this ob-
jection is therefore essential to our project. Moreover, careful atten-
tion to it will repay us with a better understanding of the relation of 
persons in groups to those groups. 
That groups act only in virtue of acts by persons does not en-
tail of itself that groups are thereby coerced by those persons. For 
the relation of acts by persons to acts by groups is one of coercion 
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only when the acts by persons are a force external to and disruptive of 
the normal decision-making and acting process of the group. In the case 
of the group agent, the relation between acts ~by persons and act ~by 
the group is not a causal one, i.e., not between an exterior force and 
an internal process; acts by groups are acts by persons formed under 
constitutive rules into what count as acts by groups. 10 Thus, the acts 
by persons .that count as a group's act do not coerce it but are instead 
a logically necessary and normal, internal component of the group's act. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that group action is necessarily coerced 
by persons. Persons can and do sometimes coerce groups by functioning 
in an external way and disrupting the normal deciding and acting process; 
but this is not logically necessary and is, instead, dependent on cir-
11 
cumstances. It therefore appears that groups are capable of satis-
fying the second condition, that they can act uncoercedly. To see this 
more clearly it will help to see how groups can be coerced, and thus 
act involuntarily. 
10 h . 1" . h" . 1 h T e group agent ~s pecu ~ar ~n t ~s respect: 1t acts on y w en 
persons do; but the group's acts, goals, and decisions are conceptually 
distinct from those of persons. Admittedly this creates some special 
problems for the logic of personal and group responsibility, and I shall 
explore those problems in the next chapter. 
11A similar thing might be said of the various committees that 
are sometimes found within larger groups. They do sometimes exert pres-
sure for certain kinds of group decisions and actions. Where this pres-
sure is considered part of the normal process of decision-making by the 
group (as, indeed, it sometimes is), the group is not considered to be 
coerced by the committee. However, should the committee act outside of 
its role in the decision-making process (i.e., should it revolt and use 
means not accorded to it by the constitutive rules and/or norms of 
conduct) then it could conceivably be an external force acting on the 
group agent. 
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As explained above, an agent is coerced when some other agent, 
acting as an outside force, disrupts the normal decision-making or acting 
process of the first agent. This process, in the case of a group, can 
be disrupted in either of two ways, or in both of them simultaneously. 
First, a group can be coerced without persons in the group being coerced. 
Consider, for example, the case where a parent threatens to withhold a 
pledged contribution unless his offspring (who does not meet admissions 
criteria) is awarded a slot in a medical or law schoo1. 12 The force 
being exerted here is being applied to the school itself. Without the 
pledged funds, it is the school that will suffer. It is the school's 
goals (perhaps of expansion of program, retention of qualified faculty, 
or simply maintenance of present facilities) that will be thwarted with-
out such funds. Moreover, it is the group's, i.e., the school's deciding 
and acting processes (specifically, its normal criteria and processes for 
selecting and admitting applicants) that are being disrupted by this 
external force. 
Admittedly, the situation might also involve persons in roles in 
the school being coerced. This might be so if the jobs or careers of 
persons in the school admissions committee would be threatened by the 
lack of funds and who accordingly feel constrained to act in ways in 
which they would not normally have acted (e.g. in voting to admit an 
unqualified applicant) • In some such cases the external force might be 
12rn the chosen example it is a human agent (the parent) who is 
coercing, but it could as well have been a group if the group is capable 
of acting in ways that would, for example threaten the other group with 
serious loss. Government agencies are often capable of this; they can 
withhold grant monies, prevent construction projects, etc. 
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applied directly to some person in the group and through him to the group 
itself. In this regard, consider the case of the executive of some 
international corporation whose child is kidnapped and held hostage by 
terrorists who demand, in return for the child, nationalization of all 
the corporation's assets. In this case, the group might not be coerced 
in a direct way; that is, the kidnapping of the child might be of no 
relevance to the group's goals. The executive whose child is kidnapped 
might very well be concerned and might press for divestiture of his 
corporation's holdings in the country in question. Nor does it matter 
whether the executive in question has, according to the rules, the ca-
pacity to bring about divestiture. If he does not have that capacity, 
then the executive himself may coerce the group because of his own duress. 
If he does have the capacity for divestiture, then his own duress is 
actually the duress of the corporation and may still diminish the vol-
untariness of the corporation's act of divestiture. 
David Ozar has recently claimed that duress is not ordinarily 
held to diminish the responsibility of the group: 
The explanation lies, I think, in the fact individual persons cannot 
avoid being subject [to] the various forms of duress which excuse 
them, in varying degrees, from moral responsibility for their actions. 
But corporations' resources are much greater and I think we take it 
for granted that corporations can be reasonably expected to avoid 
having their actions be the product of such duress. 13 
Ozar goes on to explain how a corporation might be "reasonably expected 
to avoid" being under duress through the coercion of persons in the 
corporation: 
13oavid Ozar, "The Moral Responsibility of Corporations,", 
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Since the actions of corporations can be structured to incorporate 
the perceptions, intelligence, and decision-making powers of many 
persons -- and might even be structurable so that the activities of 
persons acting under duress do not count as acts of the corporation 
-- we are unwilling to apply this excuse [i.e. coercion] in the same 
way that we apply it to individual persons.l4 
Ozar makes a legitimate point that is well worth considering 
here: we should at least not assume that a group is necessarily under 
duress everytime some person in the group is coerced. Ozar, however, 
appears to be claiming something stronger than this, that it is always 
inappropriate to assume that coercion of persons in the group diminishes 
the voluntariness of the group's action. To validate this conclusion, 
one would have to show that a group always can be restructured in such 
a way to prevent the activities of coerced persons under coercion from 
influencing and from counting as actions by the group. And it must be 
able to do this, not post facto, but as each relevant situation arises. 
This seems a bit much to expect, even from a group that has resources 
unavailable to individual persons. Thus, while it might be appropriate 
to be more stingy about excusing groups when persons in the group are 
coerced, it hardly seems appropriate to refuse to excuse a group as a 
matter of policy in such circumstances and thus to insist that it acts 
voluntarily. 
To summarize, then, a group acts involuntarily to the degree 
that its moral deciding and acting processes are disrupted by some ex-
ternal force. When the source of the external force is an agent, the 
forthcoming in Donaldson, Thomas and Werhane, Patricia (eds.), Ethical 
Issues in Business. 
14 "d Ibl ., pp. 
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disruption is known as "coercion". A group may be coerced by either 
persons or other groups or both. The coercive agent may be an agent that 
would, under other circumstances, be part of the normal process. What is 
most important is that there be something that is regarded as a normal 
decision procedure (set by constitutive rules), and that this procedure 
be disrupted. We have seen how all of these are possible and have seen 
examples. Moreover, we have seen that the disruption of the normal pro-
cess is due to circumstances and not to any logical necessity. Thus, 
it is conceivable that a group action be uncoerced; and so it can but 
does not necessarily satisfy the second condition for voluntariness. 
The third condition, proposed by some philosophers,is that the 
agent exhibit a sort of interiority. We saw in Chapter Three how it is 
that a group can exhibit the same sorts of things that the interiority 
requirement demands of persons as agents. When the interiority of agency 
was discussed in Chapter Three, it was with the goal of establishing 
that the performances of a group cannot be adequately explained without 
reference to the group's own normal process of deciding and acting, 
having goals, etc. This is in contrast to the sort of causality that we 
attribute to inanimate objects. I discussed the goals and decisions of 
groups, arguing that a group can have the sort of things demanded by 
interiority. In the present chapter, the discussion of coercion of groups 
drew on the findings of Chapter Three by determining in general what 
would count as a disruption of the group's normal decision-making and 
acting process. Thus, the relevant features of the interiority con-
dition can be satisfied in the case of groups as agents, even as we 
explain the nature of this disruption. 
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In summary, then, groups can satisfy the three conditions of 
voluntary action. We have also seen that there are circumstances in 
which a group can fail to satisfy the conditions for voluntary action. 
This is an important step in showing that groups can be moral agents, i. 
e. that they can be praise- or blameworthy for what they do. But there 
is an important step remaining. In arguing that groups are capable of 
both voluntary and involuntary action, I have argued for much of what we 
regard as agency. In order to show that groups are moral agents, I 
intend to argue also that groups can be right- and obligation- bearers. 
The following section of the present chapter examines this claim and 
offers evidence in support of it. 
* * * * * 
I intend here to show how it makes sense, in some specific cir-
cumstances,to claim that a group has some specified moral obligation or 
right. I shall assume in what follows (as I have assumed throughout) 
that at least some acts by persons have moral significance (i.e., that 
they create or satisfy moral obligations and/or rights). I shall speak, 
for the most part, of classes of acts rather than of specific cases, for 
there is no need for us to get bogged down here in the intricacies of 
case by case analyses. The classes of acts that I shall deal with, 
namely, contracting and promising, are drawn from everyday morality and 
the obligations spoken of are thus intended to be compatible with the 
moral beliefs, intuitions or sensitivities of most persons. 
The basic principle to which I appeal in the discussion of the 
obligations of groups is the following: if Y is an act that has moral 
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significance when performed by some agent, then ! will be morally sig-
nificant when performed by any other agent as well. In truth, this is 
one element of the principle of universalizability, a principle with a 
long philosophical history. The universalizability principle states, in 
general, that: 
•.• if one judges that~ is right or good, then one is committed to 
judging that anything exactly like ~, or like ~ in relevant respects, 
is good. Otherwise he has no business using these words. 15 
The principle thus demands consistency in our moral judgments. For 
example, a person who judges that all persons have a certain obligation 
must include also himself unless he can cite relevant differences in his 
own case. Should he fail to include himself or not cite relevant dif-
ferences, he is, under the principle of universalizability, committing 
a mistake in moral reasoning. As most moral philosophers do, I believe 
that this is a fundamental principle of moral reasoning and shall assume 
its correctness in what follows. 16 
15
william Frankena, Ethics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1973), p. 25. 
16The principle is to be found implicit in the ancients, who by 
postulating a common or similar human nature, claim that the requirements 
of morality are common to those beings of the same nature. Kant proposes 
the principle of universalizability in his categorical imperative, and 
even attempts to deduce substantive moral obligations from it alone. More 
recently, analytic philosophers have dealt with this principle. See, in 
particular, R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford University Press, 1969) 
and Marcus Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Knopf, Inc., 1961). 
Hints of a similar principle can be found in Sartre, who claims 
in his "Existentialism and Humanism" that man is " •.. a lawmaker who is 
... choosing all mankind as well as himself ... " A.J. Ayer offers similar 
hints about his own position on universalizability, when he claims that 
moral approval and disapproval are not about particular actions but types 
of action (Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Press, p. 21). It 
is odd that these philosophers of different traditions, both usually 
portrayed as radically non-cognitivist, should both be concerned with a 
sort of universalizability. It is, of course, still questionable whether 
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The discussion so far has established the agency of groups in a 
way that showed that the agency of groups is similar in important respects 
to the agency of persons, namely, they both can voluntarily perform acts 
based on goals and decisions of their own. Thus, the concept of agency 
that I have been employing here has proven to be applicable to both 
personal and group agents. Empirical studies would have to confirm when 
other similarities do exist. Final judgment about whether an agent is 
similar to other agents in relevant respects would depend on the facts 
of the individual case. Recognizing this, we can see how we might con-
elude that a group has some given moral obligation. If we take it as 
given that persons have some obligation to do Y in context ~' then a 
group, when it is similar to persons in relevant respects, will have the 
same obligation to do ~ in context C. 
In an important sense, then, acceptance of this principle places 
the burden of proof on him who regards groups as an exception. I have 
shown relevant similarities between groups and other agents (in addition 
to showing differences). Thus, it is up to the objector to show why a 
group functioning as an agent in context C should not be treated as 
similar to other agents in context C once the differences explained above 
have been taken into account. The implication of this is that, if a 
person has some moral obligation or right, then so will any group that 
is relevantly similar and in a relevantly similar context. With this 
principle we can begin discussing the obligations and rights of groups. 
I have already noted one obligation that agents have simply 
they intended to propose a universalizability in exactly the same sense 
as I assume here. 
I 
I·' 
!·'I I 
t 
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because they are moral agents. That is the obligation to be informed 
of the nature and moral significance of what one does. But if this were 
the only obligation that groups had, it would surely be an uninteresting 
obligation; for there would be no moral significance to our acts and 
thus nothing about which we ought to be informed. There are, however, 
other obligations and rights that agents have. For present purposes, it 
might prove useful to deal separately with those obligations and rights 
that exist because of some prior act(s) performed or special relations 
entered into by the agent, and those that exist absolutely, i.e., with-
. 1 1 . 17 out some spec1a act or re at1on. If a group can have rights or ob-
ligations of even one of those two sorts, then a group can perform acts 
that are not only voluntary but morally significant. And that will show 
that a group is not only an agent, but a moral agent, i.e. an agent 
capable of having obligations (and thus of being praise- or blameworthy) 
and/or rights. 
Let us first examine obligations of the first type. There are 
some things that an agent does that impose new moral requirements on 
him. Some of the most commonplace and obvious obligation-creating acts 
. f f . . . 18 Wh are the var1ous orms o contract1ng and prom1s1ng. en an agent 
performs an act of contracting, he incurs some new obligation, an ob-
17 Hart has proposed a somewhat similar distinction, but he deals 
only with rights. See his "Are There Any Natural Rights?" The Philo-
sophical Review, LXIV (1955). 
18As I use it here, the term "contracting" refers to a two-party 
promise, where each party agrees to perform some deed in return for some 
promise of consideration from the other party. Of course, contracts may 
also be multi-party with no significant change in the moral principles 
involved. Contracts differ from simple promises in that the latter may 
be unilateral and gratuitous. 
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ligation to do what he has contracted to do. Groups do enter into con-
tracts: they agree to buy and sell; they hire and fire; they guarantee 
their products; they agree to limit their political activities in order 
to gain not-for-profit status; they guarantee satisfactory products to 
purchasers; etc. We can see how this is possible by examining the con-
stitutive rules of the groups involved: any time a group has a rule 
designating some act(s) ~to count as the group's acts of contracting, 
it is capable of contracting. Persons holding certain roles or offices 
within a group are often empowered to create contracts for the group. 
Thus, salesmen may be empowered to perform acts that count as a contract 
for sale and delivery of goods by the group; the admissions director of 
a university may be empowered to create a contractual relationship be-
tween the university and matriculating students. In such cases, it is 
the group that enters into the contract, but it does so in virtue of 
the acts of those holding office. 
When a group enters into a contract it ipso facto incurs a new 
obligation, for this is part of what it means to enter into a contract. 
Because the parties to a contract also incur a new right, namely, the 
right to the consideration promised by the other party, the ability of 
. 1 abl h h 1 . h 19 groups to enter 1nto contracts a so en es t em to ave mora r1g ts. 
Thus, the ability of groups to contract indicates that they can have 
moral obligations and rights. Groups might be capable of other kinds 
19It might here be objected that a contract is purely a legal 
phenomenon and indicates nothing about morality. The legal significance 
of contracts does not entail their moral insignificance. If there were 
no legal framework, agents could still create contracts and all that 
they involve. 
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of obligation-creating acts as well, in addition to contracting, but this 
one type of example is sufficient to make our case. The example chosen 
is especially useful, for a large number of the social interactions of 
groups are contracts for the exchange of goods, services, privileges, etc. 
It seems, then, that the important question becomes not whether groups 
can have obligations and rights but instead the extent of these rights 
and obligations. 
Groups can have other obligations besides those created by their 
own acts. If, for example, we agree that persons have certain moral 
rights, then we must admit that other agents have at least a prima facie 
obligation to act in ways that respect those rights. It makes no dif-
ference what grounds these personal rights or how far they extend; as 
long as persons have them, this entails obligations on the part of agents 
who interact with them. Because groups are capable of interacting with 
persons, groups can also have the obligation to respect the rights of 
persons in those interactions. 
I cannot here discuss whether groups can have absolute rights and 
those obligations that do not derive from the rights of others or from 
some special relation to them. Nor can we establish here on what grounds 
it might be argued that a group does not have such rights and obligations. 
There is, however, a prima facie reason for doubting that groups have such 
absolute rights and obligations. Groups are, in their very nature, rule-
constituted or conventional beings. Thus, it would seem odd to attri-
bute an absolute right or obligation to a being that exists and acts 
only by convention and could be destroyed through a change in convention. 
In the end, this may prove no obstacle, but it would at least have to be 
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examined. 
Besides praising and blaming moral agents for their actions in 
relation to their obligations, we also sometimes ascribe moral virtues 
to them for habitually or ordinarily doing right or good things of a 
certain type. There is some reason for thinking that ascriptions of 
virtue to groups are well-founded as well. When we attribute some virtue 
to an agent, we are (according to traditional understanding) claiming 
that it habitually, regularly and easily performs acts of a type that 
k l•t . 11 b 20 rna e 1n some way mora y etter. Thus, to claim that an agent has 
the virtue of honesty is to make a two-fold claim: that the agent regu-
larly and easily acts in honest ways and that the agent is somehow mor-
ally better for being honest. 
Surely, a group can perform some acts more easily that it can 
others. Ease in acting can be achieved through careful structuring of 
the deciding and acting process, through careful training and selection 
of those acting in roles, etc. Once we can decide how often one must 
act in order to be acting "regularly" or "habitually" it should not be 
difficult to determine whether some given group does so. What is left, 
then, is to determine what kinds of qualities make a group morally better. 
As candidates we might suggest efficiency and some other characteristics 
that a group could have that might enable it to serve the common good or 
some other moral ideal. I cannot here give a catalogue of organizational 
20According to Aristotle, virtue is a state of character or a 
habit (E. N. ll04a4 ff.) of making choices (ll06b36) that make the agent 
somehow-better (ll06a21-22). See also Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, I-II, 
Question LV. For a more contemporary discussion of this conception of 
virtue see Peter Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: University Press, 1977). 
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moral virtues. Note, though, that it is not a problem peculiar to groups; 
there is sincere dispute concerning what qualities count as virtues in 
human beings as well. In summary, we can see that the attribution of 
virtues to groups as agents is not nonsensical, although there are sev-
eral questions that must be settled before one could make a case for 
claiming that some given group has some specified virtue. 
* * * * * 
In the present chapter I have argued a number of points that 
together lead to the conclusion that groups can act as moral agents. We 
say first that groups are capable of voluntary action, that they can 
exercise control over what they do. In this regard, we say that: groups 
can decide and act while making use of information concerning what they 
do, its likely consequences, and the moral significance of both; groups 
can act without being coerced to act; and groups can act on the basis 
of their own goals and decisions. To the degree that a group satisfies 
all three conditions, it is said to voluntarily act. 
It is important to add that a group in its actions can fail to 
satisfy one or more of these conditions and thus have its voluntariness 
diminished. Judgments about whether a group has in fact acted voluntarily 
must accordingly be made with some caution. A group may have been un-
avoidably ignorant, for example, or it may have been somehow forced to 
do what it does. In arguing that groups can act voluntarily and are thus 
responsible for what they do, we have uncovered (but not discussed in 
detail) the possibility of a group, on some occasion, not satisfying the 
conditions for voluntariness. Elaboration on that point could provide 
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an account of when a group is excusable. Thus the problem of whether a 
group is responsible for what it does can be seen to be not a general 
conceptual problem, but a matter to be settled in each instance according 
to the circumstances of the occasion. 
Secondly, we saw that there is good reason to believe that there 
are some specific obligations and rights that groups have. Because some 
acts that an agent performs create new obligations or rights for that 
agent, a group performing such acts acquires the obligation or right in 
question. This, we saw, was simply an application of the principle of 
universalizability in moral reasoning. We examined several other pos-
sible sources of the rights and obligations of groups and saw also that 
there is some basis for ascribing virtues to groups. 
In summary, a group can perform, have goals, decide, act volun-
tarily, have obligations and rights, and be worthy of praise or blame. 
This is what is meant by the claim that the group is a moral agent. What 
is left to do is to analyze in more detail the logic of the relation of 
personal to group responsibility. I shall do this in Chapter Five. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
GROUP AGENTS AND PERSONS 
In Chapter Four I argued tha,t group agency is mora.l agency, i.e,, 
that groups can fulfill the conditions of voluntariness ordinarily asso-
ciated with moral responsibility, can have moral obligations a.nd rights, 
and can be either praise- or blameworthy. In that discussion I drew 
once more on the characteristic relationship of personal to group agency: 
groups act in virtue of acts by persons, given the appropriate consti-
tutive rules. This peculiar relationship is in need of more careful 
analysis, especially where it relates to ascriptions of responsibility 
for what a group does. 
One important problem with this relationship has been raised by 
H.D. Lewis. According to Lewis, collective (i.e., group) moral respon-
sibility requires either that persons be responsible for acts they have 
not performed or that persons be not responsible for acts they have 
performed. The ~econd problem is raised by Martin Benjamin. Benjamin 
claims that ascriptions of collective responsibility are superfluous 
because, of necessity, they are merely ways of referring to an aggregate 
of persons, each of whom is already considered to be morally responsible. 
If the first of these criticisms were justifiable, it would make my 
thesis morally repugnant. If the second were justifiable, my thesis 
would be superfluous. I intend to show here that neither one of those 
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two claims ultimately affects my thesis. Each of these criticisms will 
be seen to be incorrect, although both will provide us with some useful 
insights. 
After dealing with those two problems, I shall examine in more 
detail the nature of the praise- and blameworthiness of persons for what 
their groups do. I will also examine some special types of obligations 
that persons might have simply because they are or can be members of 
groups. 1 This latter discussion will necessarily be incomplete, but it 
should provide some understanding of the special status of persons in a 
society that has groups. 
* * * * * 
H.D. Lewis sums up well a common belief about group agency and 
responsibility as praise- or blameworthiness when he claims: 
... the belief in "individual," as against any form of "collective" 
responsibility is quite fundamental to our ordinary ethical atti-
tudes; for if we believe that responsibility is literally shared ..• 
we shall be directly implicated in one another's actions, and the 
praise or blame for them must fall upon us all without discrim-
ination.2 
When Lewis states that, under any conception of collective respon-
1Earlier, I introduced the term "persons in groups" to designate 
those persons whose acts can count as acts by groups. The term "members 
of groups" .should be taken to designate not only persons in groups but 
also those persons who have roles in groups but whose acts do not count 
as acts by the group. 
2Lewis, H.D., "The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility," 
p. 122 in Individual and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter French 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972). See also 
Lewis's earlier essay, "Collective Responsibility," Philosophy, XXIII 
(1948). 
103 
sibility, "praise or blame must fall upon us all without discrim-
ination," he assumes that, where responsibility is ascribed to a col-
lective or group, it must also be ascribed individually to each member 
of the group. Let us see how this fundamental assumption figures in his 
reasoning. His argument is presented piecemeal, but I believe that the 
following is a correct outline of its steps: 
(1) Ascriptions of group responsibility always entail the respon-
sibility of each member of the group. 
in the paragraph immediately above.) 
(This is the assumption quoted 
(2) " ... No one can be responsible, in the properly ethical sense, 
for the conduct of another." 3 Because this is both a moral principle 
and a conceptual claim, counter instances to it are both morally repug-
nant and conceptually muddled. 
(3) Because ascriptions of group responsibility require distri-
bution of responsibility to all members of the group, persons may some-
times be held responsible for the acts of others. 
Therefore, ascriptions of group moral responsibility are morally 
repugnant and conceptually incorrect. 
Obviously, if Lewis's argument holds, there is something seri-
ously wrong with my analysis of group agency and responsibility to this 
point. However, there are problems with both the first and the second 
premise. Let us consider the first premise, that ascriptions of group 
responsibility always entail ascriptions of responsibility to each mem-
ber of the group without discrimination. There are, in fact, some cases 
3 
Lewis, H.D. "The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility," 
p. 121. 
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where this is true. Those that come immediately to mind are the ones 
in which the group is not itself a unified entity with its own goals, 
decisions, and actions but is instead simply an aggregate, a colection 
of atomic individuals. Let us return to an example from Chapter One, 
the case of the family who refused their flu shots. If refusing one's 
flu shot is an act for which one could be praise- or blameworthy, then 
each member of the family is praise- or blameworthy, provided only that 
he or she meets the general conditions for voluntariness. 
But not all cases are of this sort; groups do have goals, make 
decisions, and engage in acts that are not reducible to those of persons 
in groups. When I argued this, I showed also that one cannot argue from 
the premise that a group performed some act ~ to the conclusion that all 
or any persons in the group performed act ~- Persons might perform some 
acts !• ~, ~; but that is not the same as performing act ~, even if, 
under the relevant constitutive rules~, then acts X, ~, Z count as Y. 
For the descriptions of !• W, ~require no mention of R; while Y cannot 
be described adequately without reference to R. While one cannot argue 
from "The gr01;p performed Y" to "Jones, Brown, etc. each performed Y," 
one can conclude that at least some persons in the group performed some 
act(s) that count(s) as Y. Thus, for a group to act, it is not always 
necessary for all persons in the group to act; and it is never con-
ceptually necessary or even possible that some person perform Y. 
In order to determine which persons are responsible (praise- or 
blameworthy) for what a group of persons does, we need to know more than 
the membership list of that group. We need to know also what persons 
have control over what the group does, for we praise or blame an agent 
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only for what he can control. This control can be haa, for example, when 
a person's act is (part of) the X that counts as group act Y. 4 Thus, it 
is at least conceivable that a person can be a member of a group that per-
forms some act for which it is praise- or blameworthy without that person 
being praise- or blameworthy. Because it makes sense to ascribe respon-
sibility to a group itself (as aistinguishea from the persons in it), and 
because a person in a group can be not responsible for that group's act, 
we cannot assume beforehand that responsibility for a group's act "must 
fall upon .•. all without discrimination." Therefore, the first premise 
of Lewis's argument is incorrect. 
Lewis's second premise, that no agent can be responsible for the 
acts of others, is actually two distinct propositions. In the first 
place, it is a conceptual claim, a claim that it makes no sense to 
assert that one agent is responsible for the acts of another. In the 
secona place, it is a normative claim, a claim that it is morally objec-
tionable to praise or blame one agent for the acts of another agent. I 
shall analyze each of these two claims in turn. 
In explanation of his conceptual claim, Lewis offers us this 
explanation of his use of the term "responsibility": 
It ["Responsibility"] means simply to be a moral agent, ana this 5 
means simply to be an agent capable of acting rightly or wrongly .•. 
4 In this case the possibility of control is establishea through 
the logical relation of a person's acts to his group's acts. But control 
can also be gained through certain kinds of empirical relations ais-
cussed later in the present chapter. 
5Lewis, H.D., "The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility," 
p. 125. 
106 
In order to be useful, however, this explanation requires further anal-
ysis. Lewis's explanation here is similar to what Hart calls "capacity-
responsibility": 
... the expression 'he is responsible for his actions' is used to 
assert that a person has certain normal capacities ..• The capacities 
in question are those of understanding, reasoning, and control of 
conduct; the ability to understand what conduct legal rules of 
morality require, to deliberate and reach decisions concerning these 
requirements and to conform to decisions when made. 6 
"Responsibility," in this sense of the term, is the capacity for 
performing morally significant acts in a morally significant way. Thus, 
moral responsibility is moral agency. So when Lewis states that "no 
one can be held responsible .•. for the conduct of another'' he is making 
a true statement, for it is true that B cannot be the agent for A's act. 
However, the claim is not a very enlightening one, for it says nothing 
more than that moral agency can be attributed only to the being to whom 
it can be attributed. To say that~ performed ~·s morally significant 
act is, in all cases, patently nonsense. Moreover engaging in such 
nonsense is morally repugnant: it is morally wrong to praise or blame 
one agent for what another agent does (i.e., it is wrong to blame the 
innocent, and it is right to give praise where it is due). 7 
What remains to be seen is whether the analysis of group moral 
agency entails such nonsense and such a morally repugnant position. In 
fact, attributing the agency for some act Y to some group does not 
6Hart, H.L.A., Punishment & Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 227. 
7Lewis sees a further evil in this: 
cept of responsibility, so that " ... we tend 
moral indifference or acquiescence which can 
to afflict a society" ("The Non-Moral Notion 
bility 1 11 p. 143) • 
it corrodes the very con-
to lapse into a state of 
be one of the greatest ills 
of Collective Responsi-
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entail that all numbers of the group performed act ~, but only that some 
person(s) in the group performed act(s) ~which count(s) as Y.. Thus, the 
analysis of group agency given here does not require the attribution of 
agency for some act to an agent who did not perform the act. 
In general, Lewis has failed to make his point, not because of 
the falsity of what he says but because of his failure to recognize the 
true nature of the group as agent. A person does not stand in the same 
relation to his group as he does to other autonomous persons. A group 
is not an autonomous individual alongside the autonomous individuals who 
have roles in it. Lewis fails to see this because he looks at aggregates 
rather than at groups as such. For example, he cites as a typical in-
stance of an attribution of group responsibility the case o£ a teacher 
who punishes a whole class for the misdeeds of a few students. 8 Lewis 
has correctly seen the problems incurred with attempts to blame each 
member of some aggregate for what some members of the aggregate have 
done. But he has not dealt with the case of the group as such and its 
relation to persons in the group. 
We have seen that groups are sets of persons acting under rules 
and that groups act in virtue of the acts of persons in them. In the 
present chapter I have already argued that this account of the relation 
of personal to group agency survives one claim that it is conceptually 
muddled and morally repugnant. I wish to deal not with an argument in 
which Martin Benjamin attempts to show that, even if internally consis-
8Lewis, H.D., "The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility," 
p. 126. 
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9 
tent, such an account leaves group responsibility a superfluous concept. 
Benjamin says he intends to show that 
... insofar as what is said morally has to do with moral responsibility, 
it must apply distinctively to individuals. 10 
In his argument Benjamin first states three conditions that an 
,be 
agent must meet in order to~morally responsible (i.e., morally praise-
or blameworthy) for his acts and their consequences: the agent must have 
alternative courses of action available to him; the fault (or credit) 
for not acting otherwise must rest in the agent's own intentions or char-
acter; and the agent must be able to help having these intentions or 
character. 11 Benjamin then asks how a collective or group can satisfy 
these conditions. The nature of his question is somewhat unclear, for 
he never adequately explains the meaning of "collective." He first cites 
an example of a group that is merely an aggregate and rightly dismisses 
it as uninteresting for the problem of collective responsibility. He then 
cites a case of cooperation among several agents and shows it similar to 
the first case, in that all the actions undertaken are undertaken by 
9
senjamin, Martin, "Can Moral Responsibility Be Collective and 
Non-distributive?" Social Theory and Practice, IV. ll976), 93-106. 
lOrbid., p. 93. The emphasis is his. Note that Benjamin uses 
the term "individual" to refer exclusively to human persons. Through-
out the article he ignores the fact that there is a significant sense 
in which groups, too, are individuals. 
11rbid., p. 98. Note the similarity between Benjamin's claim 
here and our discussion of voluntariness as a condition for responsibility 
in Chapter Three. The three conditions he speaks of amount to the claim 
that the agent must have control over what he does, and that is pre-
cisely what I argued groups to be capable of. 
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12 individual persons. Finally, he cites an example that involves action 
by a committee (of vigilantes). Benjamin does not, however, give an 
adequate analysis of the committee and this makes it difficult to deter-
mine whether it is truly a group acting as a single agent. It will, 
nevertheless, prove fruitful to examine his argument in order to see 
whether it does apply to groups as well. 
The first condition, that the agent have available alternative 
courses of action, can (according to Benjamin) be met only if members of 
the groups have alternative courses of action available to them: 
If we can blame the committee for not having done otherwise, this is 
because at least some of the members could have done otherwise. Thus 
the committee can meet condition (1) only if the responsibility for 
not having done otherwise can be distributed to some or all of the 
members.l 3 
But this, according to Benjamin, entails that individuals (and not the 
collective or group) are responsible. We shall obvious,ly have to return 
to this; but let us look at the other two conditions. 
The second condition, that the fault (or, in the case of praise-
worthiness, the credit) for not acting otherwise rest within the agent, 
can be met by a group only if two sub-conditions are met: (a) the group 
must be able to have a character or intention in a way that is relevantly 
12The group actions cited by Benjamin as examples of aggregates 
of personal acts can be expressed by the following: the Physics De-
partment sells dope to students. 
In the first example, several members of the department indi-
vidually sell dope. In the second example, one member imports it, a 
second bags and stores it, and a third sells it. These examples are 
relevantly similar to the two examples I offer in Chapter One of the 
present work: a family's refusal of their flu shots and the community's 
barn-building. 
13 . . . . 98 Ben]amln, Mart1n, op. c1t., p. . 
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similar to characters or intentions when had by persons; and (b) the 
intention or character of the group must not be reducible to (i.e., must 
be more than the aggregate of) intentions or characters of persons having 
14 
roles in the group. But, Benjamin goes on, if (a) is met, then (b) 
cannot be met, for groups can have intentions and characters only if 
persons in them do. 
Concerning the third condition, that the agent must be able to 
help having the intentions or character in question, Benjamin asks rhe-
torically: 
How ••• can we say that it [the collective] could have helped having 
the intentions or character it had without also saying that this is 
because some of the members could have helped having the intentions 
or character they had? Here again, the condition can be met only 
by sliding from a nondistributive to a distributive characterization 
of some or all of the members of the committee. 15 
In discussion of how a collective or group can satisfy each of 
these three conditions, discussion of how persons in the group can sat-
isfy them in unavoidable. From this Benjamin concludes that "it is dif-
ficult to know what it means to blame the committee but none of its 
members."16 Because Benjamin can find no intelligible foundation for 
ascriptions of collective responsibility that do not, upon analysis, 
l4Ibid., p. 96. Benjamin's list here is similar to the one I 
provide in Chapter Three of how we can reasonably ascribe goals and de-
cisions to a group: Benjamin argues that these conditions cannot be met. 
In Chapter Three I argue that the rule-structure of groups is the key to 
how the conditions can be met. 
lSibid., p. 99. 
16Ibid., p. 99. Note that Benjamin appears to accept the pro-
position that either groups or their members are responsible, but not 
both. We have already seen that this is a false dichotomy. 
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disintegrate into some set of ascriptions of personal responsibility, it 
seems to him that ascriptions of collective or group responsibility are 
logically superfluous (though they may have some value in that they fos-
ter economy of language). In sum, since group responsibility requires 
that persons be responsible Benjamin concludes that the responsibility 
of the group can be nothing more than the responsibility of the persons 
in the group. 
It is hard to fault Benjamin's argument that, where a group is 
responsible, persons in the group must be responsible. But his claim 
that the responsibility of the group is nothing more than the respon-
sibility of the members of the group is surely open to question. In 
what follows I will first point out two conceptual confusions on which 
this further claim rests and then give reasons for preserving the notion 
of collective responsibility in the case of groups, i.e., reasons why 
it is not superfluous. 
Benjamin's first confusion rests in a blurring of the distinction 
between a necessary condition for some Y and the reducibility ot ! to 
that condition. Benjamin rightly argues that a group can do other than 
it does only if persons in the group can do other than they do, that 
groups can have goals and make decisions only if persons can do certain 
kinds of things and that they can enter into or have available to them 
alternative courses of action only if persons can. I have already argued 
17 
to the same effect above. But from this we can conclude, at most, that 
17The thrust of Chapters One and Three was to show that groups 
are groups of persons acting under rules and that the activities of persons 
in groups can count as decisions, goals, and actions of the group. 
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personal agency and responsibility are necessary conditions for group 
agency and responsibility. The thesis that personal agency is a nee-
essary condition for but nevertheless conceptually distinct from group 
agency was developed at length in Chapters One, Two, and Three above. 
Therefore, Benjamin needs to do more than he has done to reach his con-
elusion: he needs to show in addition that the conceptual distinction 
between groups and persons does not exist. But he has not done this, 
and therefore his argument, as it stands, is inadequate for his conclu-
sian. 
Benjamin's second confusion consists in an implicit quantification 
of the notion of responsibility. The problem of group responsibility, as 
Benjamin sees it, is whether there is a "remainder" o£ responsibility 
18 left once it has been "distributed" among all members of the grOU!?· If, 
however, there is none left over after responsibility has been "distri-
buted" to responsible individuals, then there is no collective or group 
moral responsibility. Benjamin employs a model in which ascriptions of 
responsibilities are likened to distribution of goods. For it is only 
if responsibility is viewed as being quantifiable and available in lim-
ited amounts that the mere ascription of responsibility to one agent 
would entail that no other agent is (can be) responsible~ 
But responsibility does not follow this model. Responsibility 
does not exist in some limited quantity available for distributioni nor 
18Benjamin, Martin. op. cit., p. 95. This formulation of the 
problem appears to be borrowed from David Cooper, who has argued in favor 
of collective responsibility. Cooper argues that when persons in a group 
cannot be blamed for some evil deed committed, the blame must then rest 
with the group itself. See his "responsibility and the 'System''' in 
Individual and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter French. 
~ 
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can it be exhausted. Rather, ascriptions of responsibility are deter-
mined by systems of good reasons. These good reasons include, but are 
not limited to, the ones that Benjamin himself has proposed. Thus, what 
,counts when we determine whether a group is responsible is whether the 
group itself (and not merely the persons in it) satisfies the conditions 
for responsibility; satisfaction of these conditions amounts to our 
having good reasons for ascribing responsibility to it. We have already 
seen (from Chapter Four) that a group is itself capable of satisfying 
such conditions. It seems, therefore, that Benjamin's objection to the 
notion of group responsibility is based not only on a limited conception 
of the nature of groups (i.e., he regards them as always aggregates) but 
also on a faulty model for ascriptions of responsibility. 
The case for group agency still stands, for the counter-arguments 
of both Lewis and Benjamin are seen to fail when they are scrutinized 
carefully and we have available a correct analysis of what groups are and 
how they differ from mere aggregates of persons. 
* * * * * 
So far I have explained the conceptual foundation on which group 
responsibility rests and have argued that it does not succomb to the 
counter arguments of Lewis and Benjamin. Some discussion of the obli-
gations that groups acquire will serve to further support not just the 
intelligibility, but the value of retaining our concept of group moral 
agency. An analysis of the obligations of groups will also underline the 
inadequacy of Benjamin's argument by showing still more clearly that 
ascriptions of group responsibility are not superfluous. 
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First, groups can have obligations that are not the same as those 
of persons in the group. Let us take the case of some group A in which 
each of the following premises is true: 
(l) X counts as act ~ by group ~-
(2) X is some set of acts in fact performed by Jones and Brown. 
(3) An agent who performs act ~ incurs a new obligation to perform 
(or to refrain from performing) Z. 
From these premises we can conclude that 
Group A is obligated to perform (or to refrain from performing) !· 
Note that nothing in the argument entitles us to conclude that 
either Jones or Brown is obligated to perform !r because neither Jones 
nor Brown has been shown to have performed act ~- Jones and Brown per-
formed act ~ (which may or may not have certain obligations attendant 
upon it), but X is not~- Rather, X counts as Y if and only if there 
exist appropriate constitutive rules to this effect. Thus, if all we 
speak of is Jones's and Brown's responsibility for their acts X, we have 
not yet said everything that is morally significant about the situation. 
What would be missing here is the obligation !, and the only way to argue 
to obligation! by some agent is by way of that agent's performance of 
Y. 
If we were to omit explicit reference to group ~ and its act 
Y from our description of this kind of case, then there would be no 
reason to suppose that any agent involved had obligation Z. This can 
have rather serious implications for everyday morality. For example, if 
the act ~ is a promise or contract by the group, then the group has 
incurred an obligation to do Z. But, if the acts X that Jones and Brown 
perform are not themselves acts of contracting, each can claim that he 
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has no obligation ~because he has not entered into a contract. Jones 
might state that he did not promise delivery and that he merely ini-
tialed the invoice that Brown brought him. Similarly Brown might deny 
that he contracted for delivery and insist that he had only offered 
someone an invoice to fill out and then returned it to Jones. 
And they both could conceivably be correct in so claiming, for 
it is the group that has contracted. In this example, if we cannot 
ascribe the obligation to the group itself, we are_left with the exis-
tence of a contract that no agent has an obligation to fulfill. In 
other words, this would not even be a contract, for contracts seem to 
involve, by their very definition, the creation of obligations. Cases 
like this show the inadequacy of a moral theory in which groups are said 
to exist but which does not acknowledge that a group is an agent and 
capable of having obligations. 
Indeed, persons in the group might themselves have obligations 
to perform the acts that count (according to the constitutive rules) as 
the acts that satisfy the group's obligation. If they do it is only 
because these persons occupy roles that might require them to aid the 
. h . f . f . f . bl' . 19 group 1n t e sat1s act1on o certa1n o 1ts o 1gatLons. But one can 
argue that Brown and Jones have obligations to perform acts that count 
as group acts that satisfy the group's obligations only by first ad-
mitting that the group has obligations. Here we can see a second reason 
why the moral agency of groups is not superfluous: propositions con-
19I have here introduced one more very important notion: the 
moral obligations of persons to fulfill the demands imposed by their 
roles in groups. This will be examined in more detail in the final 
section of the present chapter. 
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cerning the obligations of the group are logically prior to at least 
some kinds of propositions stating the moral obligations of persons 
having roles in the group; we need the former to argue to the latter. 
A third reason why group moral agency is not superfluous is the 
following: if the obligations created by an acting group were never 
any agent's but Jones's and Brown's, then there would be no reason for 
maintaining that the group still has this obligation should Jones or 
Brown die, take a leave of absence, or simply resign. Consider the 
following example: 
Jones and Brown form the Day Care Grant Committee for the Bilkmore 
Foundation. In their roles, they are required to conduct cost-
benefit analyses, and to commit foundation funds to individual day 
care projects. The Foundation promises, through their official 
actions, to fund the building renovation of the Mid-City Child 
Guidance Center. Mid-City begins renovations, confident of its 
financial backing. 
Subsequently, Jones dies and Brown, who has fallen into disfavor, 
has been transferred to the Refreshments Committee. His new position 
requires him to make coffee and serve sweet rolls. 
The question is whether the Bilkmore Foundation has a moral ob-
ligation to come through with the funds. It may or may not, but the 
question makes sense only if the act by which the obligation is alleged 
to have been created is performed by the group (i.e. the foundation) and 
the obligation so created is the group's obligation, rather than Jones's 
or Brown's. If the whole responsibility for the act (and any additional 
obligations or liabilities it creates) was never any agent's but Jones's 
and Brown's, then there is no conceptual ground for even a prima facie 
20 
moral obligation on the part of the group. In order to decide whether 
20Methodological individualists sometimes claim that social 
explanations are made in terms of anonymous individuals. See J.W.N. 
Watkings, "Methodological Individualism: a Reply," Philosophy of Science, 
XXII (1955), p. 62. Under this claim the obligation that was formerly 
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this consequence of the denial of group agency is acceptable, we need 
only to ask whether a group is invariably and necessarily absolved of 
all obligations created by its representatives when those persons no 
longer serve as its representatives. 
If we do not regard the group as always so absolved (i.e., if it 
still has obligations created by past officers or representatives of the 
group) then the group's obligation is simply not identical with the ob-
ligations of the persons having roles in it. I take it as obvious that 
groups retain at least some obligations in cases like this one; for we 
do ordinarily hold groups responsible for keeping to the terms of our 
contracts with them. Insurance policies remain in effect even when the 
agent and other officers effecting them are no longer employed. Product 
warranties are valid even after the salesman has been fired and so on. 
It seems clear that, in order to be consistent in our everyday dealings 
with groups, we must acknowledge that groups themselves (and not solely 
persons in groups) can incur moral obligations. 
In summary of these first two sections, we can state that the 
Brown's might rest now with the individual (presently anonymous) who will 
replace him. This may be true, but it does not require revision of my 
present point. For one still needs to presuppose that the group has an 
obligation in order to argue that some presently anonymous individual 
(i.e. the individual who will eventually hold the now unfilled office) 
has this obligation. Moreover we must also consider the case of a group 
that, having incurred some obligation, restructures its roles and offices 
so radically that one can no longer identify or refer to precisely that 
office vacated by Brown. In such a case, the group would still have the 
obligation in question; but how the obligation would be met is a question 
that would be answered with reference to the new rules that constitute 
the group. 
For a more general discussion of Watkin's claim, see Leon Gold-
stein, "The Two Theses of Methodological Individualism," British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, XXXIII (1957), 6-11. 
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arguments of Lewis and Benjamin do not work against the notion of col-
lective responsibility because neither of these writers employs adequate 
analysis of either the nature of groups or the nature of responsibility. 
Moreover, in further support of my analysis of the group as moral agent, 
we have seen that ascriptions of responsibility and of obligations to the 
group itself are not superfluous, and that, without them, we could not 
explain how obligations, to take one important example, could exist as a 
result of a group's acts. 
* * * * * 
In my discussion of Benjamin's argument I found fault with his 
way of understanding the issue of "distribution" of responsibility. I 
argued that taking the metaphor of "distribution" literally leads to an 
implicit quantification of responsibility and, from this, to other errors. 
It will not do to simply show that Benjamin is wrong, for there do seem 
to be some occasions when and some sense involved a person is responsibl 
for what a group does. In the present section I shall seek an answer 
to the following question: 
Given that group~ performs some act Y, when is it appropriate to say 
that Jones is praise- or blameworthy? 
There are a number of conditions that must be satisfied for Jones 
to be praise- or blameworthy for the occurrence of Y. The most obvious 
of these conditions is that Jones must have acted in order to be respon-
sible. But even such an obvious condition has its subtleties. Jones 
may be responsible even if he doesn't act: if Jones omits some sort of 
action in such a way that the omission in turn affects what a group does, 
he may even be praise- or blameworthy for his omission. Let us include, 
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therefore, nnder the rubric of "action" also omissions and forebearances. 
This will simplify matters, provided that we keep in mind that omissions 
differ in some significant ways from simply inaction. 
As a second condition, we must add that Jones's act must be 
voluntary. I have already discussed the notion of voluntariness and how 
it is a condition for morally significant action, so I will not elaborate 
here. The only situation in which an agent is responsible for an act 
performed involuntarily is when he voluntarily creates the conditions 
that cause him to act involuntarily. One important feature of volun-
tariness, though, is that the agent must have some sort of control over 
the event for which he is being considered praise- or blameworthy. In 
the present context, we need therefore to determine when and how a 
person can exercise control over a group's act and its consequences. A 
person can exercise such control in either or both of two ways, and I 
shall examine both. Before proceeding, however, we will find it useful 
to return certain of my findings concerning responsibility from our 
discussion of Lewis and Benjamin. 
First, to say that Jones is responsible for .the group's act Y 
does not mean that Jones alone is responsible for ~- All those agents 
that satisfy the conditions for responsibility are responsible, and the 
responsibility of one agent implies nothing about the responsibility of 
other agents. I may well be true that other agents as well are respon-
sible for the event in question. Secondly, if Jones is responsible for 
the event that is some group's act, it does not follow from this that 
the group is not responsible. 
The first way in which Jones can exercise control over some group 
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A's act Y (and thus be praise- or blameworthy) is if his own act is the 
21 X that counts as the group's. act Y. In acting thus, Jones exercises 
some control over what the group does; and so he may be responsible 
(perhaps not solely responsiblt, but at least praise- or blameworthy) for 
the event that is the group's act as well as for its consequences. We 
should note here that the reason for not usually considering one agent 
responsible for another agent's act is that, usually, one agent does not 
exercise control over another agent's act. Thus, Jones might well not 
22 be praise- or blameworthy for what Brown does. But the distinction be-
tween Jones's act and Brown's act is of a sort different from the dis-
tinction between Jones's act X and the group's act Y. For, in the latter 
case there is a necessary relation between X and Y defined by the con-
stitutive rule: for~ cannot happen unless X happens; and when an agent 
does X this itself is also (provided the relevant constitutive rules 
exist) the occurrence of Y. The relation between some act by Jones and 
one by Brown is different from this precisely because neither Jones nor 
21rn this discussi.on I will analyze only the simpler case in 
which Jones.' s act is. by its.elf the X that counts. as group act Y.. In a 
more complex situation, ~might consist in some set of acts by-agents 
including, but not limited to, Jones. In this more complex situation, 
the only relevant difference is that some other agents, in add~tion to 
Jones:, might be responsible. In all such cases, the relations of the 
various acts ~l' x2 , x 3 , etc. which in combination count as Y. will he determined by the constitutive rules defining ~· 
22 
. h f ' h b However, even 1.n t e. case o two persons, Jones lill.g t e re,-
s.ponsible for what Brown does, without Brown thereby not be~ng responsible, 
Consider, for example, Jones the bartender who keeps serving dl:'inks to 
Brown, knowing that Brown has decided to get drunk, work up his courage, 
and kill his wife's lover. Recall, too, that we are here dealing with 
res;ronsibility only as praise- or blameworthiness. 
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Brown is a group of persons acting under rules. When Jones does X the 
group ~thereby acts; but it is not necessarily true that, when Jones 
does !' Brown acts. Thus it is that Jones can know that, when he per-
forms !, some morally significant group act will thereby occur. In this 
way he has the power to see to it that this morally significant group 
act takes place. 23 Or, should he so decide, he might also have the power 
to see to it that the group does not do Y. 24 Thus, Jones may be praise-
or blameworthy when he voluntarily performs (or refrains from performing) 
some act X that counts as the group's act Y, provided that act~, or its 
b h h 1 0 0 fo 25 consequences, or ot ave some mora s1gn1 1cance. X and Y are con-
ceptually distinct, but he who controls X is also able to exercise some 
control over the group's act ~and may thus be morally accountable for 
~, even though ~ is attributed to a distinct agent, the group ~· 
But an agent can exercise control over what another agent does 
in other ways besides performing an act that counts as the other agent's 
act. Thus there are other ways in which one agent can be praise- or 
/•blameworthy for what a second agent does. We saw in Chapter Four that a 
group can be coerced by some other agent. Because this has already been 
23 In the more complex case mentioned in n. 21, Jones at least has 
the ability to cooperate with other persons in the group's performance 
of Y. 
24This is not always true, however, for there may be within the 
group other persons who can perform the X that counts as the group's act. 
Such a case might occur in a voting situation where a specific number of 
votes is needed for an endorsement, a decision, etc., but where the vote 
of any single person is not essential. 
25of course Jones may be praise- or blameworthy if his act X 
itself or its consequences have moral significance, independently of 
whether X counts as Y. 
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discussed, I will not repeat it here in great detail. It is important 
to note, however, that aside from the question of the praise- or blame-
worthiness of the coercive activity itself there is also the fact that 
coercive activity is, by definition, the activity of controlling another's 
act. Thus, he who coerces another agent is subject to praise or blame 
for the activity to which he coerces the second agent and not merely for 
the act of coercing. 
Because groups ar~ not themselves knowers, but can only make use 
of information, they are particularly susceptible to a certain type of 
attempt to control their decisions and actions. Groups depend entirely 
on knowers for the information necessary to make an informed decision 
about ·the nature of their acts, their probable consequences, and the moral 
significance of eac~. Because the information available to a decision-
maker can limit or even determine what acts he will decide to take, he 
who controls such information may very well be praise- or blameworthy 
tor the action taken by the group according to how he provides information. 
There seem, then, to be a number of ways in which persons can be 
praise- or blameworthy for events that are acts by groups. These ways 
can be divided broadly into two types: the first type is the sort of 
control that a person occupying a role within the group can exercise 
simply by the fact that what he does counts as something th.e group does. 
A note of caution is in order here concerning our ascriptions of respon-
sibility to persons in groups· for the acts of those groups. In many 
cases the relation that a person has with some of his society's more 
:l;undamental groups may be something less that voluntary. 26 All manner 
26
such groups are intended here to be distinguished primarily 
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of rewards and constraints, for example, are used to bring the child into 
the mainstream of his society's groups. Moreover, once in these groups, 
a person may find it quite difficult to get back out; so the claim that 
a person "could have done otherwise" in such contexts is not always plau-
"bl 27 s1 e. The second type of control is that exercised by an agent who 
disrupts the normal deciding and acting processes of a group. In either 
case the person may be praise- or blameworthy for the event that is a 
group's act. The first type of case is one peculiar to groups; only 
they have this sort of relation to persons. The second type (i.e., that 
involving coercion) is one that is not peculiar to groups; when agents 
coerce other agents, they become responsible for what those other agents 
do and can thus become either praise- or blameworthy. 28 
from those groups in which membership is elective and less essential to 
personal survival and happiness. 
27
Hume, in discussion of the nature of the ordinary man's affil-
iation with government, asks somewhat rhetorically: 
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice 
to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners and 
lives from day to day by the small wages which he acquires? (From Of 
the Original Contract. See also Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, 
Part 2.) 
Persons may still be responsible for their acts performed in groups, even 
if their original affiliation with the group was not voluntary. The poor 
peasant or artisan in Hume's example may at some point decide that, as long 
as he's there, he will be a good citizen, conscientiously perform his civic 
duties, etc. 
This is a serious issue in the whole social contract tradition. My 
comments here are intended only to show the importance of such questions 
for ascriptions of responsibility. 
28There is another argument in favor of personal responsibility 
for group action. Briefly, the argument is that, because persons must 
first accept constitutive rules in order for a group to act, those persons 
are responsible for whatever the group does. 
This argument could be assessed only with a careful analysis of a 
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* * * * * 
Moral obligations arise, are satisfied, and are sometimes altered 
within the dynamic framework of a changing world and of the individual's 
changing position within that world. I have intended to show the place 
of groups within that world. In arguing for a certain conception of the 
nature of groups, I am also advocating a position that forces us to re-
consider the place of the person in the moral framework of society. In 
this present section I will give a general account of the differences 
group moral agency might make for the moral obligations of persons. I 
shall first discuss a general problem concerning the obligations of per-
sons in groups to satisfy the obligations of those groups. Subsequently, 
I shall examine various other kinds of obligations that persons might 
incur either because of their roles in groups or because they live in a 
society in which groups can exist and with which they can interact. 
We saw already that persons can perform some acts ~ that count 
as a group's act Y. We saw further that, when such an act Y is some act 
that creates a new obligation, that obligation is the group's (as dis-
tinguished from the persons' in that group.) And yet, because the acts 
of such persons count as an act by the group, it can reasonably be said 
that they exercise some control over what the group does. Thus, if Jones 
does not, for example, personally enter into a contract, it may be through 
his acts that some group does so. 
A group may well be constituted in such a way that although Jones 
number of other issues, so I shall only mention it here. Some of those 
other problems include whether constitutive rules are chosen or learned, 
the relation between accepting a rule and applying it to some specific 
occasion, and so forth. 
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is empowered to do the things that count as the group's entrance into a 
contract, some other persons in the group are the only ones able to 
perform the acts that count as fulfillment of the contract. For example, 
if Jones is capable of performing some act that counts as the group's 
borrowing of money, he might not be able to perform the acts that count 
as the group's disbursement of money and thus not be capable of satis-
fying the group's obligation to return the money. 
In such a case, we would not conclude that Jones had a personal 
obligation to pay back the money borrowed by his group through him. It 
would, instead, be more appropriate to claim that the group must seek 
some method of satisfying its obligation. The exact process by which 
any given group satisfies its obligations will, of course, depend on the 
rules according to which it is constituted. 
However, we can conceive of cases in which Jones will incur some 
new obligation due to the particular circumstances of the act he performs. 
For example, if Jones through malice or culpable ignorance involved hi.s 
group in a debt to some other agent, Jones may incur some new obligation 
himself. As long as Jones is empowered to act for the group, the group 
does incur the debt, but Jones might have an obligation to reimburse the 
group the money he has cost it through his malice or ignorance. Notice, 
though, that this obligation derives from Jones's act X and from its 
relation toY and not simply from Y. This example is a case where the 
group itself truly has incurred a debt, because Jones was acting within 
the constitutive rule structure enabling his group to incur debts through 
his actions. He ought to make compensation not just because the group 
loses money in satisfying the obligation, but because Jones (through his 
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act X) had control over the debt and was thus at fault when the group 
29 lost money. It seems that although the obligation created by act Y 
belongs to the agent that performed !• the agent who performs act X 
(which counts as Y) might also incur some obligations. 
There are other obligations that persons can incur in relation to 
groups or even due to the possibility of some group existing. This needs 
further analysis. In order to provide this analysis in any detailed and 
specific way, we would need a wealth of empirical data concerning the 
existence of specific groups, their constitutive rules, their acts, the 
place of individuals within them, and their relations with individuals 
and groups outside them. It would be a long and difficult task to 
present such data about even a single group and would be out of place 
30 here. Instead I shall offer here a brief classification of the ways 
in which personal moral obligations may be created or altered, given 
the present or possibility of groups acting. I have attempted to make 
this list complete (though general) but would not be too surprised if 
there are other facets of the person-group relation that will need to be 
added. More specifically, I shall discuss the following issues: moral 
29
we can conceive of a second type of example in which Jones 
attempts to perform some acts in the name of the group and these acts (a) 
create debts and (b) are not acts that he is empowered to perform and (c) 
which do not count as the group's act. In such a case, the group has 
incurred no obligation because it has not acted. Any obligation incurred 
would be Jones's. However, the group might be blameworthy if it has been 
somehow negligent in enabling or permitting Jones to do this. 
30In the Appendix I make some attempt to bring group moral agency 
to bear on specific moral issues. This, I will indicate by way of example 
how the account of groups given in this work enables us to think more 
clearly about the moral obligations that persons have in such situations. 
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obligations to perform our role-duties in groups; obligations to create 
or destroy groups; obligations to join or dissociate ourselves from 
groups; and inter-agential obligations between persons and groups. 
First, it is commonplace to talk of certain features of our roles 
in groups and other rule-constituted entities and activities as duties. 
In describing a job, for example, we might list specific "duties" such 
. th h . th . h h. 31 as answer1ng e p one, runn1ng e m1meograp mac 1ne, etc. These 
certainly are duties, in that a person who accepts the job in question 
ought to answer the phone when it rings. Similarly, pinochle players 
ought to follow suit when able, policemen ought to stop speeders, and 
auditors ought to uncover financial irregularities. What we have to 
determine is when (and why) we have a moral obligation to do such things. 
Peter French has recently called such role-obligations "institutional" 
and argued that our moral obligations are those institutional obligations 
that ought to take priority when there is a conflict among our obliga-
tions.32 But this still demands some sort of criterion of priority. 
French offers us as one such criterion "the conditions necessary for the 
possibility of a life worth living." 33 But, in the long history of 
31such duties are expressed as norms of conduct for a person 
occupying such a role. 
32Peter French, "Institutional and Moral Obligations," Journal of 
Philosophy, LXXIV, 10, October, 1977, 575-587. French states that "even 
if the intent to participate is assumed in the rules, it is not assumed in 
sentences that state the obligations that derive from those rules" (p. 580). 
"When ... [the word 'ought'] is used either to identify one obli-
gation as paramount in a conflict of institutional obligations or as a 
reminder ••• that one obligation in case of such conflicts is paramount, its 
use is paradigmatically moral" (p. 582). 
33French, Peter, "Institutional and Moral Obligations," p. 582. 
128 
reflection on this topic, there have been offered many other criteria for 
determining what should be our highest-order, or moral, obligations. Thus 
for example one might test the acts of satisfying role-obligations against 
the principle of utility or the categorical imperative, or natural law. 
It seems clear that such tests might uncover important features of our 
obligations to satisfy our duties in groups. But it seems out of place 
to try to formulate here the consequences of such tests, given the di-
versity of the criteria used in determining them. 
But there is more to be said about role-duties. Entrance into 
some groups, for example, involves some specific act of accepting a role. 
Where this act is contractual or promissory in nature, it may provide a 
foundation for a moral obligation to satisfy our role-duties. This is, 
of course, under the assumption that contracting and promising are them-
selves moral concepts. I hasten to add, though, that the model of accep-
tance has only a limited usefulness; we would be hard pressed to make a 
case for every role that we enter into as being entered into through a 
contract. 34 But it may still be useful in understanding certain types 
of cases, especially in formal organizations involving elective office, 
hiring processes, pledge nights, or some other very explicit procedure 
34Hart distinguishes another set of non-contractual obligations 
for those in roles. According to him, 
.•. when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to 
rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to 
these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission 
from those who have benefited by their submission ("Are There Any 
Natural Rights?" The Philosophical Review, LXIV (1955), p. 185. 
Hart argues that this differs in important respects from the classic 
social contract model. 
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for initiating and terminating a role in a group. In summary, then, 
our obligation to satisfy the duties we incur by occupying roles in 
groups may also be a moral obligation, because some higher order moral 
rule or principle may require acts in accordance with the role or be-
cause we have contracted or promised to observe the normsofconduct that 
help define that role. 
The substance of personal moral obligations can also be changed 
in significant ways given that there either already exists (or could 
easily begin to exist) a group capable of performing acts that would 
satisfy some moral obligation that we have. Let us take as an example 
a case where a person is morally obligated to produce some morally sig-
nificant consequence ~- It is a fact that, at least sometimes, highly 
organized forms of cooperation with authority structures and roles can 
perform certain kinds of acts ~ more successfully and more effeciently 
than can individual persons. Where these acts ~produce the same con-
sequence Z that persons have an obligation to produce, we might argue 
thus: 
If persons are obligated to produce Z, then if the most successful 
way to ~is through some group, then-persons have an obligation to 
create that group. Conversely, if persons have an obligation to 
prevent ~ and there exists a group that produces ~' then those 
persons are obligated to prevent the group from producing Z and, 
in extreme cases, even to eliminate the group. 
So persons can have obligations to create or to eliminate groups. Of 
course, groups are neither created nor eliminated by a simple fiat. What 
we are talking about is the (non-) existence of the system of rules that 
constitute the group. And the existence of such rules depends on soci-
etal acceptance of and patterns of behavior using the rules in their 
understanding of the group in question. Thus, groups "go away" only 
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when the society in which they exist no longer accepts and used the rules 
h t . h 35 t a const~tute t em. 
The difficulty of creating and eliminating groups might require 
us to ask whether the moral task of doing so is supererogatory. In such 
cases, then, our moral obligations might be merely to offer or withhold 
our personal support of those groups. We could, for example, either 
offer or withhold financial support, but there are many other ways of 
supporting or withholding support. 
When we use groups as a means of satisfying our personal moral 
obligations, we thereby change the structure of our obligations. Persons 
might still have the obligation in question (to produce ~) , but the 
specific actions required of them will change. They might, for example, 
incur the obligation to perform acts X that would count as a group's act 
~' where~ produces consequences ~- Or, if these persons cannot them-
selves perform ~' they might at least have the obligation to facilitate 
the performance of~ by others. 
When groups perform acts that satisfy our moral obligations, the 
specific acts required of persons may change. In fact, those acts that 
would be obligatory without the existence of relevant groups, may, with 
the existence of such groups, become subject to moral condemnation. As 
Morris Ginsberg states: 
The duty of charity, for example, loses its primacy in an age in 
which the abolition of poverty by organized effort becomes possible. 
35A refusal to grant a group legal personality may be part of 
this refusal to accept constitutive rules. Thus, the conferring of legal 
personality on some given group could truly be a matter of moral sig-
nificance. 
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the giving of charity to individuals may then even come to be depre-
ciated as likely to divert attention from the need for a radical 
reconstruction of the system of property. 36 
And Ginsberg offers a second example: 
So again self-redress is condemned in societies which possess a 
system of public justice but may be considered a duty where there 
is no regular public machinery for obtaining redress. 37 
We need not agree with Ginsberg on the specifics of these cases in order 
to understand the broad relevance of this type of claim: the existence 
of groups alters our social world in ways drastic enough that we cannot 
assume independently of careful inquiry that actions good where there 
exist no groups capable of producing some good consequence ~ remain good 
or even morally indifferent when such groups do in fact exist. 
The fact that we can use groups as the tools by which we dis-
charge our personal moral obligations might seem to require the denial 
of the agency of the group itself. In fact, though, we can use other 
agents (e.g., persons) as the means by which we accomplish personal tasks; 
and this does not at all entail the denial of their own agency. In this 
regard, we may fruitfully return to the discussion of goals in Chapter 
Three. I argued there that the possibility of having goals for some 
other agent does not itself entail that the other agent cannot have goals 
for himself. Our ability to treat other agents as objects does not entail 
36
on the Diversity of Morals, p. 107. In this regard, one might 
wish to consult also an article in the New York Times, Sunday, July 2, 
1978, Section One, p. 1. The article ("Private Charity Going Out of 
Style in West Europe's Welfare States") explains that private donors to 
charitable groups are sometimes now considered blameworthy in the coun-
tries under discussion. Behind this is the belief that charitable do-
nations should come from groups set up expressly for that purpose. 
37Ibid.,p. 106. 
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at all that the other agent cannot have goals, make decisions, and engage 
in actions of his own. One agent treating another agent as an object 
does not involve a logical contradiction, although it may create an 
emotionally charged conflict situation and it may, of course, involve 
important moral issues precisely because of that fact. So our potential 
for treating groups as objects does not point to an inadequacy in my 
main thesis -- that the group itself is an agent, albeit one whose exis-
tence depends on the existence of constitutive rules of the proper sort. 
It is worth noting in passing that there is another way in which 
the existence of groups can significantly alter personal moral obli-
gations. First, in addition to those obligations that persons have due 
to the existence of and their roles in groups, persons may incur obli-
gations due to their special inter-agential relations with groups. A 
person may owe a group money, may have various contractual obligations 
to groups, etc., without having these obligations to any individual 
person(s) in the group. To understand this requires nothing more than 
has already been shown in this work. We have seen the applicability of 
the principle of universalizability to groups. Briefly, this means that, 
where a group is relevantly similar to a person who has some right or 
obligations, the group has a similar right or obligation. We have seen 
also that an agent can acquire through his own actions, some new right 
or obligation. And we have seen also the irreducibility of a group agent 
to the personal agents who comprise it. Since it is a general principle 
that agents can (through their actions and relationships) incur new 
obligations to other agents, and since the group is itself an agent, we 
have every reason to conclude that persons can incur obligations to groups. 
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And where this is in fact the case, groups can correctly be said to have 
rights. 
* * * * * 
In this chapter we have seen in more detail the relation of 
personal moral agency to group moral agency. We have seen that, con-
trary to the expressed views of Lewis and Benjamin, ascriptions of moral 
responsibility to groups are neither incoherent, nor morally repugnant 
nor superfluous. Group moral agency, due to the peculiar relationship 
it has with agency of persons in groups, can logically co-exist with 
personal moral agency. Thus, group moral agency does not require the 
denial of traditional beliefs in human moral agency. 
Group agents do complicate our world, though. They can alter 
persons' moral obligations; they can create new obligations and do 
away with old obligations. In a society in which groups exist, persons 
may be morally obligated to participate in the creation, alteration, or 
destruction of groups. They may be obligated to accept or to refuse 
roles in groups, and may have ·toward institutions a good many of the 
same sorts of obligations that they have to persons. Therefore, if we 
live in a society in which there are groups, then we as moral agents 
need to be aware of the difference that groups make for morality. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the argument for group moral agency is now essentially 
complete, it would serve us well to summarize here the conclusion and to 
go over once more the steps by which it was reached. The conclusion is 
that groups are in fact moral agents, which is to say that they can 
decide to act, that they act voluntarily, have moral obligations and 
rights, and can be praise- or blameworthy for what they do. And this is 
not simply a convenient way of saying that persons in groups are moral 
agents, for the decisions, actions, rights, and obligations of groups 
cannot be reduced to those of persons in those groups. 
The key to this conclusion, we discovered in Chapter One, consists 
in the rule-constituted nature of groups. In Chapter One we discovered 
how one thing can count as something else, where the appropriate rules 
are accepted and exist. More specifically, we saw there that some set 
of things that persons do can count as a performance by a group. In later 
chapters, especially Chapters Three and Four, I argued that rules play a 
similar function in establishing for groups other characteristics essen-
tial to agency. Among such characteristics are having goals, making 
decisions, and acting voluntarily. From this we were able to see also 
that, through their actions, groups can incur moral obligations and can 
thus be praise- or blameworthy for what they do. 
I have not argued that any given group in some specific situation 
has in fact acted voluntarily, or is in fact praise- or blameworthy. Such 
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conclusions would certainly draw on my argument here, but they would 
have to draw also on empirical information concerning the particular 
group, and the rules according to which it is constituted as well as 
some moral principle(s) taken to be correct. In the Appendix that fol-
lows I shall provide the beginnings of such analyses for several cases. 
We need not fear the conclusion arrived at here, for regarding 
groups as moral agents does not require denying the moral agency of 
persons in groups. Certainly, the relation of groups to persons in them 
exhibits some logical idiosyncrasies. But the relation of personal to 
group responsibility is not disjunctive: no claim that a group has an 
obligation or a right in some situation entails, by itself a denial 
that persons in the group have rights or obligations in that same sit-
uation. Similarly, that a group is or is not praise- or blameworthy for 
what it does, does not entail by itself that persons who act in the 
group are either praise- or blameworthy. In all such cases the obli-
gations, rights, praise- and blameworthiness of persons in groups must 
be decided with empirical information on the relation of the person and 
his activities in the group and its activities. We might therefore find 
in one case that a person is blameworthy for his contribution to the 
evil that some group does and that he is innocent on another occasion 
where the group does evil. 
The acknowledgment of group moral agency has a two fold value. 
First of all, it does render intelligible our ordinary ways of speaking 
and thinking about groups. We do, in fact, sometimes claim that our bank 
has loaned us money, that the manufacturer guarantees our new car, that 
a university ought to educate, and so forth. When we make such claims we 
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often are not referring to any individual persons. But, more importantly, 
the acknowledgment of the existence of group moral agency removes an 
unwarranted restriction on the scope of morality. It does so by estab-
lishing that moral considerations are relevant in a society where moral 
evil and good are the products not only of persons acting on persons, but 
also of persons acting on groups, of groups acting on persons, and of 
groups acting on groups. Any model of moral agency that does not permit 
evaluation of all such relationships is simply inadequate for present 
society, where hospitals, universities, corporations, clubs and other 
kinds of groups all exist and act in morally significant ways. 
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APPENDIX 
My intention in this study has been to provide an analysis of 
group moral agency in general. But the importance of that analysis be-
comes apparent only when we begin to see what difference it might make 
in the clarification of and, ultimately, the resolution of moral issues 
of contemporary concern. Moreover, such an application of my analysis 
of group agency will have the added dividend of bringing to light parts 
of the account that stand in need of further examination and explanation. 
In this way, the appendix may also be regarded as a diagnostic tool that 
suggests directions in which further research into the subject of group 
agency and responsibility needs to be carried on. 
The topic that I have chosen for more detailed discussion con-
cerns reparation for past acts of discrimination. This discussion is 
valuable here, because it is often claimed that the acts or policies of 
discrimination for which reparation is owed were initially engaged in 
by groups and that those groups are therefore obligated to make reparation. 
I shall also discuss a second issue, that of strict liability in tort. 
Specifically, I shall be concerned to show how the concept of group moral 
agency can clarify the role that corporations have under legal doctrines 
calling for strict liability for harm suffered through product use. 
There are, indeed, numerous other examples that could have been 
chosen to demonstrate the clarificatory power of the analysis of group 
agency offered in this study. It should shortly become obvious that I 
am not attempting an exhaustive treatment of even those few issues chosen 
for examination. But if the usefulness of the analysis of group moral 
agency can be exemplified and important questions in need of further 
investigation brought to light, I will have achieved my aim in appending 
this section to the study. 
* * * 
In April and May, 1969, the National Black Economic Development 
Conference (NBEDC) wrote and disseminated a document that has since be-
come known as the Black Manifesto. 1 This document is significant in that 
it proposed in a highly public manner that reparation be made to blacks 
1The Black Manifesto originally appeared when James Forman inter-
rupted the Sunday morning service at Riverside Church in New York City in 
order to read it. The document has since been published in a number of 
places. Page references here are to the collection by Lecky and Wright 
(eds.), Black ~mnifesto (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968). 
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for past acts of discrimination against them. Specifically, the demand 
was for white Christian churches and Jewish synagogues to pay some 
$500,000,000 to blacks, because 
..• the exploitation of colored peoples around the world is aided and 
2 
abetted by the white Christian churches and synagogues. 
I shall examine two issues regarding the Black Manifesto: first, 
by whom reparation can be owed, and secondly, to whom it can be owed. 
The Black Manifesto offers answers to each of these two questions; but 
it is not clear from the document how the answers presented in it would 
be defended. 
Concerning the first of these two questions, the Manifesto calls 
for reparation from the groups that have promoted or benefitted from 
racism. Its demands are addressed to churches and synagogues, with some 
hint that future demands will be addressed to governments as well. It 
is claimed that these groups have, through their actions, deprived blacks 
of their due: 
... the racist white Christian church with its hypocritical declarations 
and doctrines of brotherhood has abused our trust and faith. 3 
Thus, one of the Manifesto's claims is that such groups are morally ob-
ligated to make reparation; for it is they who have performed acts of 
discrimination. 
In addition to this claim on groups, the Manifesto also declares 
that reparatio2 is owed by the ''white racist imperialists who compose 
[the groups]." In a nationally broadcast radio interview, James Forman, 
spokesman for the NBEDC, made it clear that the Manifesto's demand was 
addressed not only to those groups addressed but also to individual members 
of the groups; that is, not just to the churches, but to their members 
as well (and especially to rich trustees). In summary, the Manifesto 
views as justified the claim that both groups and persons in groups owe 
reparation. There must, therefore, be an underlying belief in the intel-
ligibility of the claim. 
Concerning the second question, to whom reparation is owed, the 
Manifesto again appears to give a twofold answer. The Manifesto demands 
that money.be given to the following groups (among others): the National 
Welfare Rights Organization, an International Black Appeal, a southern 
land bank, black publishing houses, alternative television networks, and 
a new black university. These are all group entities, but the Manifesto 
2Black Manifesto, p. 120. 
3Black Manifesto, p. 126. 
4Black Manifesto, p. 125. 
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appears also to be demanding reparation to black individuals, since it 
ties the reparation fund to black population statistics. The demand for 
a sum of $500,000,000 is explained thus: 
Fifteen dollars for every black brother and sister in the United 
States is only a beginning of the reparations due us as people who 
have been exploited and degraded, brutalized, killed and persecuted. 5 
The wording of the Manifesto leaves it unclear as to whether the black 
population merely serves as an indicator for the amount of money or 
whether the money is, in fact, owed to individual black persons. This 
issue requires more careful examination. 
I shall examine the cogency of claims that reparation is owed by 
and to groups, and by and to individuals; and I shall explore the log-
ical relations between these two kinds of claims. It is not my intention 
here to demonstrate either that reparation is in fact owed or that it is 
not owed. My aim is rather to sort out the ambiguities involved in making 
such claims about persons and groups. First I shall examine what is 
entailed by any claim that some moral agent ~ owes reparation to some 
other moral agent ~- Then I shall look at the logical features of such 
claims when either A or B is a group. 
* * * 
The discussion of the role of groups in reparation must begin 
with some explanation of reparation itself. Whenever reparation is owed, 
it is as a consequence of the agent to whom reparation is owed having 
been unjustly deprived. For this reason, reparation must be distinguished 
from other forms of compensation. To be owed compensation it is not 
necessary that one have been deprived through some unjust act by another. 
Those physically disabled by birth defects, for example, might dese~ve 
some compensation even when they have not been dealt with unjustly. 
Only a moral agent can own reparation. It is tempting to support 
this proposition with the claim that one must have acted unjustly in order 
to own reparation. But this is, I believe, too narrow a view of the matter. 
For, in some situations, not only the agent who unjustly deprives some 
other moral agent of his due has an obligation to make reparation, but 
the parties who have benefited from this unjust deprivation might also be 
obligated to make reparation. There are several kinds of cases in which 
5Black Manifesto, p. 120. 
6on the distinction between reparation and compensation see 
Bernard Boxhill, "The Morality of Reparation," Social Theory and Practice, 
II (1974). 
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this appears obvious, for example, the case of a recipient of stolen 
property. But even this case becomes complicated if he received the 
stolen property as part of a good faith bargain with the thief, or, 
perhaps, with another good faith recipient. And the matter is still 
more complex when we have to ask questions such as: To what extent 
should the injustices of fathers result in obligations on the part of 
their benefiting grandchildren? 7 At what point does an agent's present 
advantage gained by past injustice cease to require rectification and 
become instead a simple fact of life? Thes~ are hard questions that 
need to be answered in some cases, and I do not intend to attempt to 
resolve them here. The point is that we cannot simply say that only 
those perpetrating injustice can have an obligation to make reparation. 
Reasonable arguments can be made regarding other sorts of situations in 
which the beneficiaries of injustice also seem to have such duties. 
The obviousness of the proposition that "only a moral agent can 
owe reparation" stems not from the unique ability of moral agents to 
act unjustly but instead from the meaning of the terms in the proposition. 
In general only moral agents can have moral obligations, because that is 
part of what it means to be a moral agent. There is little difficulty 
in imagining circumstances in which a person might owe reparation pro-
vided that the person can perform acts that deprive another person of 
his due or can at least benefit from such acts. But with regard to groups, 
we need to take a more careful look. It is often claimed, with consid-
erable historical support, that some group has deprived another agent 
of his due. Groups have been said to discriminate in hiring practices, 
membership s-election, salary scales, scholarship offers and other ed-
ucational opportunities, housing, loans, military conscription, and so 
forth. I£ there is any objection to be offered to such claims ~esides 
the argument that the particular actions under consideration were not 
unjus.t), it would likely· be that groups are not moral agents and that 
these actions were, properly speaking, performed by individuals. Thus, 
only individuals would have obligations of reparation in such cases. But 
from the account of group agency given here, we can see how such actions 
and policies· can belong to the groups themsel vas (by reason of the rules 
that constitute themi rather than simply to persons in groups. From 
7The Black Manifesto argues, for example, that presently existing 
white Americans owe reparation for wrongs suffered by blacks since at 
least 1619, because presently existing whites have benefited from such 
past injustices. I presume that the year 1619 was cited because the first 
recorded shipload of slaves arrived at Jamestown in August of that year. 
Because our present connections with events of three hundred fifty years 
ago are little understood and because some effects of actions then are 
unknown and perhaps irreversible, it might be tempting to conclude that 
those actions and their consequences were reprehensible, but that we have 
no obligation to remedy them now. The conclusion is perhaps too hasty, 
but it does point to the necessity of careful examination. 
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this is follows that it is the group agents, and not only the persons 
acting in groups, who can have the obligation of reparation. So far, 
then, the Manifesto's claim that churches owe reparation is in intel-
ligible claim, provided only that the churches named are actually groups 
with the appropriate constitutive rules. 
I stated above that it seems likely that not only those who 
engage in unjust acts but also those who benefit from such acts might 
owe reparation. It thus becomes important to show that groups can also 
benefit from injustice, as this might reveal moral obligations on the 
part of groups even when they do not themselves engage in unjustly 
discriminatory actions. In order to be a beneficiary, a being must 
have goals or interests. In the case of human beings, whether some-
thing is a benefit is often determined by its contribution to such goals 
as survival, growth, pleasure, etc., as well as to more specific goals 
that the person himself has adopted. In the case of a group, whether 
something is a benefit must be determined by its contribution to goals 
that the group has (as distinguished from goals that persons might have 
for the group) • 8 Anything that helps a group achieve its goals is a 
benefit to that group. Thus, a group might rightly be said to benefit 
from an act of discrimination if, for example, a white university re-
ceives more government grant money because less money is allocated to 
black schools. Groups can, then, be the beneficiaries of acts of in-
justice. 
It seems, then, that it is intelligible to claim either or both 
of the following: that a group has engaged in acts of injustice for 
which it ought to make reparation; and that a group has been the bene-
ficiary of some other agent's unjust acts and ought accordingly to make 
reparation. But to claim that some group benefits from an act of in-
justice might sometimes require us to admit also that individual per-
sons within the group have also benefited. Though we can draw a dis-
tinction between the goals of a group and the goals of persons in that 
group, it is often the case that persons will in fact benefit when a 
group with which they are affiliated in some way benefits. This raises 
the possibility that both a group and the persons in it will owe rep-
aration for some unjust act performed by the group; for persons owe 
reparation when they unjustly deprive others of what is theirs, and as 
we have noted, also sometimes when they merely benefit from such a 
deprivation. In such a case, persons would owe reparation not because 
of their affiliation with the group, but because of their own relation 
to the unjustice committed. 
When persons depend to a great extent on groups for the achieve-
ment of their personal goals, any penalization of the group (through 
payment of reparation) would also penalize the persons affiliated with 
8
on the goals of groups, see Chapter Three. 
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the group. This raises a rather serious moral issue for any claim that 
some group owes reparation, for the payment of reparation by a group 
may deprive persons affiliated with the group of benefits to which they 
might otherwise be entitled. 9 I shall discuss this issue further, but 
at this point it is important to note that it is neither a logical nor 
an empirical necessity that a loss of benefit to a group be also a loss 
of benefits to persons affiliated with the group. We have seen already 
that a group's goals are conceptually distinct from the goals of persons 
in it, and this shows that there is no logical necessity in the relation 
between group and personal benefits. Moreover, it might at least some-
times be true that that attainment of the goals of a group would bring 
no benefit to the persons in it. 10 In such a case a group could owe 
a debt of justice and pay it without thereby depriving any person in 
the group. 
Unfortunately, it does not often happen in this way, for the 
welfare of groups is often intimately connected with the welfare of 
persons in those groups. Consider, for example, the case of a for-
profit corporation that has as one of its goals the maximization of 
dividends for its shareholders. Ani time the corporation is deprived 
of money, so are its shareholders. 1 In such cases there arises a 
rather complex question of justice, for any deprivation of the group will 
result also in the deprivation of persons in the group. When such a 
group owes reparation, it might sometimes be able to satisfy this moral 
obligation only by depriving persons in the group. In some cases, those 
persons deprived may have performed (or have been responsible for the 
performance of) those acts that counted as the groups' acts of dis-
crimination. Even in that case, it would not be correct to state that 
9Martin Benjamin, in the article already cited, claims that it 
is impossible to punish a group without punishing the persons in it. 
For the purposes of this examination, I shall assume that there are 
differences between being punished, paying reparation, and being deprived 
of some benefit. Benjamin does not discuss such a distinction in his 
analysis. 
lOAlthough this is logically possible, it does seem highly 
doubtful that such a group could get the support needed to survive long. 
A detailed discussion of various relations between group and individual 
goals will be found in Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). 
11As a second example, consider the International Toastmasters' 
Association, which has as a goal the development of the public speaking 
talents of persons in the group. Should the association be in some way 
deprived, so also might its members, although the deprivation would not 
be a purely financial one. 
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those persons owe reparation; but it might be correct to state that 
those persons have abused their roles in the group, thereby costing it 
money, and that they ought therefore to make reparation to the group. 
It is also possible, though, for a person not contributing to 
the group's unjust act to be deprived when the group makes reparation. 
This is so because a person in a group is not necessarily responsible 
for each of that group's acts. Such a person might have benefited from 
the group's unjust act, but it is also possible that he did not. If 
he did not, then it would seem that this person is being unjustly de-
prived when his group makes reparation. It would thus seem that doing 
justice might require a group to act unjustly. We should note, though, 
that this difficulty does not arise out of the special logical relation 
we have uncovered between persons and groups. It is, instead, a problem 
that arises out of the interdependence of the fortunes of different 
beings interacting in the same world. It is not a problem peculiar to 
group agents. Consider, for example, the analogous difficulty of 
punishing criminals without thereby causing suffering of deprivation to 
their families and others who depend on them. 
The problem can disappear in many cases when we recognize that 
such an indirect deprivation of a person in a group is an injustice only 
when that person has a legitimate claim to the benefit of which he is 
being deprived. One can, of course, conceive of situations in which 
we have a legitimate claim to the benefits that can be provided by 
groups, e.g., when we have contracted with the group for them. In any 
case, simply being affiliated with a group does not itself legitimate 
our claim to the benefits that the group could conceivably provide. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued recently that members of a group can 
acquire a right to only those benefits that remain after the group has 
settled debts that it owes. 12 Only at that point may the group act 
justly in deciding to distribute the remaining benefits among the members. 
On this view, the group is not merely a device for holding the assets 
of its members but is also an owner in its own right, with obligations 
to pay its debts and the right to make decisions concerning the allo-
cation of its remaining resources. Thus, because the group is itself 
an owner, we cannot assume without further examination that persons in 
the group have a right to all the benefits it can provide, or even to 
those that it usually in fact provides. As moral agents, groups are 
woven into the fabric of society in such a way that the expectations 
of their members must be weighed against the rights of others whom they 
must deal with in a morally responsible way. 
Let me summarize what we have learned so far. So far, the 
discussion has been about the possibility of a group owing reparation. 
We have seen that, given the findings of previous chapters of this 
12J.J. Thomson, "Preferential Hiring," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, II (Summer, 1973). 
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study, such a claim is at least intelligible. For groups, as moral 
agents, can perform unjust acts and can incur moral obligations. More-
over, we have seen that the obligation of a group to make reparation is, 
when it exists, logically distinct from any obligation that its members 
may have to do so. We saw also how it is that penalizing groups might 
involve depriving persons in those groups, but that this is not always 
an injustice to them. Certainly there are other matters regarding 
reparation that could be discussed, but these are the matters that have 
the most important connections with the subject of the present work. 
It might also be claimed -- and the Black Manifesto appears to 
do this that reparation is owed to a group. I want now to examine 
this claim in some detail. Many of the same issues that arise in a 
discussion of groups as owers of reparation arise again, but in new 
clothing, when we discuss groups as moral agents to whom reparation can 
be owed. For purposes of discussion, we can conveniently divide the 
topic into the following kinds of cases: reparation owed to a group 
but not to persons in it; reparation owed to a group as well as to 
persons in f.t; and, and a special kind of case, reparation owed to 
persons but distributed to them through groups. 
We saw earlier that it is intelligible to claim that some group 
has a right to something, We saw that the foundation for at least some 
of the rights that a group can have rests in the group's ability to enter 
into special relations with other agents. Thus, a group capable of 
entering into a contractual arrangement not only incurs some new obli-
gation but acquires some new, right as well. Indeed, it might well be 
that groups can have other rights as well; but for present purposes we 
need to know only that, under some circumstances, a group can have a 
right to something. For, as long as a group has a right to at least 
something, we can conclude that, when it is deprived of the thing in 
question, an injustice has been done to it. And if doers of injustice 
ought to make reparation, we can see how reparation might be owed to 
a c;rroup. 
It should be noted that, when a group is treated unjustly, it 
is not necessarily the case that any persons in the group are treated 
unjustly. For it is quite conceivable that a group could have a right 
to something to which no person in the group has a right. If, for 
example, a phi.lanthropic foundation has contracted with some research 
instituti.on to provide funds for a special project, it would seem rea-
sonable to claim that the research institution has a right to those 
funds. This would not be itself entail, however, that any person in 
the research institution had a right to those funds. If subsequently 
the foundation should fail to provide the agreed upon funding and be 
unjustified i:n its failure to do so, the research institution (but 
not necessarily the persons in it) would be treated unjustly and might 
be conceivably owed reparation. 
vfuen certain kinds of additional relationships are introduced 
into the above example, it could come to be the case that both the c;rroup 
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and the persons in it would be owed reparation. Since persons often 
benefit from what benefits their groups, it is quite possible that, 
when the group is deprived of some benefit, so also will the persons 
in the group. Should those persons, in addition to the group itself, 
have a right to that of which they are deprived, they too may be owed 
reparation. The ower of reparation would then have a twofold obli-
gation, to the group as well as to persons in the group. 
Even when reparation is not owed to a group but only to persons, 
it can still be the case that groups are somehow involved in the satis-
faction of the obligation to make reparation. To return to our earlier 
example, the Black Manifesto urges the moral necessity of reparation 
to certain groups. It may be that no reparation is actually owed to 
at least some of these groups. In fact, the Manifesto demands payment 
to some groups that do not yet exist. If, however, we own reparation 
to the persons that those groups might serve, one way of discharging 
that obligation might be to support the groups in question. In that 
case, the group serves as an intermediary, aiding one party in dis-
charging its obligation and others by seeing to it that the reparation 
owed is distributed equitably and efficiently. 
Several things must be noted concerning this third kind of 
situation. First, it is not a matter of reparation owed to the group 
itself. The Manifesto is never clear about this, and this makes its 
demands for reparation a bit difficult to comprehend and assess. Se-
condly, in its role of distributor of benefits, a group takes on an 
obligation that it would not otherwise have, the obligation to insure 
a just distribution of benefits owed. 13 Finally, we should recognize 
that a group taking on such a task could thereby be radically changed. 
Bittker states it thus: 
But the choice of means and ends would be vested in a different, 
and smaller, group of hearts and minds. The managers and their 
organizations would be transformed overnight from voices crying in 
the wilderness into major social and political institutions. 14 
13Exactly how a group acquires such obligations is not discussed 
at length here, but several possibilities can be cited. First, a group 
could acquire such an obligation simply by consenting to serve as dis-
tributor of benefits. Or it could be that certain groups acquire obli-
gations to distribute reparation benefits simply because they, of all 
agents, are best situated to do so. I shall have more to say on this 
in the next section of the present chapter, where I discuss the business 
corporations as distributor of risk to consumers. 
14Bittker, Boris, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: 
Random House, 1973), p. 82-.---------
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It would be out of place here to explore the nature of these changes, 
but it is important to note that they could conceivably have ramifi-
cations of moral significance and that these ramifications would ulti-
mately have to be examined. 
Finally, it should be noted that the present discussion of 
groups and reparation deals with only those groups of persons that have 
the sort of internal unity established by constitutive rules that enable 
them to have goals, make decisions, and perform actions that are all 
attributable to the group itself. Sets of persons grouped together 
only on the basis of race or sex do not ordinarily act as single entities, 
either to discriminate or to be discriminated against. 15 This does not 
entail that blackness or femaleness cannot be a morally relevant char-
acteristic.l6 Nor does it entail that persons cannot be discriminated 
15vine Deloria has recently argued that the payment of claims 
to Indian tribes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission 
serves as a precedent for reparation to other minority groups: 
In 1946 the Indian Claims Commission was established to litigate 
outstanding claims that Indian tribes might have against the United 
States based on treaties and land cessions. This commission thus 
provides a prototype of structure by which the aspirations and 
claims of minority groups can be realized (We Talk, You Listen, pp. 
148-49, cited in Bittker, op. Cit., p. 74). 
Deloria may be making a mistake here if he is assuming similarities be-
tween a tribe and a race; for tribes are constituted according to cer-
tain rules and thus can conceivably be moral agents and, a fortiori, 
right-bearers. Not all minority groups are such. Bittke~, without 
explicit reference to the rule structure underlying the difference, makes 
this same point: 
To recognize the tribe as the proper recipient for Indian payments, 
however, is to accept the groups own loyalties and culture •..• This 
approach cannot be automatically transferred to black-white relations. 
The American descendants of ••• diverse African ethnic and tribal 
groups .•• do not maintain distinctive tribal organizations, official 
membership rolls ... By contrast, American Indians, even in their 
worst days, were able to preseve the structure .•. that characterized 
their separate tribal organizations (op. Cit,, p. 74). 
That there no longer exist such organizational structures among blacks 
may itself be a result of the acts of injustice perpetrated against blacks 
(e.g., removing them from their homelands, breaking up families, etc.). 
This certainly complicates the issue and is in need of further discussion. 
16James Nickel has recently argued that blackness itself can be-
come a morally relevant characteristic in the distribution of benefits. 
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against on the basis of race or sex. It means merely that blackness or 
whiteness and maleness or femaleness do not in thems.elves confer the ,· 
unity necessary for all whites, blacks, males, or females to be a sin-
gle moral agent. 17 It does entail that any claim like "The male sex 
(or the white race) owes reparation to the female sex (or to the black 
race)" be either translatable to some set of statements about persons 
and groups or remain unintelligible. 
To summarize, so far we have seen that it is at least intelli-
gible to claim that a group could owe reparation for some past offense, 
either because it performed some unjust act or because it benefited 
from such an act. We have seen also that persons having roles in groups 
might have some obligations to a group that owes reparation but that 
whether they in fact do must be decided not simply by their affiliation 
with the group but instead by their own relation to the unjust act or 
to the benefits derived from it. We saw also that it is intelligible 
to claim that a ·group is owed reparation but that this situation should 
not be confused with the situation where a group functions as distri-
butor of benefits to persons who are owed reparation. In order to 
analyze (and, ultimately, to assess) the moral claims that the Black 
Manifesto makes, we need to keep clear the nature of groups and their 
logical relations to the persons in them. 
16see his "Discrimination and Morally Relevant Characteristics," 
Analysis, XXXII (March, 1972}. His argument brought a number of re-
sponses. See especially the following: Paul Taylor, "Reverse Discrim-
ination and Compensatory Justice," Analysis, XXXIII (June, 1973); Roc;Jer 
Shiner, "Individuals, Groups and Inverse Discrimination," Analysis, 
XXXIII (June, 1973); and Alan Goldman, "Reparations to Individuals or 
Groups," Analysis, XXXV (April, 1975). These articles share a common 
concern with the problem of when (and whether) blackness itself can 
serve as a sufficient reason for priority in a just distribution of 
society's benefits. 
George Sher argues that "racial and sexual groups .•. are simply 
not enough like persons to fall under the principle of distributive 
justive." See his "Groups and Justice," Ethics, LXXXVII (January, 1977), 
174-181. Gertrude Ezorsky, in responding to Sher, distinguishes between 
groups as aggregates and groups as single entities. See her "On 'Groups 
and Justice,'" Ethics, LXXXVII (January, 1977), 182-185. 
17It is, of course, possible that systematic discrimination over 
a long period of time can transform an aggregate into a sufficiently 
unified and rule-constituted group that moral rights can be ascribed to 
it. I am indebted to David Ozar for this suggestion. 
156 
* * * 
The second discussion of this. appendix is concerned with the 
issue of strict liability in tort. As currently applied, the doctrine 
of strict liability requires the producer o~ marketer of a product to 
pay compensation for harm suffered (and, under some circumstances, for 
commercial loss} in the use of its products, provided only that the 
products are found to be defective. This issue is of interest to us 
here because it is becoming more and more commonplace that both pro-
ducers and marketers are groups rather than individual persons. In 
this section I shall first explain the nature of strict liability. 18 
Then I shall examine more closely some of the justifications that have 
been offered for the use of strict liability in the law. This will be 
followed by an analysis of one type of argument that might be offered 
against strict liability. My concern here is not to show that any of 
these justifications are either successful or unsuccessful but to show 
rather that such justifications must ultimately regard the groul?s as 
moral agent, and to see precisely how the notion of the group moral 
agent enters into them and clarifies their intent. 
The courts have long held that a producer who is negligent in 
the manufacture of a product ought to pay compensation for any damage 
suffered by a purchaser in the event the product proves defective. This 
seems to be a legal application of the moral principle that, when one 
acts negligently and thereby causes harm, he owes reparation to the 
agent harmed. Over the last century, however, the conditions under 
which a producer may be held liable have become less and less restricted. 19 
First, there was the acknowledgment by the-,New York Court of Appeals 
that, in order to claim damages in such cases, a consumer need not have 
had a direct contractual relation with the producer. 20 Then, with the 
18In what follows I shall draw mainly from the doctrine of lia-
bility as understood and applied in the United States. For a brief 
analysis of similar doctrines in European legal systems, consult Fried-
rich Kessler, "Products Liability," The Yale Law Journal, LXXVI, (_1966-
67), 886-938. 
19The brief remarks here on the history of liability are sum-
marized from Kessler's article as well as from Michael Coccia, John 
Dondanville, Thomas Nelson, Product Liability: Trends and Im~lications 
(American Management Association, 1970), and also Roland McKean, "Pro-
ducts Liability: Trends and Implications," The University of Chica9o 
Law Review (XXXVIII) (1970-71), 3-63. -
20Thomas v. Winchester 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See also MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
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doctrine of res ipsa loquiturf it became easier to prove that a pro-
ducer had been negligent in the production of defective items: the 
existence of specified kinds of defects was held to be sufficient evi-
dence of negligence in their production. 21 With a number of additional 
developments in the law, we have now reached a situation in which a 
producer can be held liable even if he has no contractual relation with 
the consumer and even if the "seller [producer] has exercised all pos-
sible care in the preparation and sale of his product."22 It is this 
final state of affairs that I wish to examine here. 
Strict liability, in assigning liability with no judgment of 
fault or negligence, might seem to be an injustice to the producer (who 
is often a group) who is required to pay compensation. One could argue 
plausible that the consumer himself ought to bear the costs of his own 
injury in such cases, because the transfer of costs to some other agent 
from the one harmed always requires justification. If only negligence, 
a contractual relation, or intentional harm would justify this transfer, 
when all of these conditions are absent the injured party ought to bear 
the burden as his own. Kessler has summarized well this position (with-
out advocating it) as follows: 
Accidents not negligently caused, according to classical theory, are 
an inevitable part of the risk of living and have to be borne by 
the victim. It is up to each individual to minimize the risk in-
herent in the use of good by careful shopping •.. and by taking out 
insurance against inevitable risks. 23 
2 lsee, for example, May v. Columbian Rope Company, 40 Ill. App. 
2d 264 (1963) and Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 
P.2d 436 (1944). 
In the former case a rope was judged to have been negligently 
produced simply because it broke on initial usage. In the latter, the 
presence of a cockroach in a bottle of Coke was sufficient evidence of 
negligence on the part of the bottler. 
22 Restatement (Second) of Torts 402a. Note here the difference 
between a simple defect and a defect that is the result of negligence. 
With many types of products it seems reasonable to allow that, even with 
conscientious and skillful design, manufacture, and inspection, a certain 
small number of defective units will slip through the production network. 
The cost of preventing such defects might raise the price of the product 
to the point where it could no longer be afforded by consumers desiring 
the product. Thus, it seems important to admit that defective products 
could still be produced even without fault on the part of the producer. 
23 Kessler, Friedrich, op. cit., p. 924. 
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But there are also reasons for not regarding the injured con-
sumer as the only appropriate bearer of such costs. For examplef Roland 
McKean has pointed out that leaving such costs to the consumer would 
provide an incentive to the producer to take only minimal care in ~re­
venting defects.24 One might also argue, that, if the consumer had no 
recourse in cases of the sort under discussion, he would be saddled 
with an unbearable burden and that the use of strict liability in the 
law enables society to spread the burden over all consumers of a given 
product. Increased costs to the producer are reflected as price in~ 
creases to consumers. 25 Both of these justifications have in commori 
that they are based on the utility of holding the producer liable; the 
producer is so located within the market system, it is being argued, 
that he can, by redistributing cost to consumers, achieve the maxim-
ization of well being for the greatest number. Moreover~ the possibility 
of legal recourse gives him a strong incentive to do so.~6 
There are other possible reasons why the producer should have 
the obligation to provide compensation or at least to distribute the 
costs of compensation among all users of a given product. In Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motor Co. the New Jersey Supreme Court enunciated the 
following principle: 
The burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is 
borne by those who are in a position to either control the danger 
or make an equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur. 27 
Actually, there are two distinct principles contained in the court's 
claim, and I shall examine each of them. The first of the twa prin-
ciples is that those who are in a position to control some danger should 
be held liable when it is not controlled. The corporation that produces 
has several means at its disposal for controlling such dangers: it can 
24McKean, Roland, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
25This raises another possible moral objection to the doctrine 
of strict liability: because each consumer is compelled to pay extra 
for protection he might not want, it seems that such restriction of his 
liberty demands some justification. Strict liability thus appears to 
be a sort of paternalistic approach. I shall not examine that problem 
further here. 
26To this must be added also the possibility that justice might 
require a corporation, in some kinds of case, to bear the cost itself 
rather than to pass it on to consumers. In what follows here, I work 
only with those cases in which distribution of costs is a just way of 
proceeding. Criteria for deciding when this is a just way of pro-
ceeding are not discussed here, though those would have to be arrived 
at for a complete analysis of the problem. 
27 N.J. 358 (1960) • 
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withhold the dangerous product from the marketplace; it can improve 
the product and the relevant quality control procedures; it can provide 
sufficient information to the consumer to enable him to protect himself 
from possible defects, etc. 
We can see in this first principle a basis for several other 
moral obligations that a group which produces for the marketplace might 
have. To see this we must first return to a claim made by H.L.A. Hart 
that I discussed earlier. Hart claims that an agent can acquire some 
new right that he would not otherwise have due to some action that he 
has taken in relation to another party or to some special relationship 
that he has come to be in. 28 As examples of rights arising from acts, 
he cites those rights arising from promises and acts of consent. In 
addition he proposes that there are rights arising out of special 
relationships. He offers the following schema: 
When a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to 
rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to 
these restrictions when required have a right to a similar sub-
mission from those who have benefited by their submission. 29 
Thus, Hart is claiming that any co-operative system based on rules is 
binding on those who have benefited from its existence, even when they 
have not given any actual consent to the system, and that those who 
have submitted have the right to expect the submission of theirs. 30 
28 
H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" 
29Ibid., p. 185. 
30Hart may be stating his point somewhat too strongly here, for 
it is at least not obvious that whenever several agents develop among 
themselves some mutually beneficial practice with rules ascribing 
rights and obligations, that any other agent who happens to benefit 
from this practice is thereby obligated to observe those same rules. 
What is missing might be some reference to an underlying unity 
among all agents benefiting from the practice. Perhaps, Hart alludes 
to this when he later discusses this issue as among "members of society" 
( p. 186), but he is never clear on this. 
Rawls, in arguing for Hart's point, claims that an obligation 
that arises in this manner 
•.• is not ... an obligation which presupposes a deliberate perfor-
mative act of acceptance •.• It is sufficient that one has know-
ingly participated in a practice acknowledged to be fair and ac-
cepted the resulting benefits ("Justice as Fairness," p. 17). 
Participating in a practice may itself provide the underlying unity 
mentioned above. 
In what follows I shall presume that Hart's point, even if not 
correct as it stands could be repaired so that it would be correct and 
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He calls all such rights "special rights." 
Although Hart focuses his attention on rights including those 
"special rights," there are also obligations that arise out of acts and 
relations, including some that we might call "special obligations" 
because they arise, like Hart's "special rights," out of special rela-
tionships. Certainly in the case of a promise there is not only a right 
to have the promise kept but also an obligation to keep the promise. 
There are also moral obligations arising out of joint enterprises, such 
as those discussed by Hart in the passage quoted above. We can thus 
see how within a society, all persons who have an overabundance of goods 
may have an obligation to feed the hungry, insofar as they themselves 
benefit by the same basic structure of institutions in the society, 
and this even though they have not actually contracted with the poor 
for some sort of a reciprocal assistance program. A similar thing might 
be claimed in support of our obligation to save drowning persons when 
we have life preservers available, and so forth. 31 
Now, if we suppose that there are some obligations that arise 
because of mutual benefit from rule-governed co-operative activities, 
we can see a possible justification for the claim of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court that "the burden of losses ... is borne by those who are 
in a position to control the danger." For if everyone in fact benefits 
from the existence of the practice of allocating liability according 
to this principle, then those who follow the principle have the right 
to expect the same from other agents. We can see then how this prin-
ciple might create some more specific kinds of obligations for groups 
whose activities consist in producing and/or marketing. The group would 
be obligated to gather for itself the information necessary to make a 
safe product. 32 Where the producer is a group, this is a complex moral 
obligation. It involves an obligation not only to have technical 
expertise available, but also to create and maintain the kind of chan-
nels necessary to provide that information to the decision-making 
process of the group. This may involve obligations on the part of the 
group itself as well as on the parts of those persons in the group who 
have the power or authority to control the flow of information. A 
group that did not provide for the flow of safety information in its 
decision processes would likely find itself at some point culpably 
ignorant. The situation here is more complex because of the nature of 
applicable to the kinds of issues I address here. 
31 For a sample application of this principle to a specific 
moral issue, see David Ozar's "Justice and a Universal Right to Basic 
Health Care," as yet unpublished. 
32The group might also be obligated to provide safety infor-
mation to consumers, but that issue will not be discussed here. 
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group decision making as distinguished from decision of persons in 
groups. 
It should be noted, though, that the first of the two principles 
enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court does not directly relate to 
the issue of strict liability, for it asserts only that a producer ought 
to do what he can to prevent defective products from harming people. 
Thus, it establishes a principle by which subsequent claims of neg-
ligence might be made. Strict liability obtains, though, when a pro-
ducer is held liable even though he is not negligent. The second prin-
ciple of the court is thus the part that relates directly to strict 
liability. It states that, where losses do occur, the burden of com-
pensation should be on those who are best able to distribute them 
equitably. 
I suggested above that the producer (rather than the consumer) 
might be best able to distribute losses equitably. That it ought to 
take on the task of distributing losses equitably is another matter, 
though, and would require further justification. One might argue, in 
accordance with Hart's view, that the system of rules that renders 
producers liable even without negligence, is a system from which pro-
ducers themselves benefit. Producers can, of course, benefit from 
economic survival, profits, and so forth. Moreover, most producers are 
themselves consumers and thereby benefit from the same system of allo-
cating losses. Thus, other members of society have a right to expect 
producers to follow the system of rules from which they benefit. 
Alternatively, sometimes the arrangement is a contractual one 
whereby, in exchange for certain privileges such as the right to profit, 
the right to certain tax advantages, and so forth, the producing group 
has consented to render the service of distribution of costs, satis-
faction of consumer needs and desires, etc. This argument would have 
to show that the producing group voluntarily entered into the arrange-
ment. This would involve showing not only that the group chose to enter 
into the arrangement but also that it could have chosen not to. It is 
only by showing both of these that one could show that a group had 
consented to the strict liability arrangement. 
Or finally, one might accept as a general moral principle that 
those who are in a position making them either uniquely or maximally 
capable of providing (without significant loss to themselves) some 
benefit necessary to others have an obligation to provide that benefit. 
Such a principle might justify the claim that the rich have obligations 
to the starving, that strong swimmers have obligations to save the 
drowning (when they can safely do so), and so forth. But to apply this 
principle to the strict liability issue would require that we show that 
the producer is uniquely or maximally capable of distributing losses. 
This would be simple if persons could not purchase their own accident 
insurance; but, given the availability of such insurance (and the 
ubiquity of insurance salesmen) , the conclusion would be more difficult 
to establish. One would have to show also the necessity of risk and 
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loss distribution and, in doing so, clarify the criteria for judging 
whether something is a necessary benefit. Finally, one would have to 
show that the group itself would not suffer significant loss by serving 
as loss distributor. The moral principle is an interesting one; it 
might be used to show that universities, hospitals, and any number of 
other groups have some moral obligations simply because they are able 
to provide the necessities of life. To apply it to the kind of case 
we are discussing here would require careful consideration of the above 
mentioned issues. 
I have offered here several kinds of arguments that might be 
offered to show that producers, whether persons or groups, have obli-
gations to distribute risk and costs incurred through the use of their 
defective products. One could argue for this as matter of utility, on 
the basis of some contractual arrangement, from Hart's principle, or 
from some moral principle stating the obligations of those uniquely 
or maximally capable of providing necessary benefits. I have not estab-
lished the correctness of any of these principles, although each appears 
to have either historical support or intuitive appeal, or both. The 
merit of the discussion is that it shows that, where groups that pro-
duce and market are moral agents, an argument might proceed to estab-
lish that they have a moral obligation to do the things demanded of 
them under the doctrine of strict liability. 
It is important that we also examine arguments against the 
claim that producers have obligations such as those imposed under a 
legal system that includes strict liability. Most notable among such 
arguments are those of a libertarian nature. Such arguments usually 
begin with the premise that each person has a right not to be inter-
fered with except by his own consent or to prevent him from harming 
others. Thus, it would seem that a person ought not to be forced to 
provide compensation or to distribute risk and loss as long as his 
actions as marketer and producer do not directly harm anyone. 33 Im-
posing the obligation of loss and risk distribution on the producer 
would be, according to this argument, an unjustified infringement on 
his personal freedom. 
This argument may be a good one; but, if it is, its relevance 
to the present discussion is questionable. We are concerned here not 
so much with the liability of persons but with the liability· of groups. 
It does little good to introduce an argument about the unjustifiability 
of interference with the lives of persons. The argument might be 
33rf one were to argue that the non-negligent producer of a 
defective product is indeed harming consumers, it could be countered 
that the injured consumer is injured because of his own choice to use 
and bear the risk of using a produce that might be defective. 
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salvaged in one of two ways. First, the libertarian might establi~h 
that groups, as well as persons, are entitled to maximum liberty. 3 How 
this would be established is a problem, as the value of liberty is usu-
ally taken as somehow related to the intrinsic worth of individual human 
persons. An appeal to the intrinsic worth of groups would likely not 
have the same sort of intuitive obviousness. 
A second approach might be used to save the argument. One 
might introduce a new premise to the effect that the liberty of groups 
is a necessary condition for the liberty of persons, and that any re-
striction of the liberty of groups is necessarily a limitation on the 
liberty of persons. This seems to be a more fruitful line of argument 
for the libertarian, but a careful statement of it would still have to 
respect the peculiar relations of persons in groups to the groups 
themselves. 
Perhaps these arguments against the obligations of groups under 
strict liability could be repaired. If so, they could be repaired only 
with the acknowledgment that the group is an agent distinct from the 
persons in itj and with an adequate analysis of the liberty of persons 
in the group. 5 On the other hand, the arguments in favor of obliging 
groups to distribute costs under strict liability must also acknowledge 
that the group itself is a moral agent, for there is no other way to 
show that it (rather than the persons in it) can have moral obligations 
of any sort at all. Thus, the recognition of the group as moral agent 
is essential if we are to sort out the moral problems of strict lia-
bility in a society where production and marketing are not at the hands 
or individual craftsmen and merchants but by the agency of groups of 
persons acting under rules. 
* * * 
What has been established in this discussion of moral issues? 
34 h . . 1 . f th d f For an 1stor1ca v1ew o e ten ency to con use the cor-
poration as agent with the person as agent see T.W. Arnold, The Folk-
lore of Capitalism (New York: Yale University Press, 1939), especially 
Chapter Seven, "The Personification of Corporation." 
35Patricia Werhane has argued recently that 
... there is an inconsistency in Friedman's concept of a corporation 
as a free autonomous institution to whom the notion of moral agency 
does not apple. 
Werhane's claim here is that, if we claim that groups are entitled to 
liberty (i.e. that they have rights), then we must admit that they are 
moral agents. See her "Formal Organizations, Economic Freedom, and 
Moral Agency," forthcoming in the Journal of Value Inquiry. 
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First, there are several things that I did not try to accomplish. I 
have not tried to solve the normative issues. I have not established 
that reparation is in fact owed by anyone to anyone else. But we have 
seen how such claims as those involved in the reparation question must 
be understood when groups are involved. We have seen that groups can 
intelligibly be claimed to be perpetrators of acts needing reparation 
and that they can also benefit from the perpetration of such acts by 
others. We was also that groups can be unjustly deprived of what they 
have a right to and can consequently be owed reparation. In each case 
we saw that this sort of situation differs from the owing of reparation 
by or to persons who happen to comprise or have roles in a group. We 
saw also that, even when reparation is owed only to persons, a group 
can still be, and can sometimes have an obligation to be, a distributor 
of benefits to those to whom reparation is owed. 
In the matter of strict liability, we saw how one might go about 
arguing that a group (or any other moral agent) has an obligation to 
serve as distributor of costs incurred by consumers in using defective 
products made or marketed by the group. We saw also the rudiments of 
a libertarian argument against holding producers liable. The libertarian 
argument considered was shown to be defective. To remedy the defect, 
one would have either to show the relation of the liberty of groups to 
something else assumed to be morally good (perhaps, to maximum liberty 
for persons) or to show that groups are entitled to freedom. Of course, 
one would still need to determine what freedoms a group ought to have; 
but this is a general issue that is problematic in the case of persons 
as well. 
In summary, it seems that resolution of several important moral 
issues requires an understanding of the nature of groups and of their 
logical relations to persons in groups as well as of the rights and 
obligations of groups. This study has been intended to provide the 
beginnings of such an understanding. It has enabled us to see more 
clearly precisely what the normative issues are as well as to see other 
directions in which the study of group moral agency would have to be 
pursued. 
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